CRAFTING BORDERS:
From Tordesillas and Q'osqo to Andean Nation-States
1500-1900



Crafting Borders:
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Images with Author's notes.

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Preface

The present longterm account of the crafting of borders in the Andes is the result of decades of research and many twists and turns of the questions asked. Initially, it was part of my thoughts on the indigenous headtax and the monetization of the Andean economies through fiscal interventions. Officially, the Indian headtax subsisted past the establishment of the national borders between Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. Gradually, as research moved on, the idea of borders and the connections between borders, Indian headtax and territorialities took on a life of its own, especially because the Indian headtax, as the main source of fiscal income before and after the wars of independence and the territorial control of where indigenous peoples were concentrated – since before the arrival of Spaniards – became after the separation from Spain one of the main reasons why most (except Guadalajara and Cusco) of the former capital cities of the Audiencias and its regional elites established their own governments. This meant the geographical, demographic, economic, and political dismantlement of what used to be the Peruvian Viceroyalty.

The crafting of borders, however, could not be explained only by looking into what happened decades before and after independence and with the Indian headtax. A longterm historical analysis was needed in order to grasp the many additional processes that determined the establishment of borders: patterns of market relationships, institutional-administrative-political decisions, the existence of resources, silver in particular, and how the different social groups participated or not, in part because of the pressures exerted through fiscal means. It was the joined reading of these processes that led to the conceptualizing of the present text.

As can be readily noted, this interpretative turn has much to do with an advancing and ever richer historiography on the Andean region and beyond, a historiography which over the past thirty years has been part of a conversation with many colleagues around the globe, in writing, reading, and talking. My list of many thanks would fill the next few pages, including colleagues, students from several countries and with different backgrounds – both culturally and discipline-wise -, as much as the many archivists who not only provided sound advise, but also hands-on efforts to organize archives, all the way from the Archive of the Indies in Seville/Spain, to the Perthes Collection in Erfurt/Germany, to the Foreign Affairs offices, and the Departmental and Provincial archives, often with less than scant resources.

Over many years, for this and other research endeavors, I have counted on decisive financial support. Special thanks in this regard, go to the British Council and the Deutsche Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD), who allowed me to make the first inroads into my Andean-Indigeneity book in the form of a dissertation at the University of Bonn. Later on, it was the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) that made it possible to return to Peru to continue my research; then, it was the Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO) and the Ford Foundation that made research possible in very precarious economic conditions in Peru, and it was the Tinker Foundation and the Banco Central de Reserva del Peru that led my way into the monetization project in the context of the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos (in a project led by historian Heraclio Bonilla) and the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (Department of Economics). I "landed" at UC, San Diego in July 1990, from where on it has been our Academic Senate who has greatly helped me to finish this and other projects (some to be still written on).

A very special thanks goes to the reviewers of the manuscript and my unfailingly supportive editor, friend, and guide, Yolanda Carlessi. Gracias, YO!

Very literally, the present book, was born and bred across the oceans, academically, financially, personally. It is tough to let go such deep and rewarding experiences, the many memories -- including my parents, my (consecutive!) husbands, and my children -- that are very visible herein. But, the story continues in Amazonia, where we historians and anthropologists have been witnessing the collapse of history as one indigenous group after another in various moments in time died, disappeared, and became missionized and colonized, in tandem with the gradual collapse of nature. What started in Tordesillas and Q'osqo feeds into the "Tree of Rivers." (John Hemming).

Introduction

Dividing the Land and the People

Organizing territorial domains and the people living in them is as ancient as humankind itself. It is an expression of often complex power relations tied into natural givens, sometimes affecting natural contexts, sometimes determining or being determined by natural environs. The socioeconomic and political organization of space throughout time, from the Treaty of Tordesillas to the national divides in the Andes (broadly from 1500 to 1900) is the story of a continued spatial fragmentation, in stern contrast to the former existence of an Aztec, Maya, and Inca Empire that spanned integration rather than fragmentation in America, about the same time Columbus was setting foot on Hispaniola, and Pope Alexander VI (1431-1503) was dividing the world between the empires of Spain and Portugal. At the other end of the time span imperialism and globalization, albeit with a spatial organizational logic that still responds to and counts on the continued existence of nation-states, once emerging from administrative boundaries and colonial and regional interests.

The intercontinental encounter between Europe and America, together with the demographic expansion and the patterns of accumulation and expenditure in Europe accelerated the need (and the greed) at reshuffling and controlling territorial domains. This remaking of borders and frontiers was the essence of imperial colonization, which entailed a continued dialogue, often embedded in violence, both within the seat of empire and in conversation with different patterns of organizing nature, land, and people. An evolving demarcation of "borderlands" was and is a lived, encountered, and negotiated material reality.[1]

A papal bull by Nicholas V (1397-1455) in 1454 granted Portugal the exclusive trading right with India. A year before, Constantinople fell to the Ottoman Empire. Pope Alexander VI, through an agreement signed on June 7, 1494 in Tordesillas and later ratified and sanctioned by a bull issued by Pope Julius II (1443?-1513) in 1506, divided the Earth in half. The "divide" was an imagined line across the Atlantic Ocean, from the North to the South Pole, "370 Leagues [Leguas] West of the Cape Verde islands, be it done through the determination of meridians [*Längengrade*] or through any other means." (Peschel, 1865:531) Since the islands were separated by more than 2.5 degrees of longitude, the unresolved power struggles revolved around from where the 370 leagues should be measured, either beginning at the east or west side of

the islands. The consequence, when Oskar Peschel published his conference in 1871, was that Spain continued to uphold its dominion over the Philippines and a kingdom like Brazil (only one-sixth smaller than all of Europe) was under Portugal's rule. Such dividing lines were drawn on what Pierre Chaunu (1969:28-34) has called the *frontera de nadie* (no-man's land), with imprecise lines drawn on a piece of paper, and based on topographic ignorance to an extent that puts today's Brazil at more than 3,000 kilometers west of the juridical line established by the 1494 treaty.

Six years after the Tordesillas decision, Pedro Alvares Cabral (1467-1520) undertook Portugal's second expedition westwards and hit land in Brazil, a still unknown mass of land, first called Santa Cruz, later to become Brazil, derived from the brazilwood. A bit later, Fernao de Magalhaes, (1480?-1521) a Portuguese *hidalgo*, who after serving as an officer in India and Africa turned his back on the Portuguese crown and undertook new explorations on behalf of Spain, offered king Charles V to seek a passage to India sailing west, so as not to touch upon Portuguese domains. Magalhaes reached Patagonia, crossing from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, showing unprecedented nautical skills.[2]

Magalhaes had left Spain with five ships in 1519. Only one (the *Victoria*) finished the first Western European circumnavigation of the Earth in 1522; of the 300 sailors who began the expedition, only 13 returned home. On the fire-spitting islands of the Moluccas, Magalhaes traded 533 quintals of 58¾ kilograms (= 1 Zentner) each of *caryophyllus aromatica* (*Gewürznelken*, cloves) with a total earning of 100,000 ducats (Dukaten), five times the cost of the expedition, not counting the lives lost.[3] Expected revenues renewed Spain's determination, in particular, to exactly determine the 180th longitudinal degree. Both crowns agreed to set up a team of three astronomers, three seamen, and three lawyers each to participate in a congress, the Junta de Badajoz, also called the *Pilotenkongress* (Congress of the Pilots). The task, though, was beyond the scientific expertise of the age. The first exact measurement of the earth, on which Isaac Newton (1643-1727) based his laws of motion and universal gravitation, only came in 1669 with the maps elaborated by the Cassinis, especially by Jean (or Giovanni) Dominique Cassini (Cassini IV, 1625-1712), who produced the first topographic map of France and was succeeded by one of his students, Guillaume Delisle (1675-1726), who used geodetic triangulation.[4] Until then, what prevailed were the notions developed by Eratosthenes of Cyrene and Claudius Ptolemaeus which in Arabic and Latin translations arrived north of the Alps at the beginning of the fifteenth century.

An episode of the Magalhaes expedition illustrates the geographical and astronomical puzzles and some of the prevailing mindsets:

> "When Magalhaes and his companions returned home, they were missing a whole day because they had traveled with the sun toward the West. They

> were quite baffled by this experience. They had not only celebrated sabbaths and important religious holidays on the wrong days, but also had not eaten on Thursdays and eaten meat on Fridays. To soothe their conscience they followed the advice of virtuous friends and walked barefooted, wearing a shirt of penance [*Buesserhemd*], all the way to Sevilla's dome. In these days in Spain even very knowledgeable people had no other explanation of this unavoidable fact than blaming it on sloppy record keeping. Only the Venetian envoie [Gasparo] Contarini [1483-1542], who at that time was residing at Charles V's court [1520-1525] could help solve the riddle." (Peschel, 1865:534).[5]

Initial speculation and riddle solving was followed, in a relatively short time, by exploring the newly encountered sites, a cumulative knowledge that laid the ground for further voyaging, establishing new relationships with peoples, resources, and land. Chroniclers, who sometimes were also missionaries, extensively documented life and history, while learning from and reading each other.

Based on the reading of two early chroniclers, Juan López de Velasco ("Geografía y descripción Universal de las Indias," 1574) and Antonio Vázquez de Espinosa ("Compendio y descripción de las Indias Occidentales," 1628 a Carmelite priest), Bernard H. Slicher Van Bath (2010) provides us with an analysis and a classification of 85 economic variables and their concurrence and territorial distribution in the 36 "natural areas" the geography (*geografía indiana*) saw itself divided into. Such "natural areas" in most cases predated the advent of Portuguese and Spanish administrators, soldiers, artisans, and merchants. Within these 36 areas, Van Bath detected four large territorial complexes in turn composed of three subzone types: nuclear, intermediate, peripheral, or marginal, a scheme that "presents a quite real panorama of the degree of regionalization and internal articulation existing around 1600." (Serrera, 2000:231).

The four continental territorial complexes Slicher van Bath illustrates:

- Mexico, with Tlaxcala (Puebla), Michoacán, and Oaxaca as its intermediate zones, and Yucatán (Tabasco) and Nueva Galicia as its peripheral zones,
- a nucleus in Guatemala, with Nicaragua and El Salvador as its intermediate zones, and Honduras, Panamá, and Costa as the periphery,
- Quito as a center, with its intermediate zones in Nueva Granada and Popayán, and Cartagena and Santa Marta at the periphery, and
- the fourth complex had two nuclei, Los Charcas (Santa Cruz) and Lima, with intermediate zones in Cusco, Puno, and Arequipa on the one hand and Trujillo on the other. In this fourth complex, Tucumán, Huamanga and Huánuco were peripheries.



Expansion of Inca empire, Territory and Roads, from ca. 1230 to 1525. Map drawn by Leonidas Marín, based on maps in the public domain https://tatianaabcde.weebly.com/map-of-the-inca-empire.html also available at https://periklisdeligiannis.wordpress.com/2012/06/21/%CE%B1%CE%BD-introduction-to-the-history-of-the-incas/

And, he concluded:

> "Within each complex we see a hierarchy. There was a nucleus characterized by a high demographic concentration and the presence of economic activities requiring abundant labor. Surrounding such nuclei were peripheral areas that developed economic activities requiring scarce labor and others associated with nature. In the nuclei we see a concentration of agriculture and manufacture, as well as horticulture and fruit trees, whereas in the periphery we find cattle ranching, the mines and activities associated with nature." (Slicher van Bath, 2010:107, 111).

As early as 1600, the Hispanic colonial territory was polycentric and hierarchical within each complex. At the same time, the nuclei showed the highest

demographic concentrations in pre-Columbian times and, in 1600, the highest numbers of tribute-paying indigenous peoples. Urban nuclei in 1600 had been the seats of the Mayan, Aztec, and the Mochica and Inca Empires. There also was an early overlay between political-administrative and institutional-religious demarcations. In complex four, we find the number of tribute-paying Indians per bishopric: Lima (21,217), Trujillo (49,582), Huánuco (Tarma) (49,973), Huamanga (46,875), Cusco (Puno) (110,220), Arequipa (21,725).[6] Some tribute-paying Indians were assigned to *encomiendas* under the aegis of an *encomendero* and his family, on a given territory. In thirteen regions across Latin America, in 1574, there were a total of 2,648 *tributarios* in encomiendas, most highly concentrated in peripheral areas, in descending order: Nuevo Reino de Granada (439-444), Paraguay (380-400), Guatemala (370-30), Chile (356-359), Quito (313-315), Venezuela/Cumaná (163-173), Ecuador (327), Mexico (186), Yucatán/Tabasco (160), Los Charcas (104), Cusco/Puno (83-88), Oaxaca (82), Trujillo (48), Lima (30). In Paraguay all vecinos were encomenderos, and all were very poor. The same year there existed a total of 170 cities (*ciudades*) and 152 towns (*villas*), mainly founded between 1520 and 1570, mostly on top (in a very literal sense) of pre-existing structures. From these 322 Spanish cities and towns, 64 were mainly mining sites (Slicher van Bath, 2010:37ff).

The founding of each small or big encomienda, city, and town, represented a subdivision within the encompassing colonial territory with a redistribution of people (as taxpayers and labor force). As the colonial territory became better known and mapped, the early large encomiendas handed out to the conquistadors tended to shrink, multiply, and eventually revert to the Crown, in tandem with the establishment of additional administrative entities in the form of *cabildos* (municipalities) and *audiencias* within the two first established Viceroyalties (New Spain/Mexico, Peru), covering the entire territory from North to South America. As will be seen, these administrative, as well as commercial and internal market shifts molded the spaces that were to configure the new national spaces, moving space and timewise ever closer to what were nuclei in the early sixteenth century, but ever more removed from what -- in the Andean case -- was the geography and the exercise of power during Inca and pre-Inca times.

When Slicher van Bath mappings are overlaid with an Inca road map, for the case of the Andean region, it becomes clearly evident that the colonization project in the Andean region was based on the pre-existing pre-Inca and Inca expansion, including the silver mines in Potosí and the gold mines around Lake Titicaca, in what used to be the Antisuyu.

Toward the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, territorial demarcations, national boundaries, and regional identities were tensely encapsulated in liberal ideals, lived reality, and the vagaries of still imprecise scientific ways of delineating borders and frontiers. Geography and geology as



Approximate areas of Indigenous Cultures that were partially incorporated into the Inca Empire before the Spanish Conquest. Map drawn by Leonidas Marín, based on maps in the public domain http://adockrill.blogspot.com/2012/05/latin-america-indigenous-culture-maps.html also available at https://slideplayer.com/slide/8633505/

disciplines, as much as ethnography and anthropology, were still in the making. Only gradually were "white spots" on maps covered with colors following the trajectories of Western (sometimes scientific) eyes.

Roughly 60 years of war on American-known soil at the turn of the nineteenth century were part of an Atlantic cycle of revolutions beginning with the independence of the thirteen colonies in North America, followed by the Tupac Amaru II Indian insurrection in the Southern Andes and the French and Haitian revolutions and, then the wars of independence throughout Latin America, roughly from the 1780s to 1825, with the exceptions of Brazil, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. The revolutionary cycle was the stage for the gradual dissolution of imperial ties, the reformulation of market relations and the role of the state,



Viceroyalty of Peru, ca. 1650. Early Establishment of the Audiencias, 1538-1565. Map drawn by Leonidas Marín, based on C. L. and J. V. Lombardi, Latin American History, A Teaching Atlas (Madison, WI, 1983)

paralleled by the spreading of demands for equality and citizenship. Years of revolutions and wars themselves became processes and experiences crystallizing, defining, but also questioning, the definition, meanings, and implications of republican liberal ideas. In its wake, the territorial and maritime divisions once determined by papal bulls split into smaller geographical, political, social, and economic units, into subregions with a varied set of outlooks as to how the new borders, its diverse landscapes and multiethnic peoples, should or could be administered and brought together, an unfinished process to this day. Border societies force power to reinvent itself, to revise concepts and languages, "in a laboratory that is constantly evolving." (Favaro, Merluzzi, and Sabatini, 2016:24).

When the wars of independence ended with the final battles taking place in the Audiencia of Charcas (Bolivia) in 1825, those in charge of forging new nation-states were those who after independence fought against each other, without reaching a consensus for decades to come, on who the new citizens should be and what they were to do and to think, while erecting barriers and borders excluding over the very long haul the vast majority of potential citizens (Indians, blacks and *castas*; and later, Chinese, Japanese, and European immigrants, and women from all walks of life) from the benefits (not the duties) of citizenship. The question arises as to how "colonial" mindsets in tandem with economic and political interests provide an understanding of the restructuring of space or, put differently, how arbitrary or not did the newly established borders become from several angles: geographically, demographically, administratively, politically, militarily, market- and vision-wise. Based on the thoughts, opinions, and economic and political interests of the contemporary decision makers, what was the logic behind the hardening physical demarcations between Quito (Ecuador), Bogota (Colombia), Lima (Peru), La Paz (Bolivia), and Valparaiso/ Santiago (Chile), the Andean strongholds of what was once defined as the Inca Empire and the Peruvian Viceroyalty? How did a unified space become a war-driven geography? Or, put differently, paraphrasing Lauren Benton (2002:260, 243), how did a fight over territory and location become a fight over the control of the state and the structure of the legal order, whereby "border hopping as a form of forum shopping was still a familiar strategy to *caudillos* and their dependents"? In the Andes, as will be seen, this was the case in many instances throughout the nineteenth century.

In letters written to and from Spanish American Liberators José de San Martín (1778-1850) and Bernardo O'Higgings (1778-1842), Simón Bolívar (1783-1830) harbored no doubts as to the desires and interests of regional economic and political elites and, with it, the strengths and weaknesses of regionalisms. The main purpose of independence was the creation of new nations, with new political boundaries leading to prosperity. Although pragmatic in outlook, Bolívar still hoped for a level of political association among the new nations, an assembly of plenipotentiaries (Collier, 1983:37-64). However, among regions and particularly within regions, there were economic, political, and sociocultural discrepancies, in large part determined by the demographic composition among and within regions, the functioning of markets, and the obtention of fiscal revenues. Maybe it was for these same reasons that Bolívar had "more faith in London than in God or his Spanish-American compatriots." To obtain aid from Great Britain, he was willing to deliver Spanish-American territory.

One of the main differences in the process of nation-building between the two American hemispheres is that Canada and the United States (and later on even Alaska and Hawaii) were able to hold on to their territorial and federal

integrity despite the forces of dissension and civil strife. The Civil War in the United States and the continuing tensions between French, British, indigenous and enslaved peoples, although shaking the foundations of unity, did not break apart a politically and economically unified whole. In Latin America, in contrast, attempts at unity in the nineteenth century did not congeal, beginning with Simón Bolívar's Gran Colombia, proposed in the 1828 Congress in Panama (at a time when Panama was still part of Colombia), to the failed attempts during the years of the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation, to the wars over remotely located border regions between nation-states in the making. Border conflicts, indeed, escalated to a point that wars threatened the existence of smaller countries, prominently Paraguay, Uruguay, Ecuador and Bolivia, and since the sixteenth century, the Peruvian Viceroyalty was pushed westwards by Portugal's advances into the Amazon basin. Often, it was the powerful neighbors of smaller countries that upheld their existence, for fear that their absorption into larger units would create an even more powerful neighbor, not without taking over large stretches of land, as happened in the War of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870) and the Chaco War (1932-1935) that confronted Bolivia and Paraguay over the Chaco Boreal. From a more general perspective, the formation of new countries and new frontiers itself, for the sake of a balance of power on the subcontinent, was not only a way of harnessing political and economic aspirations of regional elites, but also a way of separating those same interests in other regions from one's own. "Internal" wars lay at the heart of spatial fragmentation; in fact, internal wars gradually became international border wars by which demarcations among regional spaces and regional control were reset. The most dramatic case was Paraguay, losing, in the wake of the War of the Triple Alliance, almost two-thirds of its 1860-held territory. To this day, when we look at a map of Ecuador and Peru approved by Ecuadorian authorities, the map will include portions of Peru's (and Brazil's) north-eastern Amazonian territory., with Quito still being defined as the core entry city to Amazonia, as part of what used to be indigenous Omagua territory, first mapped by the Czech Jesuit missionary Samuel Fritz (1654-?1730). In the Peru-Bolivia-Chile case, Bolivia is still pursuing a territorial claim to recover its access to the Pacific Ocean in the international La Haya Court, lost at the end of the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), while also continuing its pursuit of an access to the Atlantic, via the Paraná River and the Rio de La Plata. Landlocked for 135 years (as of 2018), Bolivia's recent economic history has lived through many tribulations, civil strife, and ongoing political unrest as a consequence.

Civil wars, once boundaries had at least administratively somehow settled, continued to be threatened from within, with a potential of further subdividing the Latin American subcontinent. This was most prominently the case during the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation (1836-1839), when today's Bolivia and Peru were on the verge of becoming three distinct entities.[7]

One question arising from the broad historical differences between the Northern and the Southern hemispheres is why and how spatial separation occurred, especially in the Andean region. Construing territorial and administrative boundaries has been recognized to be a central element in explaining larger processes (mainly in the European context): the emergence of a bourgeoisie taking control of the state, the consolidation of capitalism and the nation-state. At the end of the wars of independence, in Latin America (maybe with the exceptions of Paraguay and Chile, two countries who had only marginally been involved in the war itself) there was little left that could be identified as a state or a nation, compared to Europe. As will be seen over the following pages, there were some incipient attempts, especially in Quito, La Paz, and Lima, but such attempts were riddled with problems, including the establishment of borders in the first place, as this interrupted long-established flows of goods, contributed to the deterioration of ancient roads and pathways, and reoriented how and where fiscal revenues were obtained, framed by the economic devastation following the wars of independence and civil and international wars throughout the nineteenth century. For Bolivia, the creation of new republics reduced traditional markets, especially in northeast Argentina, left Bolivia in a serious credit crisis when ties to Lima were severed, and increased Bolivia's transport costs when its exported minerals had to pay port duties to Chile, Peru, and Argentina (Klein, 2003:102). For decades, Ecuador found itself torn apart between the *colombianistas*, the *peruanistas* and the *independentistas*, who as late as 1830 won the economic and political day (Deler, 1986:47). Already in the wake of the Bourbon Reforms, Peru lost its access to the silver revenues of the Potosi mines, first siphoned off to Buenos Aires with the creation of the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata and then retained in Chuquisaca and La Paz when República Bolivia was established. As we will see, these were only the most overt consequences of spatial fragmentation.

When considering what determines the physical making of a national territory, a concept that remains to be a useful analytical tool is the "region" or the "economic-administrative contexts" forging new political dynamics over time. Regions come into historical existence following a double interrelated dynamic: one that is construed from inside, articulating local producers and production centers through social, economic, and often also political and cultural networks, a subset of microregions that can become -- sometimes more loosely than others -- interactive in different moments in time; and another influenced by outside of the region and national forces, measured by the greater or lesser autonomy a region and its social groups have. The convergence of a physical space and a social space is what defines the existence of a region, different from a nation in that it represents a smaller unit at all levels, and in that the social spaces are defined as and are reproduced in a way that they respond to regional interests and outlooks rather than to national interests.[8] Sometimes, regions can become nations, or, in political terms, counter-hegemonic projects can become hegemonic.

Although region as a concept remains elusive, is seldomly defined in a graspable way or even mapped, and has been used widely and profusely to classify "regional histories," it remains a useful tool to grasp the main organizational principles in a given space at a given time, and over time. The principles and the boundaries of a 'region' change over time, but the workings of a region basically remain the same: the levels of economic development, articulation, permanence, specialization, and social (marriage alliances, inheritance patterns, dowries) and political networks (ritual kinship, clientelism, class alliances).

Before the establishment of the new republics, what we see at work are solidly integrated regions based on commercial circuits, "trade spaces." Merchant capital, however, tends to behave un-nationalistically, its main goal being profit-making wherever markets exist. We will see, however, that in the first decades of the nineteenth century this was not quite the case. Mercantile spaces were based on and reproduced through the existence of social spaces, across and beyond what became national boundaries. Oftentimes, mercantile spaces coincided with social spaces or at least a set of social relations. This social and spatial articulation lasted until Ecuadorian, Peruvian, and Bolivian merchants lost control over vaster commercial circuits, being replaced by international merchant capital, mainly British merchants and merchant houses, and when tariff policies were implemented based on binational commercial agreements (Part I, herein). By this shift of control, commerce and commercial relations became denationalized and a lesser cohesive regional influence, even more so when merchants and merchant houses strongly articulated themselves to capital-city elites.[9]

In contrast to what happened in Europe, in few instances did merchant capital organize production at a smaller peasant household level (proto-industrialization) or participate with direct investments in industrial ventures. The historical role of merchant capital in the Andes was the reproduction of merchant capital per se, in addition to delivering loans, especially to mineowners, and forcing laborers into harvesting guano, rubber, or cinchona bark (*cascarilla*). Organizing sheep and alpaca wool production in the Southern Andes meant for export (mostly in the hands of British merchants) and local cloth production was the closest to proto-industrialization the new Andean *repúblicas* came (Bonilla, 2005, 2007; Flores Galindo, 1976; Caravedo, 1978; Wibel, 1978). In Central Europe, merchants displaced the nobility, bought or accessed landed properties for unpaid loans, and invested in commercial crops and a rapidly improving technology. Smaller merchants organized peasant households during the agrarian cycle's rest season to produce crops and textiles that they would then take to more distant (mostly urban) markets (Kriedte, Medick, Schlumbohm, 1981, 1982), whereas banks from early on provided loans, with much lower interest rates than was current in the much riskier Andean mining sector (Part II). Production in the Andes was further removed from merchant capital and thus less tied into a national project. Large coastal plantation owners (the oligarchy) linked to cocoa

(Ecuador) and cotton and sugar (Peru) had the political say, at least until the 1930s. In Bolivia, it was the mineowners who had the upper hand in national politics, determining economic interests and national policies.

Still, merchants and merchant capital had an important role in organizing space and social relations, when they over and again traveled either the *carrera del norte* or the *carrera del sur*. The open-ended question is how solid this space and these social relations were and the impact they had in forging the new republican national spaces, or viceversa, how the establishment of the national space hampered or reduced commercial networks through, for instance, the establishment of commercial treaties or national currencies.

By around 1780, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru represented the core geographical and administrative area of the Peruvian Viceroyalty after the Bourbon Reforms established two new Viceroyalties (New Granada, broadly today's Colombia and Venezuela; and Rio de la Plata, broadly today's Argentina, Uruguay and -- fought over with Portugal -- Paraguay).

Around two million people lived in this core Andean area toward the end of the eighteenth century, 90 percent being indigenous peoples. Bolivia's, Ecuador's, and Peru's territory held coastal, highland, and lowland territories.[10] The region's history has a common ground: It was Incan territory between ca. 1350 and 1500, gradually incorporating several culturally and developmentally different ethnic groups, with its imperial capital in Cusco. When Francisco Pizarro and his men disembarked in Tumbes, the empire was amidst a civil war between the heirs of Inca Huayna Capac – Huascar in Cusco, Atahualpa in Quito – a situation that aided the Spanish conquistadors to subdue an empire of approximately 20 million highly militarized peoples. While Rome, Lisbon, and Madrid were deciding on how to divide the world between Portugal and Spain, Incas, Mochicas, Mayas, Aztecs, Tupi Guaranies, and many other ethnic groups were engaged in redefining their economic, social, political, and territorial domains, either to the inside or through negotiations, tribute payments, and military actions with or against the powerful.

Such interactions were ultimately made possible by the extensive road network built in pre-Inca and Inca times, from the Chinchaysuyo to the highlands of present-day Colombia, from Cusco to Pasto, to Bogotá, linking Quito to Cusco (the Camino Real de la Sierra or the Camino del Correo de Lima, as labeled during colonial times). From Guayaquil there were three highland connecting roads: from Babahoyo to Quito running through Guaranda and Riobamba, from Yaguachi to Alausí, and from Naranjal to Cuenca. All three connected with the Camino Real de la Sierra (Serrera, 2000:242-243).

Despite such looming demographic and historical antecedents, it was only partially that an indigenous organizational logic informed the long-term establishment of new boundaries. Particularly in the nineteenth century, ethnic cohesion, identities, and territories went different national paths. Indigenous

unrest throughout the eighteenth century, culminating in the Tupac Amaru II and Tupac Catari upheavals between 1780 and 1783, taught non-Indians (whites, mestizos, castas, and blacks) to fear a repeat of indigenous rebellions, by which everyone and everything not indigenous would be erradicated (O'Phelan, 1988). On February 1, 1780, a rebellion in Arequipa, a city located 990 km from the viceregal capital Lima and 405 km away from the former Inca imperial capital erupted and, almost simultaneously Moquegua, Huancavelica, Huaraz, Pasco and La Plata (Chuquisaca) were in uproar. José Gabriel Condorcanqui's (Tupac Amaru II) uprising surged on November 4, 1780, in Cusco and was closely related to the uproar under the leadership of Julian Apaza (Tupac Catari) in the provincia of Chayanta,,[11] Audiencia Charcas, between the present-day cities of Oruro and Sucre on July and August of 1780. By March 1781 the entire area between Arequipa and Potosi was up in arms and would, albeit with diminished impetus, reach the provincia of Tucuman in today's Argentina. For several months, the city of Puno lay besieged. As military pressure intensified, royalist commanders had to retreat to Cusco. In Oruro, tensions mounted as well throughout the month of December in 1780, and on February 10, 1781, a bloody riot under the leadership of the wealthy Rodriguez brothers was unleashed. Both brothers were *criollos* born in Oruro and the owners of a silver mine close to the city of Oruro. During the Oruro riot, Indian and mestizo participation was decisive, although "indianness" predominated, to a point where the Rodriguez brothers decided to use Indian clothes. Tupac Catari's rebellion expanded to besiege La Paz, moving all the way to the Eastern shore of Lake Titicaca. La Paz's siege began in March and, lasting until October 1781, possibly was the most prominent military action undertaken during this wave of mainly indigenous uprisings. Further north, in the *corregimiento* of Larecaja, another leader, Andrés Mendigure, also called Andrés Tupac Amaru and a nephew to José Gabriel, took action. He is considered the savviest of the rebel leaders. Under his command, Indian forces took the city of Sorata. Tupac Catari had been captured and executed by mid-November 1781. Nevertheless, the rebellion continued into Cochabamba and Chayanta, while Andrés and Diego Tupac Amaru were already negotiating an armistice with Spanish authorities. The upheavals continued until June 1782, especially around La Paz.[12]

Sebastián de Segurola (1872) described the horrific scenes during the massive upheaval in quite some detail. In Chucuito, the rebels, we are told, killed more than 400 Spaniards and mestizos from both sexes, not even sparing the lives of newborns, with similar occurrences in the *provincias* of Azángaro and Lampa, and in the city of Capachica. An account written on April 28, 1781, by an eyewitness in Puno who was a fierce critic of Spanish governance, ascribed the reason for the upheaval as resulting from the excesses committed by *corregidores*, especially their draconian practices of the forced sale of merchandise (*repartimiento de mercancías*). One of the first military actions taken by Tupac Amaru II, himself a muleteer, was indeed to

put an end to Tinta's corregidor's life, largely because -- so Tupac Amaru believed -- Tinta's corregidor was disobeying orders and laws emanating from Madrid. At the initial stages of the upheaval, some non-Indians sympathized with the actions undertaken by Tupac Amaru and his Indian troops; they distanced themselves when the movement became radicalized (Hunefeldt, 1977).

As happens with most violent upheavals in human history, the Tupac Amaru II and the Tupac Catari revolts did not come out of the blue. They had been preceded by several protests in court and in the streets since almost the beginning of colonial dominion. What added to the indigenous struggles in the eighteenth century was demographic growth, after centuries of a declining population and the Bourbon Reforms implemented in the colonies under the kingship of Carlos III (1759-1788) brought with them a spatial and administrative reorganization of the viceroyalties under the supervision of newly merit-appointed *intendentes*. Industrial growth, higher levels of bureaucratic efficiency, and the consolidation and modernization of the military were also key parts of the Caroline reform project (Fisher 1970, 2015). Tupac Amaru II was aware of changing winds; he might even have thought of himself as helping toward the implementation of royal intentions. In his several proclamations and writings, he never demanded or offered to abolish the Indian head tax (*tributo indígena*), the main bond between Indian vassals and Spain's monarch, and he attacked corregidores not complying with Spain's stipulated amounts of distributed merchandise among Indians (*aranceles*).

The geography and chronology of the upheavals show interactions among indigenous peoples on the present-day territories of Southern Peru and Western Bolivia and even Northern Argentina. To this day, indigenous groups live on both sides of the borders, including the Aymaras and Quechuas in Southern Peru, Bolivia, and Northern Chile and the Cañaris in Ecuador and Peru.[13] However, as Charles Walker (1996) warns, "the actions, organization, and motivation of insurgents in Northern Peru or on the Coast were not necessarily the same as those of Tupac Amaru and his collaborators more closely linked to Cusco." Each region developed a distinct relationship to its indigenous peoples and, at the end, although such relationships were marked by inequality and the frequent use of violence, the powerful (the states) never held absolute power (Walker, 1996:15-22).[14]

A different trajectory pertains to the Northern Andes, beginning with the wars between the Chimús and the Incas in the fourteenth century. Indigenous populations in the north also protested the changes brought about by the Bourbon Reforms, however, they were much more localized, vindicating local abuses of power. Most of the protests took place in Cajamarca and Trujillo (Huamachuco), with a diminished intensity in Lambayeque and Piura. In these areas, indigenous peoples were aware of what was happening in the south and of the Tupacs' revolutions. The northern coast and highlands were an integrated space since the middle of the eighteenth century in a favorable international economic

juncture, with Lima controlling, via the Consulado, the mercantile flow from its mining sites. Locally, the north saw a weak administrative structure and an early presence of North American shipbuilders and contraband (Gleijeses, 1992:273-308). According to Susana Aldana (1997), the North had a will for independence grown out of its own turf, with many of the ideologues having been born or with family members in the north: Chachapoyas, Lambayeque, Huamachuco, Trujillo. Trujillo, indeed, became the headquarters for José de San Martín's forces coming out of Buenos Aires and Simón Bolívar also began his final military campaign in Trujillo, a city strategically located close to the sea, from which (using pre-Inca and Inca roads) the north and the Peruvian central highlands could be overseen and controlled, with the additional advantage of having the province of Huamachuco as a granary to provide for armies, soldiers, and animals (Aldana, 1997:61-77).[15]

New regional maps drafted since the end of the eighteenth century implied the non-recognition of ethnically defined boundaries and ethnic territories. To the contrary, boundaries were meant to cut off and divide ethnically controlled territory, a long-term process in the construction of the nation-states as conceived by white elites (Part III).

Fiscal and custom controls are the best-documented mechanisms that helped -- with uneven success -- sustain and solidify national borders, a daily reminder of matters changed. Although customs offices were more often than not ill-equipped and understaffed, they were the main agencies next to the consular representatives to enforce border control and commercial agreements. It is largely the complaints and recommendations coming from these police agents and diplomats that have helped reconstruct what happened to mercantile and fiscal activity and people on the border (Parts I, III). Today's smugglers do not use different routes or tactics than was the case since the inception of borders, with contraband items coming today from Brazil and from ships on the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans,[16] often carried cross-country by indigenous women and muleteers.

Establishing borders through fiscal, monetary, military, and commercial means did not lead to the erasure of indigenous networks and interactions. First there are borders and controls, then there are tariffs and prohibitions, and contraband follows on its heels. Indian carriers and migrants had a hard time in grasping the reasons and the logic of borders and why their long-established social, economic, and political networks needed to come under scrutiny and, eventually, ceased. A sordid dialogue developed throughout the nineteenth-century, culminating in renewed fears of a *guerra de castas* (caste war), especially around Lake Titicaca. Chucuito provincia in Peru is geographically next to Omasuyos provincia in Bolivia, the places where some of the most terrible massacres occurred during the Tupac Amaru rebellion. Civil strife engulfing politics in the Andean region, especially in Bolivia, was a permanent reminder of the dangers of the presence of a majority Indian population. However, such fears when expressed in official

writings, often were "invented" fears based on historical memory to call for the attention of governments and to eventually invite troops to suffocate a possible Indian upheaval or deal with a political antagonizer.

Another important fiscal aspect of the border pertaining to indigenous peoples was the headtax, or which Indians counted as Bolivians, Peruvians, or Ecuadorians for tax purposes. Since, especially in the first half of the nineteenth century, Andean states depended largely on *contribuciones indígenas* (equivalent to the colonial headtax), this was a matter of fiscal survival. Officially abolished between 1854 and 1856, the colonial headtax continued in existence well beyond the date of its official abolition and was reintroduced several times thereafter in times of fiscal need, in conjunction with military recruitment and Indian peasants providing provisions for armies on the move.[17] How in the course of the nineteenth century did "boundary issues" express sentiments of nationhood, local identities and -- more importantly -- what did such issues mean for whom and for what reasons? A glimpse at what happened and how what happened was interpreted by whom in the decades following the wars of independence, the time period when national borders were frantically reshaped, provides some insights and answers to these questions.

In our current historiographical assessment of nation building in Latin America, the research accent lies on internal pressures, showing a fractured but emerging national consciousness in and amongst all social groups. Sometimes this recent literature contemplates the context of international wars to measure degrees of national identity through participation, whereas there also is the questioning of what an international war meant in the Latin American historical context (De La Pedraja, 2006), as internal political confrontations often overlapped with international clashes. It is only by relativizing the importance of the battlefield that we may more comprehensively understand how present-day Latin America was shaped. Internal military and civil maneuverings, tariffs and customs, diplomatic ventures and channels, group interests, indigenous lives and culture informed the making of the nation at least as much.

According to Peruvian historian Heraclio Bonilla (2007:71-72), the wars of independence and the territorial dismemberment of what until the implementation of the Bourbon Reforms was the Peruvian Viceroyalty, was a process already latent in the eighteenth century, if not before. A "Peruvian space" initially nucleated around mining sites and the flows of merchant capital, together with the expansion of agrarian enterprises, was gradually dismembered through the physical destruction of production sites during the wars, leading to the expansion and accentuation of continental regional interests and their clienteles. These processes, together with external competition (Britain, France, Germany, United States) with the partial inclusion or exclusion of large parts of the population led to a national spatial fragmentation.

The geographical and administrative partition of the Peruvian Viceroyalty into different countries, it has been argued, responded to elites' particular regional interests, accompanied by a concentration of political and military power in the aftermath of the indigenous rebellions. This is a strong reason. However, what is also true is that city-based elites in Lima, La Paz, and Quito depended to a great extent on the collection of the Indian tribute to fill state coffers and throughout the nineteenth century also their own coffers. Before independence, the Indian headtax at the end of the bureaucratic chain went to Lima, La Paz, and Quito and, eventually, a portion thereof to Spain. Silver coins followed a similar path. After independence, silver coins and the Indian tribute circulated at the departmental level before a remainder was syphoned off to the new capital cities. Local officeholders depended on the renamed exaction (contribución de indígenas) (Hunefeldt, 2018), now mostly spent within the provincias (or *cantones*) on both sides of the border. Gradually, the former Indian head tax morphed into "labor exactions" or payments in kind, off and on (as will be seen) reflecting a scarcity of circulating money, silver pesos, and since 1863, silver soles, the production of which depended on what happened in the mining sector and with the minting of coins. With the fragmentation of the tributary space first at the national level and then at the regional level inside national territories, governments no longer saw the political and economic relevance of their respective large Indian populations, leading to a disconnect between capital cities and provincias.

Over the next pages we want to present a reading of how Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia came into being as separate national entities after more than three centuries of a common territorial, economic, political, and administrative destiny by reconstructing commercial networks and the circulation of money, administrative and fiscal boundaries, military movements in the wake of the wars of independence, diplomatic entanglements, and, most prominently, how life on the border forged and disrupted the consolidation of territorial mappings between countries.

Over the past decades many colleagues have published books on each of the core Andean nations (Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia), sometimes with a particular time frame or a specific topic, with some research focusing on the military skirmishes and wars between the three countries that involved border issues. Borders as such and their historical grounding are the turf of diplomats and politicians and, sometimes, scientists measuring the land, with little consideration of people and nature. Bringing together history, people, and nature to explain the process of border building -- that is the historical mapping of how space and culture lead to the construction of nation-states -- is perhaps the key objective herein.

To do so, there are three distinct but intertwined Parts: I. Territoriality, Exchange, and Boundaries; II. Money, Mining, and Contraband; III. Living the Border.

Aside from National Archives, Puno's prefectural archive was a unique source for this undertaking. It contains police reports and lengthy descriptions pertaining to border issues between Peru and Bolivia. Another little-worked-at archive is the demarcation archive in Lima's Foreign Office (Archivo de Límites, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Lima), containing consular reports, trading and political-diplomatic information. Also consulted were the records in the Archbishopric archive, illustrating the confluence of moral and practical issues, when priests had to define who would collect and use ecclesiastical contributions in which provincia and on which side of the border.[18] In essence, Andean borders had a complex and tortuous historical trajectory, with many social, economic, political, natural and cultural forces at play. The crafting of borders reflects national imaginations, as much as its contestation and questioning.