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“Multiculturalism and Political Integration in Modern Nation-States”
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MATTHIAS KOENIG, Editorial

JOHN REX & GURHARPAL SINGH, “Multiculturalism and Political Integration in Modern Nation-States: Thematic Introduction” 3

EDWARD A. TIRYAKIAN, “Assessing Multiculturalism Theoretically: E Pluribus Unum, Sic et Non” 20

GURHARPAL SINGH, “Multiculturalism in Contemporary Britain: Reflections on the ‘Leicester Model’” 40

FRANK-OLAF RADTKE, “Multiculturalism in Germany: Local Management of Immigrants’ Social Inclusion” 55

CATHERINE WIHTOL DE WENDEN, “Multiculturalism in France” 77

HIDEKI TARUMOTO, “Multiculturalism in Japan: Citizenship Policy for Immigrants” 88
With its current thematic issue, the International Journal on Multicultural Societies (IJMS), now in its fifth year of existence, not only presents itself in a new format but also opens a new thematic thread by focusing on questions of international migration and integration. Since the post-war period, international migration has become one of the major factors of cultural diversification, even in classical nation-states which did not conventionally describe themselves as “nations of immigrants”. Thus, while it is true that Australia, Canada and the United States took the lead in adopting various forms of “multiculturalism” as a public policy framework for dealing with diversity, governments in Western Europe and Japan have no less recognised the need to respond to cultural diversity in their immigration and integration policies. The importance of cultural aspects of international migration has also been acknowledged in the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1990 and entering into force as recently as 1 July 2003. Whereas previous thematic issues of the IJMS dealt with religious, linguistic and ethnic diversity in general, we therefore considered it appropriate to focus more closely on the specific policy problems related to the integration of migrants.

We start with a thematic issue on multiculturalism and political integration in modern nation-states, guest-edited by Gurharpal Singh and John Rex, which is based on a conference sponsored by the UK Economic and Social Research Council’s ‘Future Governance’ programme. This issue approaches the governance of cultural diversity in (post-)industrial societies of Western Europe and Japan from an explicitly comparative perspective. Against the background of John Rex’s and Edward Tiryakian’s theoretical analyses of changing models of social and political integration in multicultural societies, the articles investigate the policy responses to cultural diversity in France, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom. Catherine Withol de Wenden and Hideki Tarumoto argue that immigration and cultural diversity have induced far-reaching transformations of political ideologies and institutions in France and Japan, respectively, while in case studies on Leicester and Frankfurt am Main, Gurharpal Singh and Frank-Olaf Radtke each scrutinise the interplay of policy-making and the collective mobilisation of immigrants at the local level. The articles not only demonstrate that different nation-states, in spite of similar challenges and noticeable trends of policy convergence, continue to follow specific institutional paths of state-formation and nation-building, but also that the adoption of public policies of “multiculturalism”
generates several unintended consequences and hence creates new problems of social and political integration. This certainly is an area in the highly developed field of migration research that merits further attention, particularly from comparative and policy-oriented social science research as promoted by the IJMS.

For that purpose, while a subsequent thematic issue of the IJMS, also edited by Gurharpal Singh and John Rex (Vol. 5, No. 2), addresses the governance of diversity – or pluralism – in post-colonial settings, notably in India, Malaysia, Pakistan and South Africa, other up-coming issues will present recent developments in social science research on multiculturalism in the Asia-Pacific region and will critically investigate the interrelation of policy-making and social science research in the field of migration. As always, readers are invited to contribute to our debate by sending their comments to the mailing list attached to this Journal and/or by submitting articles on related topics.
Multiculturalism and Political Integration in Modern Nation-States – Thematic Introduction

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The question of multiculturalism has been central to the political concerns of European countries since 1945. It covers a number of different issues, however, and which of them predominates has varied with differing political circumstances. It reflected concern about immigration and the ways in which immigrants might settle in Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s. After the break-up of communism in 1989 and the resurgence of ethnic nationalism in the East, it centred around questions of devolution of power from central national governments to regionally based sub-national groups and the possibilities of power-sharing at the centre. Third, it has had to deal with the growing numbers of political refugees and asylum seekers in Western Europe. Fourth, and most recently, in the wake of terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent assertion of American power in the world at large, it has been concerned with the dangers posed by unassimilated immigrant groups.

It is not the intention of this paper to deal in detail with each of the structures and processes in all the different political situations to which reference will be made. Rather it seeks to place these situations within an overall conceptual framework and, in doing so, to produce a general theory of multiculturalism.

1. Philosophical and Social Science Views of Multiculturalism

There are few terms used more widely than multiculturalism in popular discourse in the media and in politics. Until recently it was discussed as a positive feature of national societies and cities. Politicians and even monarchs would say “we now live in a multicultural society” and cities would boast that they were now multicultural or, sometimes, cosmopolitan. These usages we may refer to as soft versions of multiculturalism.
In recent times, following ethnic conflicts where older societies broke up and what was called *ethnic cleansing* occurred (as in the former Yugoslavia), or where there were violent ethnic conflicts within nations and cities (such conflicts were almost universal), multiculturalism was seen in a very much more negative light. In the United Kingdom, for example, when there were disturbances involving violent conflict between Asians and native British citizens, such conflicts were diagnosed as due to multiculturalism. Economic migrants or political migrants and refugees were seen as endangering the unity of society and this unity was seen as having to be defended against multiculturalism.

During the past twenty-five years multiculturalism has also been debated among philosophers and social scientists. In political philosophy the question arose in attempts to define the nature of a good liberal society. Such a society, it had been thought, would involve the guarantee of the rights of individuals (see, for example, Walzer and Miller 1995), but now the question was asked whether such rights should be extended to groups. Prima facie, it appeared that the very recognition of groups would involve a denial of individual rights. Charles Taylor, however, saw what he called *recognition* as essential to the concept of rights, and individuals could be recognised as members of groups (Taylor 1994). Kymlicka raised similar issues in writing about multicultural citizenship (Kymlicka 1995). Both of these writers, being Canadian, had to deal with the special problem of Quebec’s claims to a separate political identity at the same time as discussing the identity of dispersed groups of immigrants and their descendants. A related question arose in Europe where Baubock posited the idea of a transnational citizenship alongside that of national citizenship (Baubock 1992).

All these approaches implicitly involved a positive evaluation of multiculturalism. So too does that of the British Indian political philosopher, Bhiku Parekh (2000). Parekh raises the question of the possibility of culturally distinct groups coexisting in a single society. He believes that they can, and that the multicultural nature of such a society should be welcomed and celebrated. Societies with single unitary cultures for him are no longer likely in the modern world as a result of migration. Far more likely are societies in which multiple cultures coexist and it is important for him that they should all have equal respect. Parekh coupled this theoretical work with his leadership of a Commission for the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain which sought to spell out the policies and institutions necessary to create a society in which racial discrimination, exploitation, and oppression were prevented (Runnymede Trust 2000).

### 1.1 An Alternative Theory of Multiculturalism

Barry (1999) has offered a sharp critique of the theories of multiculturalism discussed above. He sets out to defend the values of a liberal society which he believes is opposed to what is advocated in these theories. He believes that they are wrong in seeing the various groups which they discussed as only *culturally*
different and wishes to insist upon their political relations. When they are thus understood they present the real problem to which liberal political theory has to address itself.

In discussing Barry’s work (Rex 2001), it is argued that there is a limited version of multiculturalism which can be sustained even if his basic criticism is accepted. We base this on Marshall’s theory of citizenship (Marshall 1951) and a British definition of the term integration as it should appropriately be applied to immigrant ethnic minorities (see Rex and Tomlinson 1979).

1.2 Social Citizenship and the Welfare State

Marshall’s problem is not directly concerned with immigrant ethnic minorities. Rather it seeks to show how class loyalties and class conflict have come to be transcended by the concept of citizenship. The first stage of this transcendence is in the legal sphere, in which all individuals regardless of class have equality before the law. The second is political. When universal franchise is achieved all individuals share in controlling the government. The third, gradually being achieved in the post-1945 world, is social. This involves insurance which provides a minimum income in times of unemployment and ill health; free collective bargaining on the part of workers in dealing with employers over wages and conditions of work; minimum standards of housing; education; and health care free to all at the point of delivery. These ideas of Marshall were based on the work of Beveridge as set out in his book Full Employment in a Free Society (Beveridge 1944) and in the report on Social Insurance and Allied Services (Beveridge 1942). Together Beveridge and Marshall laid the foundation of what came to be called the welfare state.1

Doubts were expressed as to whether citizenship would totally and permanently transcend class (Rex 1961). It was argued that it would so long as there was a balance of class forces, but that, if this balance was destroyed, class conflict might well be resumed. This was an important issue in the United Kingdom during the period of the Labour Government of 1964 and later Conservative administrations between 1979 and 1993. The Labour Government had issued a White Paper entitled In Place of Strife (Department of Employment and Productivity 1969), which envisaged cooperation between trades unions and employers organisations in government-sponsored institutions. The Conservative Government of the 1980s subsequently greatly weakened workers’ rights and envisaged a much more limited welfare state which involved little more than social insurance and a free health service. None the less, a later Conservative Government declared itself in favour of a classless society.

What has been discussed here is the evolution of social policy and political institutions in Britain, but very similar ideas were operative in most Western European countries. Radtke (1994), for example, speaks of the social democratic
welfare state in which a plurality of conflicting interests had led to a compromise after negotiation.

All the above discussion refers to the possibility of class conflict and class compromise. None of it refers to the position of ethnic groups, which are the centre of discussions about multicultural societies. To this question we must now turn.

2. The Integration of Immigrant Ethnic Minorities

There have been three basic European responses to the arrival of immigrant ethnic minorities in the post-1945 period. The first is that of assimilationism, which is most strongly affirmed in France. The second is that of the gastarbeiter system of the German-speaking countries, under which immigrant workers are denied political citizenship. The third is one or another sort of multiculturalism commonly thought to be exemplified by Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

In the Swedish case, provision for ethnic minorities was conceived as part of the provision of the welfare state. The problem that the Swedish Government faced, however, was that of who was to be chosen to represent the immigrant minorities. They were accused of choosing traditional leaders, usually elderly men. Their critics, such as Schierup and Alund (1990), argued that in fact younger members of these communities were not represented. They also argued that, in any case, they tended to form cross-ethnic alliances and alliances with dissident Swedish youth thus creating new syncretic cultures.

The historic Dutch response to cultural diversity had been what came to be called pillarisation. This was the establishment of separate education systems, separate trades unions and separate media for Roman Catholics and Protestants. This policy was extended to deal with ethnic minorities. One important critic of this policy, Jan Rath (1991), suggested that the policy of minorisation by no means necessarily implied that minorities would be subject to equal treatment. As he saw it, minorisation could mean the singling out of those labelled as minorities for unequal treatment.

In the United Kingdom, after a brief acceptance of a policy of assimilation in education in 1964, the government accepted the notion of integration. This was defined by the then Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, as “not a flattening process of uniformity but cultural diversity, coupled with equal opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance” (Rex and Tomlinson 1979).

What is significant about this definition is that it dissociates itself from any form of multiculturalism which would permit the unequal treatment of minorities. In fact it relates the notion of integration to Marshall’s notion of social citizenship.
Jenkins' definition also suggests the existence of two cultural or institutional domains. On the one hand, there is a public political culture centred around the idea of a welfare state in which all have a minimal degree of equality. On the other, there are the separate cultures of the different ethnic communities including the host community. These separate cultures involve the members of each community speaking their own language among themselves, practising their own religion and having their own family practices.

This, however, is only a general starting point for the definition of an egalitarian multicultural society. In practice it raises many difficult questions and is contested by a number of different groups.

A first question is that of why separate communal cultures should continue to exist. There are three elements involved in answering this. The first is that they are allowed to exist in the belief that they may have value in themselves. Accepting this is implied by the notion of mutual tolerance. The second is that their culture provides individuals with a moral and emotional home which is essential for their personal psychological stability. Durkheim, in his classic work *The Division of Labour* (1933), argued that such stability was only possible under conditions of organic solidarity if there was some grouping between the individual family and the state. He thought that this might be achieved through the development of occupational guilds. This is obviously unlikely in modern times but clearly ethnic minority groups can perform a similar role. This is true also for the members of the host society. Quite apart from their participation in the public political institutions of the welfare state, they too have their culture and organisations in which they feel at home. The third reason for preserving these groups is that they make possible collective action to protect their members in political life.

### 3. Problems of the Two Domains Thesis

Everything said so far provides only a starting point for the analysis of multiculturalism. We must now consider some of the problems in the two domains thesis. These include problems within the education system; the attempt to extend the values of the public political culture into the private communal sphere and, per contra, the claim that the values of the private communal cultures should be extended into the public realm; and finally the different problem of the degree of commitment or lack of commitment of immigrant groups to living in a host society.

#### 3.1 The Problem of Multicultural Education

The one institution that clearly straddles both the private and public spheres is the education system. Here we can distinguish, with some oversimplification, between primary and secondary schools.
Primary schools have among their functions one which they share with families. Unsocialised babies are the barbarian invaders of the social system. They have to learn and accept a complex set of norms if they are to become full social beings. These their parents teach them and so do their primary schools. In the primary schools they also become bilingual. Ideally they start to learn in their home language but they also have to learn the language of the host society and for school purposes to use it as their main language.

In secondary education, students may be seen as being prepared for entering a wider world governed by norms of a different kind. These norms involve individualism and competition even though these may be contained within some conception of common citizenship. They are being prepared for the world of work and as well as learning relevant norms they must acquire skills.

We should now ask whether there is any place within schools for the perpetuation of different languages and cultures. One view with considerable currency in many countries is that the perpetuation of these languages in schools increases students’ self-esteem and enhances their performance. This view was robustly criticised by a West Indian schoolteacher, Maureen Stone, in England. She argued that the relation between low self-esteem and poor performance had never been proved. She therefore believed that any supplementary education should be devoted to basic skills and not to education in different cultures (Stone 1985). In saying this she was recognising that schools are concerned with the wider world and participation in the public realm. Another author, Jennifer Williams, pointed out that where multicultural education was taught in schools it was taught in the low-status uncertificated parts of the syllabus. Despite these criticisms, or taking account of them, there have been some attempts in the United Kingdom to foster the study of minority languages and cultures in the high-status certificated parts of the syllabus (Williams 1967). Those who support such developments clearly have in mind the creation of a multicultural society in which a variety of cultural traditions are respected.

3.2 Public and Private Domains Reconsidered

The sharp distinction between public and private domains which was our starting point is disputed from both sides. It is disputed by some who believe that certain values in the public sphere apply also in the private sphere, and some who believe that private communal values also apply in the public domain. It is also the case that some immigrant ethnic communities may be transnational in character and have commitments elsewhere.

Those who argue for extending the values of the public into the private sphere often do so in the name of human rights. This is a notion which includes more than the commitment to the values of the welfare state and suggests that our definition of the public sphere must itself be revised. This is particularly true of feminist
Multiculturalism and Political Integration

claims. Host society feminists usually claim that the private family practices of immigrant communities are unacceptable. They suggest that women in these communities are oppressed by their menfolk and that they involve arranged and forced marriages. Those who speak for immigrant communities may reply to this on each point. They point out that the oppression of women is the product not of their culture as such but of the village practices which they bring with them. These, they agree, should be altered and they are prepared to join in altering them. Further, they say that what they are doing is protecting their women and children from a society which is sexually promiscuous and whose symbols are the pornographic magazine and the sex shop. This could be, and sometimes is, a basis for dialogue with more sophisticated host-society feminists who may recognise these problems from a feminist point of view. So far as arranged marriages are concerned, they would argue that these need not and should not be forced and that the normal random mating practices of Western Europe are not necessarily preferable to arrangements in which the family of a bride frequently ensures that she is supported with a significant dowry. In modern conditions this might involve a contribution to the cost of a house or a car. The notion of being in love, which Westerners claim is essential to marriage, is something which may be longer and more lasting in arranged marriages than it commonly is in the West.

The opposite objection to the notion of two domains comes from immigrant communities. Some would say that their culture is not simply for the private sphere. This is what many Muslims are claiming when they say that Islam is a whole way of life. Thus they would see the values of the welfare state or those advocated in the name of human rights as integral to their own beliefs. If this is so then we cannot simply regard the political culture of the public domain as secular. It may be shared between different communities. The real revision of the two domains thesis which is required is that it should leave open a space for dialogue.

In estimating the possibilities of integration of minority communities, we should also avoid the essentialist view that the cultures we are seeking to integrate are unchanging and rigid. It has been suggested that they have three points of reference. The first is to a homeland which is itself undergoing change; the second is to the land of present settlement; and the third to possible countries of onward migration. This raises the whole problem of the nature of transnational migrant communities which is discussed elsewhere (Rex 1996). So far as their position in the land of first migrant settlement is concerned, immigrant communities may well have a modernising perspective as it is in their interest to fight for equality and equal treatment, even while being bound together by the use of their mother tongue amongst themselves and dealing with the life crises of birth, marriage and death in their own religious ceremonies. In addition to all these factors, some of the second, third and later generations in immigrant families may well defect from their communities and culture and become assimilated. All these factors suggest that the problem of integrating immigrant communities may be a more temporary and simple one than many of the advocates and opponents of multiculturalism believe.
We have already seen that the culture and institutions of the public domain consist of more than those related to equality in the welfare state. They include concepts of human rights but they also include all that is involved in participating in a modern economy and polity and accepting its criminal and civil law. This is something that immigrants accept because it is essential to the migrant enterprise.

Next under the heading of dealing with the difficulties of the two domains thesis comes the question of whether there are not some new emergent shared areas of life. The most obvious of these concern cuisine. It is often remarked in the United Kingdom that chicken tikka masala is the most-purchased prepared meal in supermarkets and it is true in all modern societies that a shared interest does develop in a new range of dishes of international origin. The other, rather different, shared area concerns literature in particular but probably most of the creative arts. The most important literature reviewed in prestigious magazines deals with many immigrant and multicultural problems, while music also obviously crosses borders. There is a case here for allowing for a domain of shared culture between those domains we have discussed but this does not necessarily mean that the two separate domains do not exist, or that shared cuisine and shared creative arts necessarily foreshadow a shared new culture overall.

Finally, we should note that this emergence of some shared intermediate institutions in particular societies goes along with the process of globalisation of culture, at least among elites.

3.3 Multiculturalism in the Former British Commonwealth

We have so far considered the various forms of multiculturalism in European societies, particularly in the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. To complete the picture, however, we must consider the cases of the former British Commonwealth countries of Australia and Canada which, although first settled by British and British and French settlers, sought to develop multicultural policies that would indicate the position of various later groups of settlers as well as the aboriginal or native people.

In the Australian case, the first settlers established a range of British social institutions including, in the sphere of religion, Protestant Christianity, and in sport, cricket and various forms of football. Later migrants came from other European countries so long as the White Australia policy was maintained and there was recognition of diverse cultures in the various immigrant communities, while at the same time maintaining English as the national language and educating the younger members of these communities to accept Australian institutions in the public sphere. These problems were intensified when the White Australia policy was abandoned and immigrants accepted from various parts of Asia whose cultures were even more at variance with those of the original settlers. Apart from all these problems, Australia had to deal with the question of the place of the Aboriginal
peoples who had been confined to limited reservations and had an inferior status when they sought to migrate to the cities or to white farming areas. Australian multiculturalism therefore was a policy which had to determine the status vis-à-vis the original British settlers of other European settlers, of Asian settlers and the Aborigines.

Canada’s problems were made more complex by the fact that there were two founding nations, the British and the French, and that the French-speaking state of Quebec had to be found a place within an overall federal system. Much discussion of multiculturalism in Canada turned on the question of Quebec, but even outside Quebec the whole country was deemed to be bilingual and bicultural. It was against this form of binationality that a multicultural policy had to be developed to deal with later European and Asian immigrants, as well as black and white immigrants from the United States and the Caribbean. Additionally there was the problem of the native peoples. In the 1980s, an attempt was made to deal with all these problems through constitutional amendments known as the Meech Lake Accord. This was intended to recognise Quebec as a distinct society while recognising the various newer immigrant cultures. The conference failed, however, because it required the support of all the provinces and that of Manitoba could not be obtained because of a filibuster in the legislature organised by the representatives of Native Americans. Despite all these problems Canadian politicians and scholars continued to argue that Canada could provide Europe with a model of multiculturalism.4

4. Sub-Nationalisms and the Process of Peaceful Devolution

Arguments about multiculturalism usually confuse the problems we have been discussing – those of the integration of immigrants – with problems of a different kind. These concern the place of sub-national units such as the Welsh, Scots and Irish in the United Kingdom or the Catalans and Basques in Spain. Separately from these cases are those of binational states such as Belgium and Canada. In each of these cases, the claims of nationality may be based on linguistic, religious or cultural unity or they may simply be based on residence in the region of the sub-nation. Catalan nationalism is attributed to all those who live in the sub-national area and Scottish nationality and the right to vote for a Scottish Parliament is attributed to all those who live in Scotland. Slightly different situations occur in Belgium and France. In Belgium, Wallonia is French-speaking and Flanders Flemish- or Dutch-speaking, while Brussels is bilingual. Government at a national level is shared by the two groups, but is in the hands of the French speakers in Wallonia and the Flemish/Dutch speakers in Flanders. In Canada, the claims of nationalism are made on behalf of Quebec led by a French-speaking majority and not on behalf of other francophones in Manitoba and other provinces.

Devolution may involve the concession of more or less powers to the sub-nations. The greatest degree of devolution in the United Kingdom is accorded to Scotland.
with its Scottish Parliament, while the Welsh Assembly has far more limited powers. The situation in Catalonia is similar to that of Scotland, but in both these cases the sub-national government is subordinate to that in Madrid or London. In both cases, and in those cases where devolution is more restricted, there are minority parties aiming at secession (for a discussion see Guibernau and Rex 1997).

Similar problems are to be found in other parts of the existing European Union. France, for example, has a problem of devolution in Corsica. Italy has such a problem both in dealing with its regions and with its island dependencies in Sicily and Sardinia. Greece has a problem with its island dependencies in Corfu and Crete and on its northern border with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Thrace.

Again, there are problems of devolution in the countries envisaged as the first entrants to an enlarged European Community, some of whom also have border problems. This is true of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, all of which have had to deal with the question of devolution, and it is even more true of the countries who might be later entrants such as Romania and Bulgaria. Among those selected for earlier entry, moreover, some such as the Baltic Republics and Cyprus have very special difficulties. In the case of the Baltic Republics, there are large Russian minorities who were previously ruling minorities, while in the case of Cyprus the recognised Greek Cypriot territory will be required to have negotiated at least a loose federation with the unrecognised Turkish part of the island.

4.1 The Problem of Incorporation into Supranational Units

A new situation arises with the emergence of supra-national units such as the European Union because it raises the possibility of the regions dealing with the supra-national government directly. True, ultimate power in the EU lies with the Council of Ministers drawn from the central governments of nation-states, but there are many forms of development in which the EU deals directly with the regions. This raises the possibility that radical groups in the sub-national units may not simply seek secession from their own nation-states but may seek to turn the EU into a union of regions rather than of nation-states.

The problem of devolution was also dealt with in the former Soviet Union. Although the Communist Party controlled the whole society, Stalin’s policy allowed varying degrees of autonomy within particular departments in different kinds of autonomous regions (Connor 1994). Tartarstan represented a case in which a very workable type of cooperation grew up between the regional and central Soviet Government (Yemelianova 1999). As in the West, however, there were a variety of political and religious groups who sought more independence and some of them had international connections outside the Soviet Union.
4.2 Cases of Armed Ethnic Conflict

In the cases so far discussed, we have been assuming that some degree of peaceful devolution is possible and that there will be very few extremists seeking to bring about change by violent means. This however has not been the case with the Basques in Spain or the Republicans in Northern Ireland. There, political parties have emerged which engage in violent armed struggle in which the participants are seen as terrorists by the central governments of Spain and the United Kingdom. There is something in common between these two cases and it is not surprising that there have been contacts between the Basque separatist organisation ETA and the Provisional IRA. None the less, there are differences between them. In the case of Spain the conflict is between one ethnic group and the Spanish state. In the case of Northern Ireland there are two ethnic groups in conflict with one another, one seeking ultimate unification of Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, the other professing loyalty to, and demanding continuing union with, a United Kingdom.

What the two groups have in common is their use of violence. In both cases, moreover, there is a problem of their relationship with parties who share their aims but oppose the use of violence. This is a complex relationship in which the moderate parties give some protection to the more radical and violent ones.

The response of the Spanish Government has been to take strong measures against violence but also to offer some degree of devolution. The British Government has had to use its own army to oppose two groups of paramilitaries, even though one fights in the name of loyalism, and the British army is often accused of devoting its energies to fighting the Republicans. In this case there is also an offer of ultimate devolution but this has to follow a delicately and carefully constructed Peace Process.

4.3 Armed Conflict in Post-Communist Societies

The overall title of this article refers to “multiculturalism and political integration in modern nation-states”. Thus far, however we have referred to only one type of modern nation-state, that based upon private economic enterprise or a mixture of private and public enterprise, parliamentary democracy, and a tendency to move towards some kind of welfare state. The other type of modern nation-state is that based on communism. As we have seen, such states dealt with the potentiality of ethnic conflict relatively successfully until communism as an economic and social system began to collapse in 1989. At this point many groups sought secession from the state and engaged in violent conflict with the successor states and with one another.

The experience of the former Yugoslavia in this respect has been central to the study of ethnic conflict and the prospects of multiculturalism. Under Tito, Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, Montenegrins, Herzegovinians, Slovenes and Macedonians were held together by a national Communist Government, albeit through a subtle
balancing of ethnic forces at local level. With the collapse of communism, however, ethnic groups separated themselves from one another and there were brutal wars between them and ethnic cleansing within each one of them. The Bosnian and Kosovan wars led to outside intervention by the international community, which then sought to promote new constitutions based upon some notion of multicultural balance. These new constitutions depended on outside force, but the outside powers aimed at being able to withdraw. It was easy enough to suggest new multicultural constitutions but harder to realise them in practice. The various ethnic groups who were required to implement the new constitutions entered into discussion with their smoking guns still on the conference table. Some of the problems involved were made explicit in The Kosovo Report (Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000), which recommended independence for Kosovo on condition that it became fully multicultural.

Less well known are the problems which faced successively the Soviet Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the remaining Russian Federation. There the various ethnic, political and religious groups that had always resisted central government were now able to pursue secessionist liberation struggles and were inevitably dubbed as terrorists by the central governments involved. The war in Chechnya is the best known of these conflicts but there have been many others in the Caucasus, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia and in the former Central Asian territories, involving complex alliances between religious sects and political parties, coupled with intervention from allies in neighbouring states (Yemelianova 2001).

5. Prospects of Multiculturalism after the American-led War against Terrorism

After the attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001, a new political climate emerged which was fearful of multiculturalism. The diversity of cultures appeared to provide a base for more terrorist attacks and Islam particularly was seen as doing this. An attempt was made by the United States to establish a coalition of nations against terrorism that would destroy terrorist bases across the world. On the other hand, there was little chance of those opposing this coalition seeking a multicultural solution. Rather they established their own international networks of opposition and regarded any party, sect or nation not joining these networks as allies of the American-led coalition. The war against terrorism continued in 2002, making multiculturalism an impossible and unrealisable ideal except in the limited sense in which the coalition or the international network of resistance used it to strengthen its own unity.

Within this framework the United Kingdom’s commitment to multiculturalism was weakened when it faced more local but violent conflicts between white British and Asians in some northern cities and between local people and asylum seekers in Glasgow and other places. At the beginning of 2002 there was considerable confused debate among politicians and the press about the dangers of
multiculturalism, which was identified with segregated forms of housing and education. There was a new emphasis on the importance of immigrants and their children learning English as rapidly as possible and learning about the duties of a unitary British citizenship. Thus whereas the United Kingdom had been a place where multiculturalism could be sympathetically discussed and shown to be compatible with a modern society and a welfare state, it was now seen as a danger. The predominant view became far more like the assimilationist French approach. In this new climate any residual multiculturalism will have to be shown to be compatible with an essentially unitary society. The sort of multiculturalism which has been defended in this paper is, of course, compatible but even such a policy outline will find it difficult to get a hearing.

6. Concluding Remarks

This introduction has ranged widely over a number of topics, including nationalism and devolution in Western Europe, South-Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union, while dealing with the settlement of immigrant minorities who do not make the claims of sub-nationalities. It has been necessary to do this because that is how the issue appears in public debate, whether that debate is sympathetic or hostile to the multiculturalist idea. Throughout, moreover, we have recognised that national and immigrant minorities cannot be simply the objects of policy thought out and imposed from above. A viable multicultural policy will be one that recognises conflicts of ideas and interests between different groups and considers the way in which such conflict can lead to negotiation and compromise.

The present thematic issue of articles explores these themes with a range of case studies. It opens, however, with a theoretically engaging article by Edward A. Tiryakian which examines the recent history of multiculturalism as a concept. For Tiryakian, multiculturalism is a reaction against the state’s monopoly of cultural space that was established after the Westphalian settlement. The decoupling of culture, nation and state, together with global movements in migration, have fostered multiculturalism as an ideology and as a demographic reality that needs to be addressed. In the last forty years or so, Tiryakian argues, cultural conflict has upstaged class conflict as a key aspect of modernity. Yet ethno-cultural conflicts occupy different public spaces and a variety of political options are available for managing multiculturalism, each carrying certain costs and benefits. He cautions that while a liberal ideal is emerging favouring the inclusion in the public sphere of as many different groups and their cultural symbols of collective identity as can commit to the basic norms of the polity – a renovated *e pluribus unum* – this secular ideology meets with resistance. The aftermath of 11 September illustrates some of the more obvious elements of this resistance.

Gurharpal Singh provides us with a fascinating case study of micro-multiculturalism “from below” by focusing on the City of Leicester, which was once described by a local historian as “wholly uninteresting” and by J. B. Priestley
as “lacking in character”. Today Leicester is internationally recognised as a model of civic multiculturalism which has developed a relatively successful approach to managing ethnic diversity and promoting tolerance. Following riots in the northern British industrial cities in 2001, there was considerable official debate about the utility of public policies in managing ethnic and racial diversity. Leicester was identified as an example of best practice, but this model, Singh argues, requires critical reflection, both historically and in the light of public policies aimed at promoting social inclusion and diversity. Assumptions about Leicester’s relative “success” remain untested. Structural changes – demographic, local government, political party identification – are gradually undermining the multicultural corporatism that has characterised local governance since the early 1980s and the city is not without its substantial share of “parallel lives” with a high degree of residential segregation. In the absence of much shared social capital between ethnic and non-ethnic communities, the civic commitment to social diversity, Singh concludes, is likely to come under severe strain as Leicester becomes a majority non-white city by 2011.

Civic multiculturalism and integration is also the subject of Frank-Olaf Radtke’s discussion of the “experiment” of multiculturalism in Frankfurt that reviews the work of the Office for Multicultural Affairs. Maintaining that multiculturalism as a public policy is best associated with developed democracies, Radtke distinguishes between policies that were top-down (Canada, Australia) and bottom-up (United Kingdom, United States). In Germany, because there was no coherent multicultural strategy, local practices – as in Frankfurt – provided the most appropriate case study for policy analysis. In the early 1990s, Frankfurt was viewed as a radical departure in the management of diversity, but in the restructuring of the welfare state currently under way the concerns of identity have been overtaken by social inclusion or debates about the cost of public policy. In response, local policy has changed from the recognition of cultural diversity to conventional integration policy for newcomers. Throughout Germany, according to Radtke, the dynamics of immigration are undermining local initiatives. The heterogeneity of migration, and especially the simultaneous migration of ethnic Germans and non-Germans, has had the effect of refocusing public attention on social integration.

Similar concerns with social cohesion are identified by Catherine Wihtol de Wenden in her wide-ranging survey of multiculturalism in France. She identifies 1968 as a key turning point which began the fight for la différence that culminated between 1987 and 1993 in polarised debates between national or plural citizenship, secularism or interculturalism, and public order versus equality. In France the space for multiculturalism as a public policy has emerged in negotiation with a deeply entrenched concept of citizenship that is viewed as a quality rather than a right. This negotiation through the citizenship of anti-discrimination and rights has led to significant developments in public policy, embracing schools, religious toleration and military service. These developments, Wihtol de Wenden suggests, are likely to be further strengthened by policies emanating from the European Union.
Finally, Hideki Tarumoto provides a refreshing reassessment of the conventional view of Japan as a homogeneous society. This view, he insists, needs to be revised in the light of immigration since the beginning of the twentieth century and the more recent arrival of migrant labour to service the “bubble economy”. Although cultural diversity is a demographic fact, the Japanese Government has not adopted a “multicultural logic” in granting citizenship. Its policy decisions have been influenced mainly by the international human rights regime and by foreign pressure, especially from the Republic of Korea, because of the former colonial relationship. The legal enforcement of migrants’ rights remains problematic, and within government there is no coherent strategy, with departments often following contradictory policies that appear to both encourage and restrict immigration.

Notes
1 Of course there are a number of alternative types of welfare state, as Esping-Andersen has shown (1990), but the British version has been widely influential.

2 Secondary schools clearly also prepare their students for a socially stratified world and they themselves may be stratified. In England there has been prolonged debate about whether there should be a tripartite system of schools or whether all children should study in the same comprehensive schools. Similar arguments occur in other European countries although they may be resolved in different ways.

3 There are of course minorities, especially in Muslim communities, which would support schools preparing their students for living in a separate society. There are even those who would wish to find ways of applying sharia law in domestic matters. However, probably even those who live in communities with these aims also adjust to living in a modern economy and polity for most of their lives.

4 A good comparative account of the development of Canadian and Australian multicultural policies is to be found in Freda Hawkins (1989), Critical Years in Immigration: Canada and Australia Compared. Another important source is Wsevolod Isajiw (1997), Multiculturalism in Europe and North America. It should also be clear from what has been said above that much of the general theoretical debate about multiculturalism has been influenced by the ideas of Canadian scholars such as Taylor and Kymlicka.

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Assessing Multiculturalism Theoretically:
E Pluribus Unum, Sic et Non

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Drawing on John Rex’s call to place multiculturalism in a global and theoretical perspective, this paper begins with a conceptual differentiation of “multicultural” and “multiculturalism”, treating the former as a demographical variable and the second as an ideological variable. The exposition provides a broad historical overview of the relation of culture to state formation in the making of the nation-state, with the more recent decoupling of culture and nation-state, partly stemming from globalisation, partly from new waves of immigration. This decoupling creates opportunities in democratic societies for “minority cultures” of indigenous and new immigrant ethnic groups to seek recognition in the public sphere.

The sociological assessments of multiculturalism as a controversial theme of late modernity have been slow to follow the initiatives of John Rex in the past ten years (Rex 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998). For instance, mainstream American sociology, in its leading refereed journals, has paid scant attention to it and to the public debates surrounding it, with a couple of exceptions (Alba 1999; Koopmans and Statham 1999); yet “ethnicity”, “race” and even “culture”, which are interwoven in any discussion of “multiculturalism”, have been topics of continuing interest to various American sociological researchers. I hope that the present discussion and the attention given to multiculturalism in a new major reference work (Smelser and Baltes 2001) that will be a standard for the social sciences will stimulate the sociological focus this theme merits. Towards this objective, this paper is a modest attempt to assess analytically a very extensive and heterogeneous literature outside mainstream sociology. In doing so, I draw on various leads offered by Rex and his colleagues.

If we take as a point of departure that the challenge of multiculturalism is primarily a challenge for liberal democracies or for societies that are seeking to democratise their public sphere, that is, to invite and increase citizen participation in civil society, then it should not come as a surprise that it is in societies with cultural diversity and a high level of commitment to democracy that debates, contestations
Assessing Multiculturalism Theoretically

and movements surrounding multiculturalism have been the loudest. Why? Partly because it is in the nature of liberal democracies to engage or encourage contestations in the public sphere. Partly because it is in liberal democracies where the state is seen as a source of resources which may become available if grievances are manifest in the political process.

If sociologists have given ample recognition to the role of the state in the development of industrial society, of what was taken to be the cornerstone of the modern social order, for a long time little attention was accorded to the significance of culture in state formation and state legitimation. This, I think, has been redressed in recent years due to a variety of factors, including challenges to the nation-state which are as much cultural as political. Furthermore, as pointed out later, the challenges that are very much involved in multiculturalism are both from within the nation-state and from without, in the latter case, from the former colonial periphery. So a core aspect of what is involved in the challenge of multiculturalism is a challenge to the state’s cultural hegemony – at least this is how some of the critics of multiculturalism perceive the challenge. But the state in a modern democracy may also be responsive to challenges to its hegemony by adopting a variety of policies toward minorities, and these policies themselves become part of the corpus of multiculturalism. Before proceeding, a further contextualisation may serve to point out the theoretical relevance of multicultural/multiculturalism as a critical field of study.

In the “long” nineteenth century, concomitant with the rise of the nation-state, industrialisation, public education, and other well-noted features of modernisation, the major internal challenge for the state was the incorporation of the urban working class (which had at one time been associated with the “dangerous classes”) in the institutional arrangements of the modern social order. I suggest that analysing from various sociological angles, methodologies and value premises the challenges involved in this incorporation/integration did provide sociology with a vast repertoire of research programmes and analyses. That, in fact, was the first phase of liberal democracy. How states incorporated or did not incorporate various minorities in the institutional fabric of society was a major determinant and reflector of national identity. By the mid-twentieth century, with many trials and some failures (e.g. Weimar Germany, several Latin American countries), the institutional order of liberal democracy, modified in the course of 150 years or so, had made its way along the highway of modernity. As a concomitant “conscience and consciousness” of modern society (to invoke Raymond Aron), sociology had made its appearance and its successful institutionalisation.

In the past quarter century or so, a new challenge to liberal democracy has sprung up from another sector. Not from the industrial sector in which the modern state is embedded but from the peripheral cultural sector, from various cultural minorities (racial, ethnic, sexual, even regional as in the case of “ethno-national” communities predominantly living in a homeland territory within the nation-state) challenging
the institutionalised cultural arrangements of modern societies. I take this other side of society as the “private/communal” sphere, a sphere of everyday customs, of informal patterns of socialisation, of grass-roots values and modes of expression (or to invoke the venerable William Graham Sumner, of “folkways and mores” particular to groups). Contrary to earlier static images of culture as an unchanging patrimony handed down from generation to generation, the private/communal is as dynamic if not more dynamic than the public sphere. Although at the micro level the private sphere has as units individuals and small clusters of individuals, such as the household, for the purpose of this paper we can consider immigrant/regional communities of various sizes and their representatives as the subjects of multiculturalism. The challenge to the “public sphere” has been felt foremost in already established liberal democracies – North America, Western Europe, India. It is also present for post-colonial and post-Soviet societies that seek to become liberal democracies and that have significant cultural/ethnic minorities. Some of the latter – as in the case of, say, ethnic Russians in the Baltic states and Central Asian republics – were yesterday setting the cultural agenda of the public sphere and today find themselves relegated to the private/communal sphere.

Obviously, there is no general model of how best to respond to this cultural challenge to national identity and the public sphere. How it is manifest in different settings, and how it is met and with what kinds of success and failure, does offer sociology a new major research field for comparative study, as significant as the earlier challenge and just as significant for the future of liberal democracy. One initial frame for such a comparative study is to be found in the recent volume of Cornwell and Stoddard (2001, 16) in a set of telling questions:

1. What is the official national identity? Who does it include and exclude? How did it arise historically?
2. What does “multiculturalism” mean in each national context? Does the country understand itself as multicultural? What is the place of multiculturalism in national discourse, education, politics and media?
3. How does the country understand or categorise racial and ethnic differences? Who are the groups: how do they identify? What are their relative economic and political positions within the country?
4. What is the history of power relations between and among the groups? What are the tensions, conflicts and alliances?

While it is tempting to put the political horse before the sociological cart, before considering proactive and reactive options of state policies in the face of multiculturalism, it is well to set out an important distinction between two terms that often seem jumbled together. Although obviously interrelated, multicultural and multiculturalism should be seen as analytically distinct, very much as, say, functional is analytically distinct from functionalism. As will be noted in my discussion dealing with each in turn, “multicultural” is a demographic variable; “multiculturalism” (hereafter designated MC) is a normative variable. The two should be seen as analytically distinct but empirically complementary in having
consequences for the public and the private spheres. This requires further elaboration in two succeeding sections, after which I take up how the “post-September 11” situation poses new challenges to liberal democracy in the context of MC. Basically, “post 9/11” may be seen as a test of whether MC has introduced a fault line in the public sphere, in the ability of the national centre – of what Talcott Parsons came to call the “societal community” (Gerhardt 2001) – to hold together.

1. Cultural Diversity

I begin by the assertion that the term “multicultural” is an empirical demographic condition referring to a society (which may or may not be a nation-state but may also include an empire) having two or more ethnic groups, each having cultural traits that may have some overlap with the other group(s), yet is distinctive enough to form a different cultural identity and community.

The relationships of the groups/ethnicities may be on a par in terms of power-sharing, or the groups may stand in relation to one another in a hierarchy, with marked social inequality in certain desirable attributes (wealth, education, status, political influence). The equality/inequality dimension of ethnic relations is not a constant in democratic, “fair game” regimes where competition for group advancement and promotion is legitimated, or it may be static, frozen unless violence intervenes. Belgium is a good case in point of a “traditional” multicultural society (predominantly Walloon [French-speaking] and Flemish [Dutch-speaking], with a small German community) that has witnessed the evolution of the Flemish community and its culture to institutional and territorial parity with the Walloon community. Switzerland is another country with three main language communities (that correlate with religious orientation) having established an equilibrium (though a generation ago, the breakaway of the French-speaking community from German Berne led to a new compromise establishing the canton of Jura).

British devolution of Scotland (and Wales) in the recent past is illustrative of a constituted multicultural society (Scotland retained key institutions after its eighteenth-century incorporation, with its elite sharing and participating in British high culture, and an overarching polity anchored in the crown and Parliament); operating in a “fair game” of politics, the new Scottish Assembly indicates that the institutional arrangements of one period are not frozen.

This is perhaps even more so in Canada, a multicultural society, which at the federal level has made multiculturalism (but not biculturalism), a state policy put in place as far back as the 1960s in the Trudeau endeavour to defuse Quebec separatism. The latter has taken as rallying point a monocultural policy regarding the nature of the public sphere, at least with the passage of Bill 101 in 1977 privileging French, a policy contested by non-francophone ethnic groups within the province of Quebec (Schmid 2001, 108). Equally noteworthy of state political and
cultural decentralisation in the process of becoming a liberal democracy is the case of Spain after Franco, restoring the autonomy of areas such as Catalonia, the Basque area and Galicia, all culturally distinct from the Madrid “centre”.

Taking “multicultural” as a descriptive demographic term (i.e. two or more culturally differentiated groups in the same territorially bounded polity), it must be granted that multicultural societies have been found as far back as recorded history, at least since urban centres appeared. Ancient kingdoms and certainly ancient empires drew together, by force and by economic opportunities, heterogeneous populations. This was a demographic fact, on to which was grafted a political dimension, namely that the public sphere was a cultural monopoly (which in fact, legitimated the polity). This seems to have been the case across a wide variety of historical periods (in the West, from ancient Rome through the Peace of Westphalia) and across civilisations. The central tendency of the public sphere is conveyed by *cujus regio, ejus religio*. At the local, communal level (which for this exposition may be regarded as a component of the private sphere), cultural diversity could be found and even allowed, whether in the Ottoman millet system or the nineteenth-century British indirect rule policy that seemed to work well in India and that the colonial administrator Lord Lugard transplanted to Nigeria. Even the post-Stalin Soviet system, while homogenising the “centre” around the Marxist-Leninist ideology and a central command economy, in fact let the rural countryside retain its traditional cultural ways. For that matter, in the modern West where some aspect of Christianity was the official or institutional/mainstream religion, popular religion and cults, some grafted to the official religion with others existing clandestinely (for example, in the United States, various tribal dances such as the Sun Dance), continued at least well into the last century.

“Modernity” by no means altered the public sphere/private sphere dichotomy (one culture, effectively the culture of the state, in the public sphere; diversity or multiculture prevalent in the private sphere). In fact, one may even propose that state formation in the nineteenth century, in Western “democratic” polities, *greatly expanded certain aspects of the public sphere domination of culture while marginalising other aspects that had been part of the culture of the public sphere*. This was no happenstance in the process of modern state formation: enlarging the cultural aspects of the public sphere was, much more than has been realised, a vital aspect of establishing a *national identity* that is instrumental in providing underlying attachment and legitimation to the state.

A critical cultural complex is that of language, and with it, the legal code. The formation of the modern nation-state, certainly in the case of France and the United Kingdom, but also Spain and probably others, called for imposing a uniform language over the territory of the state – French, English, Spanish. These “submerged” or drove out what had been the vernacular in important regions (Wales, Brittany, Catalonia, etc.). This aspect of state formation, the forging of a *nation-state*, met with resistance in several instances, particularly where the state
Assessing Multiculturalism Theoretically

sought to impose its control over long-standing institutions that had previously been custodians of culture. With respect to the latter, I have in mind the Kulturkampf (literally the “culture war”) that Bismarck launched against the Catholic Church in the 1870s and a similar battle that Jules Ferry launched against the French Catholic Church a decade later; Bismarck had to back down, eventually, but the Third Republic and laicity established control of the public sphere in 1905 (the Loi Combes, named after the minister who drafted the legislation), driving religious orders from a role in public education.

But, by and large, the deployment and institutionalisation of a national culture, complete with the “invention of traditions” was a great success of the modern nation-state of liberal democracy. With important variations from one societal setting to another, the process was one of complementing the parturition of the modern state at the beginning of the nineteenth century with the modern nation by the beginning of the twentieth. In the context of this discussion it might be said that this phase of modernity witnessed the state – its major institutions (and education took on a critical role) and “organic intellectuals” – imposing a policy of what in retrospect might be termed monoculturalism. This, it should be cautioned, was only partly done by means of coercion; it was also in various ways and by use of various symbols (national anthems, monuments, secular holidays, heroes, children’s storybooks, etc.) embedded in voluntary everyday “banal nationalism” (Billig 1995). Monoculturalism did not mean an eradication of the culture of “others”; it meant that there was a publicly recognised cultural mainstream in the public sphere. That this mainstream was a key part of the nation-building of liberal democracy was all too frequently lost from sight until, that is, the questioning gaze of MC.

If these remarks regarding the public sphere/private sphere demarcation give us a buoy in charting the unsettled MC waters, to stay afloat we need to be aware that the historical overview stressing state or public hegemony of culture has undergone a tremendous mutation in the past forty years. It is in effect that the monopoly (or, for some consideration that need not detain us here, the oligopoly) of the public sphere has been and is being challenged by the communal sphere, that is by culture-bearers of “other cultures”, that had been ignored, devalued or denigrated in the institutional arrangements of the state, in the definition of legitimated culture, in civic ideals, and so on. This challenge – really a multipronged affair – is a different form of legitimation crisis than that the early Habermas drew attention to in reference to capitalism (1975). Perhaps it is an even more serious and far-reaching one, as it touches on collective identity more deeply, or at least as deeply, as the economic underpinning of modern society. In the next section I discuss several bases of MC. However, before entering this ideological domain, we need to remain a while longer at the demographic aspect of multicultural.

I would suggest that there has been in effect in the past thirty to forty years a real “paradigmatic shift” in how modern nation-states, at least Western nation-states,
represent themselves; furthermore, this paradigmatic shift is a reflection of both (a) demographic changes and attendant socio-economic consequences, and (b) an assessment of what these demographic changes mean. Instead of one dominant ethnie or national group (however constructed/“imagined” that may have been’), which was or controlled the “centre” of society’s institutional arrangements, the shift is towards acknowledging, accepting, welcoming, accommodating the presence of “others” in the public sphere. And by “others” I intend “ethnic” as well as “women”.

The demographic composition of the population by gender, taking the United States as a Western reference society, has not altered to any marked extent. However, one of the most significant of social and cultural transformations of modern society is the “stepping out” of women from being confined to the private sphere to having increasing freedom of access to the public sphere. Although still short of parity, numerous are the women routinely elected and appointed to various high-ranking public offices that a generation ago would have been seen as the exception. In the United States, at least, commensurate with the breakdown of gender segregation in higher education and women becoming as numerous as men at all levels of higher education, “Womens’ Studies” have become an accepted integral aspect of academic institutions, which are a major bridge between the public and the private sphere.

The ethnic composition of the population has been going through some major secular changes. With lower fertility rates of “Whites” declining faster than other major ethno-racial groups, while the “Whites” remain the largest group, they are a declining proportion and by the mid-century will not be the majority. At the same time as this internal demographic change is occurring, “globalisation” has set in vast patterns of immigration, with significant inflows from East Asia and South Asia to North America and Western Europe, from the Caribbean to North America and Western Europe, from Latin America (especially Central America) to North America, from the Middle East and the Maghreb to Western Europe; other areas having labour shortage and strong economies (or at least that were strong until the present global economic slowdown) have also seen an influx of manual and menial labour, for example, Australia and the Gulf oil states.

Different countries and different segments of the “host” population have reacted differently to substantial immigration. And some governments who encouraged immigration to offset labour shortages in the 1960s and 1970s have had to face a political “backlash” in the 1990s, leading to various restrictions on immigration, though these fall short of what extreme “nativists” were demanding in the way of repatriation of unwanted immigrants (for the most part with racist overtones). None the less, there is now an enhanced presence of newcomers (including their progeny who are bilingual), who are both producers and consumers, and their presence is not the “benign neglect” of a generation ago but an open and on the whole welcome presence, in commercial and non-commercial advertisements, in
television media, and so on. Our liberal ideology, which is an anchor of modernity, may take pride that the welcome of “others” is the result of actualising the premise of the Enlightenment overcoming the conservative inertia of tradition. However, it is also realistic to suggest that the sheer increase in numbers and in relative proportion of the population translates into the immigrants having a certain degree of economic and political power, which the private and the public sector can appreciate, each for its own ends.9

Different countries will react differently to new multicultural and multiracial demographic realities. How to account for the institutional variability in the accommodations of the public sphere to the private/communal sphere is an engrossing comparative sociological study. And if this has an important bearing on changes in national identity, it may also uncover some interesting features of personal identity in modern societies. So, for example, in the 2000 Census of the United States, instead of pigeonholing individuals by asking them to identify with one race, as had been done previously (Lee 2001), more than one choice was allowed in the racial categories: White, Black, American Indian and Alaskan Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander, Some Other Race. While the overwhelming majority opted for one race, Table 1 indicates that nearly 7 million Americans in terms of identification think of themselves as “multiracial”, mostly “two races” but with even finer degrees of “hybridity” (Brah and Coombes 2000; Pieterse 2001) shown, albeit in rather insignificant numbers. Although marriage is far from being a “free market” system in the United States, continuing patterns of interethnic and probable higher rates of interracial marriages make for greater fluidity of ethno/racial boundaries, and add to the variability within categories. Present patterns of immigration in the United States are likely to accentuate rather than alter this important multicultural trend (Alba 1999), and the situation is very similar in the United Kingdom (Phoenix and Owen 2000).

A useful research programme, far beyond the scope of this paper, would be a comparative study of state responses to new demographic compositions of the population, stemming from immigration and/or the effects of differential birth rates. Also a variable in such comparative research would be changing ethno-racial categorisations of the population, such as took place in the 2000 United States Census and the 2001 UK Census (for the latter, see Phoenix and Owen 2000, 92).10 For the present, however, we need to consider the normative/ideological aspects presented by MC.

2. Multiculturalism

Radtke remarks that MC is a “diffused concept”, having travelled ubiquitously from its North American origins in Canada and the United States in the early 1970s, across the Atlantic to Western and eventually Eastern Europe, and across the Pacific to Australia and India (Radtke 2001, 10185). In the preceding section I have suggested that if it has done so, this may certainly in part reflect underlying
broad demographic changes in the ethnic/cultural composition of populations and consequent pressures to change patterns of integration between the public sphere and the private/communal sphere. Concomitantly, it may also reflect a generational weakening of the attachment and commitment to the national culture, stemming from factors which have yet to be analysed and empirically studied. In any case, let us treat MC analytically, keeping in mind as the editors of an important volume on the subject point out, that “there is no MC tout court; there are only specific, context-dependent multicultural problematiques” (Joppke and Lukes 1999, 16). The implication is clear: not only is there great diversity in the empirical conditions of different societal settings which give rise to frictions and clashes between the private and the public sphere, but also such clashes are to be expected in democratic societies where ballots count more than bullets in accessing valuable resources, at least as long as there are socio-economic and demographic inequalities between segments of the population. Given this broad caveat, what are major aspects of MC, which in terms of acrimonious public debates around its meaning and import appears more like a Hydra than an occasion for enlightened transdisciplinary dialogues (Camic and Joas 2003)?

At a high level of generality, MC is a normative critique of the institutional arrangements of the public sphere that are seen as injuring or depriving a cultural minority of its rights. The critique may entail claims to redress this deprivation in the public sphere so as to enhance the opportunities of the minority in question to enjoy life and to have a greater degree of self-development and self-realisation than is provided for in the present institutional arrangements. Stated with such generality, MC shares features in common with earlier broad movements of modernity, such as the labour movements and the nationalist movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As Rex has discussed (1998) the challenge of MC to the public sphere addresses not only the cultural scene which privileges some groups at the expense of others but also other components, economic and political, for example. Previous social movements challenged these until the present era of “New Social Movements”, among the latter MC may be included.11

2.1 Multiculturalism as Cultural Nationalism

Relating MC to social movements, then, though it takes on various context-specific forms, MC at one level is the making of claims of cultural nationalism, one that is differentiated from, though often interrelated with, claims of political if not economic nationalisms. So, for example, demands of various minorities – including feminists – that museums should make place for diversity in lieu of the implicit elitism of “bourgeois hegemonic culture” are growing demands of cultural nationalism.12 Claims that corporations should have a greater number of minorities in the managerial-executive level are aspects of ethnic nationalism; claims for a greater role in political office and representation are those of political nationalism, and have de facto been part of the political scene of modern democracies once universal suffrage was adopted.
In keeping with the argument of Hutchinson, cultural nationalism merits being viewed as “providing models for communal development, and in this role to be a recurring force to the modern world” (1987, 46). Of course, not all view MC as a progressive element in advanced modernity; it has had and will continue to have its share of doubters, whether in the United States, France or the United Kingdom. And the doubters cannot be readily identified as “racists” or “conservatives” in any traditional sense, as among the most thought-provoking responses to MC, responses which themselves are part of the corpus of MC as a topic of sociological research, are those from eminent liberal scholars, such as Schlesinger (1998) and Schmidt (1997) in the United States and Schnapper (1998, 2002) in France.

Taking as ingress to MC that one of its dimensions is that of cultural nationalism making claims on behalf of a “minority culture”, then we may view three loci, and not just one, of cultural grievances.

First, the one that has gained the most visibility in recent years is from ethnic and racial minorities within the metropolitan areas of advanced industrial societies. They may or may not be indigenous to the metropolitan areas. Their claims are that the dominant culture denigrates, discriminates, disempowers and does “symbolic violence” to the minority culture and to its culture-bearers.

Tacitly and often explicitly, advocates supporting the claims of MC have sought for the minority culture (and its bearers) to be given a fair share in remaking the national culture of the public sphere. Being given recognition carries with it sometimes tangible and sometimes symbolic rewards. So, for example, in various parts of the United States, recognition is now given in textbooks to the contributions of minority cultures, curricula may now require recognition of literatures other than what had been the “canon” of Western civilisation. Cultural diversity may lead to new mores, for example, where a generation ago “Merry Christmas and Happy New Year” were traditional end-of-year greetings and wishes in the public sphere, now a more generic “Happy Holidays” is de rigueur as a shortcut for celebrations of Christians, Jews, Muslims and African-Americans. This sort of recognition of difference has various other manifestations, for example, accommodations in the dress code at work, or special dietary provisions in the workplace or in schools, calendars noting holidays and celebrations of “minority” cultures and so on. This sort of adjustment, a mode that partakes of what Wieviorka identifies as “toleration” (1998, 245), has been made with relative ease, despite well-publicised conflicts between customs and practices of the minority culture when its bearers seek to carry out these practices when they enter the public sphere (as in the highly publicised French affaire des foulards).

It is when immediate advocates of MC, that is, when stakeholders of the minority culture, make demands that call for significant economic and political resources that cultural nationalism receives serious opposition. In effect, it is when structural changes in the institutional arrangements of the public sphere and the relation of
the public sphere to the private/communal sphere are called for that the reactions against MC are most vehement. In the United States, affirmative action programmes (Tomasson et al. 2001), on the one hand, and on the other hand demands for autonomous programmes and departments of studies of minority cultures (which were enlarged to include minority sexual cultures) have become part of the public institutional sphere, but have also been met with strong resistance and counter-movements, such as the National Association of Scholars. Today in the United States a new level of claims is being made by segments of the African-American community (for the most part outside academe): claims of financial reparation for the injuries of slavery and racism. It is too soon to know how the state will respond to this, and whether if reparation does get official recognition whether similar and equally justified claims will be made by the Native American Indian population. However, claims for reparation may well become the next phase of MC contestations, at least in the United States.

Two other locales need be entertained briefly. One is areas from the periphery within the nation-state that have maintained a collective identity anchored in a distinct language, a distinct history which includes memories and aspirations of independence, and a series of grievances that their culture and their culture-bearers continue to endure from the state and its functionaries. MC in what may be called these “ethno-regions” is the demand for recognition of the worth of this culture (and, particularly, its language and institutions), of having equal access to education institutions, and even, among core militants, aspirations of a completely autonomous polity that would be a more authentic “nation-state” than what now passes as a nation-state. Short of this autonomy, however, regional MC will seek a variety of means to retain the cultural identity of the region and to promote opposition to cultural homogenisation by the state cultural and legal apparatus.

The other locale is the periphery outside the territory of the nation-state: the periphery of the empire. Various intellectuals who in one period of the empire might have accepted a “subaltern” role, and even enjoyed in rare instances (such as Senegalese President Leopold Senghor, a member of the French Academy) the highest academic accolades, became a generation later vociferous critics of the hegemony of Western culture and civilisation (Spivak 1999; Sayid 2000). The lack of recognition (what might be equally termed “the presence of absence”) of non-Western civilisations in the official culture of the empire/West as transmitted in education (and the underdevelopment of education institutions outside the metropole) became a noted grievance of African, Asian and other intellectuals from a post-colonial perspective. These criticisms have had their effect, in introducing new courses and programmes of study, and in endeavours to reconceptualise “multiple paths of modernity” rather than any single trajectory (Eisenstadt 2000).

In passing, it might be noted that cultural nationalists within the nation-state and those from without, in the ex-colonial locale, though in fact having structurally the same grievances regarding the hegemonic dominance of the culture of the nation-
state (or the empire or the West, from the post-colonial perspective) have made their critiques in isolation from one another. Both reject the “universalism” and “essentialism” of the culture centre of the nation-state, yet seem unaware that there is more than one periphery.

2.2 Multiculturalism as State Policy

Earlier I have asserted that states receive their legitimation in various ways (including, of course, the use of force), one of which of particular relevance here is acceptance and commitment to national culture. Challenges to the arrangements of national culture stemming from MC demands and claims on behalf of cultural minorities have generated and will continue to generate state responses in the form of MC policies. State responses are political responses to pressures from various politically active groups, and in the case of MC, there are groups wishing to advance the interests of minority cultures, to give them a larger part of the public sphere, while there are those wishing to either maintain the equilibrium, the status quo, or to prevent access to the public sphere. From this point of departure, we can think of different options of state responses to a growing demographic presence of immigrant minorities, along the lines of analysis advanced elsewhere by Rex (1998):

1. total exclusion from the public sphere (denial of citizenship) and returning of minorities to countries of origin (approximated by the policy of apartheid in South Africa a generation ago);
2. non-recognition of minorities as culturally distinct but granting citizenship to those born or naturalised on host soil (as has been the main policy of France and the United States);
3. treating immigrants and their children as temporary residents who will return to their homeland after contractual employment and therefore do not have the right to citizenship; some state policies may provide them with welfare benefits of citizens, others may not.
4. acceptance of various forms of MC:
   (a) recognition of minority communities and their cultures as part of the institutional fabric of the social order, but under the aegis and ultimate sanction of the state and its national culture (the indirect rule of many colonial and imperial systems, including the Ottoman millet system giving limited autonomy to multiple ethnic communities);
   (b) overhauling the structure of the national culture to have a more complex, diversified or hybrid culture, with autonomy for each of the major minority cultures while protecting and enhancing rights of individuals. Presumably, in this policy option, no one ethnic culture is privileged above any other.
These are some of the options of state policies which may be viewed as ideal types. If the first three have been the most commonly opted for in the past by liberal regimes (and by not-so-liberal ones), demographic changes, which I have suggested is a critical variable, may increasingly favour some version of the fourth. As a recent survey by The Economist (2002) documents, Europe’s indigenous population is ageing rapidly and not reproducing itself, increasing the burden for those active in the labour force; it has to become more “immigrant-friendly” to make up this deficit. And as the potential sources of immigrants are culturally distinct from the traditional European national cultures, the implication is that to obtain and retain the newcomers and their families, increased recognition of MC in the public sphere will be necessary.

Similarly for the United States, which has had an unexpected population boom beyond what the 1990 Census projection had anticipated at the “higher end” of projections (281 million actually against 275 million projected). The “browning of America” (in recognition of the differential growth of the non-white population) will also favour greater acceptance of MC in the public and communal spheres, from political parties, business organisations and the mass media.

2.3 Multiculturalism as Social Philosophy

I have suggested in this paper that MC debates revolve around the challenges to liberal democracy and to the pillars of liberal democracy that ultimately can be traced to the political philosophy of the Enlightenment. The texts of an important segment of MC literature are not sociological or literary texts but really expressions of social philosophy, regarding the good society, the part of culture(s) in the good society and the question of self-identity.

There is no scientific way of providing criteria for which one social philosophy is more valid or more accurate than another one, albeit many of the texts in MC literature seem to be describing empirical reality rather than emphasising an ideal. Rather than playing the role of arbitrator in the controversies around MC, I think it may be wiser for a sociologist qua sociologist to be a conduit for dialogues between various interlocutors. But perhaps to bring some codification to the social philosophies, it may be useful to point to some similarities – perhaps we can speak of convergence – in seemingly different texts.

First, although the springboard for his reflections has been the ethnic and cultural conflicts in Quebec and the feelings of inferiority and dominance of the French population before and after the “Quiet Revolution”, Canadian Charles Taylor (1994) has provided MC with a seminal writing on the “polities of recognition”. He takes modern recognition, crucial to the modern self-identity, as having a pole of “dignity”, as advocated by Kantian universalism, and a pole of “authenticity” that draws from Rousseau; it is tempting to think that the former is the pole of practical reason, the latter of affect, feelings. Whereas reason is a universal that endows all
Assessing Multiculturalism Theoretically

with a potential dignity, authenticity and affect are grounded in “actually evolved cultures” and cultural justice is “as central as universalist justice”, (Lash and Featherstone 2001, 12).

In a sense, it follows that the “cultural turn” entails the recognition of culture, and perhaps more accurately, cultures in the plural, as constitutive of the human condition. Liberal social philosophy has, until the challenge of MC, privileged individualism and the rights of individuals. Durkheim, sociologist-philosopher, recognised that individualism was a value bestowed on the individual by modern society and that individualism needed to be buttressed by intermediary associations. Still, his liberal republicanism did not take into consideration that modern society, in addition to civic institutions and individuals, also had immigrant minority cultures providing significant communal social support (Rex 1998, 266). As a worthy contemporary successor, Habermas has made “constitutional patriotism” based on universalism and equality of citizenship the cornerstone of his vision of modern democracy, stripped of ascription and hierarchy. The question is whether “constitutional patriotism” and its association with civic virtues suffices to provide a common culture, a common good that can integrate both the indigenous population and immigrant newcomers, particularly where the newcomers carry a very different cultural baggage than that of the established national culture.

My reading of texts is that there is a growing perspective that the representation of modern society must give greater accent to the pluribus side of the American motto, whereas a previous generation stressed the unum, while recognition of diversity and of multiple communal bonds must also retain the institutional framework that produced liberal society. At least, this seems indicated in various new depictions and interpretations of the American experience (Takaki 1993; Hollinger 1995).

If this in fact is a new “centrist” position, there are opposed perspectives. On one side is the conservative liberal voice, elegantly stated by Schlesinger: in his concluding “E Pluribus Unum?”, in effect a vindication of cultural assimilation, he affirms: “The past may sometimes offend one or another group; that is no reason for rewriting history” (1998, 146f).

On the radical side are voices that question the recognition of any cultural boundaries, who stress the fluidity of cultural identities, the cross-cutting and overlapping nature of identities in non-Western societies (Bhargava et al. 1999, 30), and in diaspora communities (McGuigan 1996, 139ff). One senses in these latter voices a fear or mistrust that categorisation freezes the status quo and invariably leads to hierarchy, invidious comparisons and perhaps ultimately new forms of discrimination.
3. Aftermath of 11 September: *E Pluribus Unum, Sic et Non*

The totally unexpected attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 were an unparalleled crisis for the American psyche. As the attack was identified as originating in the militant Islamic world, that is, having been planned and organised by bearers of a non-Western culture and civilisation, would the fragmentation of American society along the lines of minority ethnic and racial cultures that were not the architects of American institutions follow? In other words, would the forebodings of the conservative voices become actualised in this period of deep crisis?

No such thing happened. All the different ethnic and religious communities, including Islamic communities, rallied around the American national culture, its values, and perhaps above all, its flag. Certainly, *unum* came on very strong, across the board; “Yes”, it might be affirmed, the centre of the public sphere held following the attack and has continued to hold in shining glory.

But there is a negative side to 11 September, a dark cloud. Despite official protestations that “Islam is a religion of peace” and that only some Islamic evildoers have taken *jihad* as a call for violence, the actions of the American administration have provided little reassurance to the Islamic community that its members, citizens or not, are accepted on parity with others. Surveillance, visa restrictions, and harassment from both private and public spheres, to say nothing of the fact that in the international arena the enemies of the United States always seem to be Islamic enemies, provide feelings of discomfort and of not feeling “at home”. And this feeling of Arab-Americans and of the Islamic community is one that racial and ethnic minorities have had not so long ago, and some perhaps still have now.

So, if hopefully the main trend of late modernity is *E Pluribus Unum* in form, albeit with a new set of the many and a new form of unity, we must be realistic that in practice the institutionalisation of multiculturalism in various societies, including the United States, will still carry with it *Sic et Non*.
**Table 1. Multiracial United States, 2000 Census**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>281,421,906</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One race</td>
<td>274,595,678</td>
<td>97.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two or more races</td>
<td>6,826,228</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two races</td>
<td>6,368,075</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three races</td>
<td>410,285</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four races</td>
<td>38,408</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five races</td>
<td>8,637</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six races</td>
<td>823</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Notes**

1. A more complex case is that of East German academics who held esteemed university positions in the German Democratic Republic (DDR) and found themselves ousted after the 1990 unification (Meier 1994).

2. There is an “indefinite” aspect to the term “post-September 11” because even a year or more after (and for the foreseeable future) the attacks seemingly from radical transnational Islamic groups, state responses and public reactions, particularly in the United States, had important consequences for multicultural affairs and relations.

3. There are various other situations, of course. A society may institutionalise a rotation of power-sharing or a proportional representation of ethnic communities, etc.

4. In response to an awakened Quebec nationalism, the federal government set up a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, which reported in favour of adopting a policy of bilingualism. This de facto recognition of Canada as a “two-nation” state was odious to the centralist Trudeau, who as prime minister modified the B and B recommendation, encouraging state support and recognition of all cultural groups (Breton 1986; Schmid 2001).

5. Official French colonial policy, reflecting Jacobin republican ideology, emphasised *assimilation*, which was operative in a limited but important way for a small number of elites (évolués). However, the prohibitive economic costs of *assimilation* led in practice to colonial rule that allowed for much indirect rule and the keeping of traditional cultures.
I have suggested elsewhere (Tiryakian 1996) that modern Western civilisation has accommodated three “metacultures” that co-exist in a state of tension.

In the case of the United States, the so-called WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) standing for an ethnic hegemon was such an “imagined community”.

There is an admixture of categories used in the US Census, as “Spanish” is a linguistic category, set apart from “White”, “Black” “Indian”, “Asian” and “Other”. “Race” in the 2000 Census became more open-ended as individuals could choose a “multiracial” identity ranging from two races to as many as six or more.

The dramatic rise in the United States at the national and local levels of the Spanish-speaking population, as shown in the 2000 Census (one out of eight Americans), is leading to political reappraisal in both parties of this previously ignored sector. We may expect that within the next two or three decades, as they are projected to become the largest minority population (Alba 1999, 5), the Hispanic community will focus demands for greater visibility in the media and greater political visibility in candidate selection, similar to the African-American successful demands on the mass media and corporate America.

For comparative materials on migration, including changing policies and reactions to immigration, see Kritz et al. (1992), Cornelius et al. (1994), Sassen (1999), and for Finland as a case study of a “new immigrant country” in the age of globalisation, Forsander (2002).

“New Social Movements”, appearing on the scene since the 1960s, have a myriad of manifestations as alternatives to existing institutional arrangements and practices in the public sphere. Over the past three or four decades, many of them, like the women’s movement, have had most of their claims and demands incorporated in the public sphere; others such as the “green” movement have had only partial success, more in Europe than in the United States.

For multiculturalist demands made on museum directors, such as formulated in Different Voices, published by the Association of Art Museum Directors, see Tassel (2002).

It might be noted that “recognition” was formulated by sociologist William I. Thomas as one of the “four wishes” basic to the human condition, in his classic The Polish Peasant in Europe and America (1918–20) and his later The Unadjusted Girl (1923). Thomas treated the four wishes as “necessary to personality formation and development” (Hinkle 1952, 474).

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Assessing Multiculturalism Theoretically


Congress of Sociology, RC 04 Session on “Sociology of Higher Education”.


Assessing Multiculturalism Theoretically

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Multiculturalism in Contemporary Britain: Reflections on the “Leicester Model”*

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Following riots in northern English industrial cities in 2001, there was considerable official debate about the utility of public policies in managing ethnic and racial diversity. The City of Leicester was identified as an example of best practice. Over the last two decades the city has been governed by the Labour Party, which claims to have transformed Leicester into a leading case of European civic multiculturalism. This paper critically evaluates the “Leicester Model” by focusing on political integration, community cohesion and the local economy. The real challenge of the Leicester Model, with reference to contemporary concerns with community cohesion, is that a multicultural city can function primarily through political and economic integration, however impartial or incomplete this might be.

The understanding of multiculturalism as public policy in the United Kingdom has been very much influenced and shaped by the lived experience of ethnic minorities in the large cities. Beginning with the first pioneering studies in the 1960s (Rex and Moore 1967), the urban disturbances of 1980s (Beynon and Solomos 1987), and the more recent riots in northern industrial towns in summer 2001, the urban landscapes where ethnic minorities have settled have always provided a testing ground for the effectiveness of public policies (Smith 2000); and the dramatic manifestation of breakdown, as evident in recent riots, often call into question wider ideals of multiculturalism as public policy. The disturbances of 2001 were no exception. In retrospect they will probably mark a turning point for the Labour Government that came to power in 1997 as “New Labour” with its agenda of a “Cool Britannia” in which cultural diversity was to be celebrated. Yet in less than four years, against the background of the pressures generated by the asylum seekers, the hostility to the report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000), the urban riots and the fallout from 11 September, this policy has marked something of a volte-face. Increasingly, the language of “Cool Britannia” with its promise of “community of communities” has been marginalised by the theme of a “cohesive nation” and “community cohesion”.

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This change of policy can be seen most clearly in the official analyses and recommendations for dealing with the disturbances of 2001 in northern industrial towns (Building Cohesive Communities 2001; Community Cohesion 2001; Community Pride not Prejudice 2001). Eloquently captured in the dramatic phrase “parallel lives” – of whites and non-whites where riots broke out – the new approach concentrates on the need to build community cohesion alongside the pursuit of racial and ethnic equality. Cultural pluralism and diversity, it is argued, has to be tied more firmly to a clearer definition – and clearer obligations – of citizenship as well as the need to develop a shared conception of nationhood. A laissez-faire approach to multiculturalism, it is conjectured, can be a prescription for a de facto apartheid (Community Cohesion 2001, 9–12). In practice this new emphasis in policy is envisioned as being realised through a set of promotional policies, national legislation and targeted local policies. The broad array of urban regeneration programmes and local authorities are seen as the best agents for promoting community cohesion while recognising the need to value diversity. Local authorities in the future are likely to be required to develop community cohesion strategies that, among other factors, prioritise the need to promote intercultural contact (Local Government Association 2002).

The emphasis on community cohesion as the explanatory cause of recent riots can perhaps be explained by an understanding of the disassociational nature of community relations in northern industrial towns, a disassociation fostered, it is claimed, by the policies of local authorities which failed to arrest separate development. In contrast the apparent “success” of local authorities such as Southall and Leicester in avoiding such riots, it is suggested, can be attributed to a range of policies and institutional practices that have, over time, checked the development of community dissonance to a degree that would be a cause for concern (Community Cohesion 2001, 15). These assertions, as we shall see, remain to be critically evaluated. None the less the official recognition of the achievements of Leicester City Council (LCC) has led it to begin the process of evolving a new community cohesion strategy that it is hoped “will put Leicester at the forefront of national initiatives on this sensitive issue and will be suitable for dissemination to other authorities” (Leicester City Council 2002).

In this paper I explore how this state of affairs has come about, and to what extent the rhetoric about Leicester reflects developments in the locality. I focus on four points: (1) a brief background to the development of Leicester as a multicultural city; (2) a review of the explanations offered for Leicester’s “success”; (3) a reflection on the contemporary challenges of managing diversity; and (4) the extent to which the Leicester experience throws meaningful light on community cohesion and the contemporary debate on multiculturalism.
1. Leicester and Ethnic Diversity

The City of Leicester, once described by a local historian as “wholly uninteresting”, and by J. B. Priestley as “lacking in character”, today portrays itself as a model of civic multiculturalism, a place of “many surprises”. This transformation of a provincial East Midlands market city into a vibrant multicultural locality is a process that began after the Second World War and only reached its climax in the 1990s (Martin and Singh 2002). Today Leicester’s ethnic minority population is estimated to be somewhere around 35–40 per cent; some projections suggest that by 2011 it will exceed 50 per cent. Currently 45 per cent of the pupils in primary and secondary school are from ethnic minorities. Ethnic minorities are attracted to Leicester from other locations elsewhere in the UK as well as the European Union. The city has a thriving Asian business sector with a rich cultural life that increasingly plays host to a wide variety of festivals such as Dewali. As lead articles in the International Herald Tribune (10 February 2001), the New York Times (8 February 2001), and The Guardian (1 January 2001) have pointed out, Leicester is popularly seen, and officially views itself, as a prosperous East Midlands city that has developed a relatively successful approach to managing ethnic diversity and promoting tolerance.

However, this image contrasts remarkably with the picture of the city in the 1970s as the “most racist” place in the UK where the white provincial equipoise was shattered by the arrival of East African and Ugandan Asians in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Marett 1988). More than 20,000 Ugandan Asians settled in Leicester after 1972 despite the determined efforts by the LCC political leadership to discourage this influx. By 1981 the ethnic minority population of the city had increased to 59,709, an almost threefold rise in a decade. It increased by an additional 17,264 to 76,973 by 1991 (Table 1). Gujarati East Africans comprise the largest segment of this population, representing about a fifth of the city’s total population. In addition to East African Asians and the migration from New Commonwealth immigrants from India and Pakistan and the Caribbean, since the Second World War Leicester has also been the magnet for European migration of Poles (3,000), Ukrainians (3,000), Serbs (500), and Lithuanians (Winstone 1996). In general Leicester’s ethnic diversity is not therefore merely bipolar (whites/non-whites): there is considerable diversity within these two categories.
Table 1. Minority Ethnic Group Population of United Kingdom and Leicester, 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Leicester</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Number</td>
<td>% Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>94.5 51 873 800</td>
<td>71.5 193 502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>0.9 500 000</td>
<td>1.5 4 112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>0.4 212 400</td>
<td>0.3 745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black other</td>
<td>0.3 178 400</td>
<td>0.6 1 756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>1.5 840 300</td>
<td>22.3 60 279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>0.9 476 600</td>
<td>1.0 2 644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>0.3 162 800</td>
<td>0.4 1 053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>0.3 156 900</td>
<td>0.3 770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian other</td>
<td>0.4 197 500</td>
<td>1.0 2 570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.5 290 200</td>
<td>1.1 3 044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100 54 888 900</td>
<td>100 270 475</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Vertovec 1994

A sudden change in the city’s demography in the 1970s set off a wave of local racism in which the neo-Nazi National Front establishing a significant foothold. Bitter conflicts ensued in the workplace and on the streets. In scenes reminiscent of the riots in industrial towns in recent years, an anti-racist movement emerged led by local activists to counter the activities of overt racists and, perhaps more significantly, institutionalised racism within the Labour movement (Marett 1988, Chs. 1 and 3). Young activists within the Labour Party seized the opportunity to outmanoeuvre “Old Labour” and construct a new political programme around a civic vision of multicultural Leicester. In so doing they were responding to local needs as well national developments such as the Race Relations Act (1976), which placed a special duty on local authorities to promote racial equality. The multicultural turn in Leicester’s politics strengthened Labour’s position, ushering in one-party dominance that still prevails; it also created new challenges in how the vision was to be implemented, sustained and redefined in the light of continuing pressures from within and outside.

2. Explaining Leicester’s “Success”

Given the political capital invested in the advocacy of Leicester’s relative “success” in managing ethnic diversity, it is surprising that these claims have so far avoided systematic scrutiny. In this section I evaluate the above narrative together with auxiliary explanations that are often offered for why Leicester is different.
2.1 Political Leadership

In the narrative of the development of Leicester as a multicultural city, the role of the Labour Party’s political leadership in bringing about radical change is seen as the major factor that facilitated the development of a civic multicultural policy. Multiculturalism as a public policy is counter-posed to institutionalised racism, the pursuit of diversity to overt racism towards the new settlers (Winstone 1996). The new policy in the late 1970s, it is suggested, marked a radical rupture with civic conventional wisdom by opening up the political market to ethnic recruitment as well as ensuring that the pursuit of racial and ethnic equality was accompanied by changes in the services delivered by local government. This policy had three key features: the pursuit of equality, the employment of black and ethnic minority staff to ensure that it reflected their proportion within the city’s population, and promotional policies to celebrate diversity and combat discrimination within the LCC and civic life. In short, LCC witnessed a “municipal revolution” along the lines implemented by many radical Labour councils in the early 1980s, of which the Greater London Council led by Ken Livingstone was the prime example (Ball and Solomos 1990).

There is much of substance in this narrative though it overemphasises the discontinuity in policy, the importance of the new departure (The Guardian 2001). To be historically accurate, however, a progressive caucus within the Labour Party had emerged in 1972 at the height of the Ugandan Asian crisis in opposition to the official leadership which then controlled the LCC (Marett 1988, 59). This caucus became eventually the basis of the radical left ruling group who ascended to power on the policy of multiculturalism. In this way it consolidated the Labour vote-bank by providing new sources of support and recruitment for the party. Multiculturalism opened up access to inner-city development funds that became the basis of establishing a patron-client relationship between the local authority and ethnic community groups. It allowed new ethnic minority leadership within the city to be co-opted into key structures of power within the local state. Yet, apart from the overarching political commitment, the policy generally elided more difficult questions of generating an intercultural consensus around which multiculturalism as an ideology could be more firmly rooted in local soil. In so far as these were addressed, they were confronted primarily in terms of discrimination and the celebration of diversity through religious and cultural festivals such as Dewali, Eid and Vaisakhi. These narrow boundaries have remained the source of strength and weakness of the multicultural experiment in Leicester.

2.2 “Twice Migrants” in a Buoyant Local Economy

Political explanations are frequently supplemented by other factors to highlight Leicester’s exceptionalism. Foremost among these is the assertion that the city’s diverse and buoyant economy has helped to avoid the kind of structural unemployment common in England’s northern industrial towns. Thanks to a thriving, diverse local economy that has traditionally included light engineering,
hosiery, boot and shoe manufacturing and retailing. Leicester, it is claimed, has not experienced the intense competition in the labour markets which has sometimes resulted in dual labour markets – segregated patterns of employment between ethnic and non-ethnic minorities. While this was, to some degree, a characteristic during the early decades of migrant settlement, the changes in the local economy since the manufacturing slump of the 1970s and 1980s have produced more varied patterns of employment with self-employment (Winstone 1996). Moreover, because East African Asians were “twice migrants” who arrived with significant entrepreneurial experience, good education and transferable skills, they adapted easily to the local economy by establishing a successful Asian business sector (Vertovec 1994). Today there are over 10,000 registered Asian businesses in the city, including some of the most successful Asian businesses in the UK; and many of these have substantial transnational trading links with Europe, South Asia and North America. Ethnic business success in Leicester is symbolised in the Belgrave Road “Golden Mile” which has become a retail and commercial centre of international renown. Similar centres – Narbrough Road, Evington Road – are emerging in other parts of the city (Martin and Singh 2002, 7–14).

The generally favourable portrayal of Leicester’s local economy normally neglects the significant disparities among and between various ethnic and non-ethnic groups. Thus, for example, in 1991 while self-employment among ethnic groups was above the white average, unemployment among the under-25s was also significantly higher among all ethnic groups when compared with the white population (Vertovec 1994, 263). Ethnic businesses were probably as much a response to the slump in manufacturing as the outcome of entrepreneurial drive by the newly arrived East Africans; and the fact that medium- and small-sized ethnic businesses continue to primarily serve ethnic enclaves highlights their relative lack of integration with the wider local economy, notwithstanding their transnational links. Clearly, what is required is a much more comprehensive understanding of Leicester’s ethnic economy and the degree to which both a response to local racism and the outgrowth of local conditions have historically encouraged small businesses.

2.3 Competition for Public Resources

A third factor, often unacknowledged but certainly implicit in some of the policy and academic research, highlights the fact that the settlement of ethnic minorities in Leicester – as was the case in other cities – was not accompanied by intense competition for publicly managed resources, in particular housing. In the late 1960s and 1970s there was significant pressure on public resources such as education, health and social services following the arrival of East African and Ugandan Asians, which led to a sharp rise in the ethnic minority population in the city from 5 per cent (1968) to 25 per cent (1975). But by and large this pressure did not manifest itself in the demand for public-sector housing. Studies elsewhere (Solomos and Singh 1990) have shown how competition for public-sector housing
has fuelled racial strife. In Leicester, apart from the Afro-Caribbean community, the demand for public-sector housing among other ethnic minorities at this juncture remained weak. Racial hostility to the allocation of public-sector housing to Ugandan Asians, at a time when there were nearly 10,000 people on the city’s housing waiting list, placed intense pressure on ethnic minorities to settle in areas designated for inner-city redevelopment, where accommodation was affordable and proximate to kith and kin. Fear of physical attacks also deterred many from seeking council accommodation (Marett 1988, Ch. 7). As a consequence Leicester’s housing ecology, with its traditional public-sector estates in the west and the outskirts of the city, has contributed to a high degree of “self-segregation” (Phillips 1981). As inner-city areas designated for redevelopment were vacated by white occupants, ethnic minorities took their place. Belgrave and Highfields still have some of the highest concentrations of ethnic minorities in the city, even though there is increasing representation in the north and east of Leicester.

The distribution of public- and private-sector housing in Leicester in the 1960s and 1970s may well hold the key to the pattern of ethnic minority settlement, but historically it would be unfair to attribute Leicester’s relatively good fortune only to the availability of cheap private accommodation. If the allocation of public-sector housing were institutionally racist, racialised entry barriers in private-sector housing also limited the opportunities of more affluent ethnic minorities to settle in Leicester’s suburbs (Chessum 2000, 96–119). Whether voluntary or enforced, the pattern of ethnic minority settlement in Leicester remains highly segregated with western and far eastern Leicester a predominantly white residential area and the ethnic minorities confined to the east and north. To be sure, in the 1980s and 1990s there has been movement by ethnic minorities to the more affluent suburbs in the east and south, but this has been accompanied by professional “white flight”, which appears to be reinforcing the traditional segregation. A more comprehensive profile of the city should be clear when the data from the 2001 Census become available in 2003 (National Statistics Online).

Taken together, these three factors are unexceptional: they can be found in other British localities such as west and north London. Indeed, it would appear that Leicester’s narrative of multicultural “success” is a reified image of the historical development of the city and the place of ethnic minorities within it. This is perhaps because it was very much a response to the problems of the 1960s and 1970s and served well in promoting the recognition of difference in a highly charged atmosphere of violence and intimidation. Ironically the set of issues that now confronts the political leadership in Leicester is, in some ways, equally if not more challenging than in the 1970s.

3. **Leicester and Diversity Management in the Twenty-First Century**

Leicester today confronts a significant set of issues in ensuring that social and ethnic diversity is effectively managed. As the city heads towards becoming the
first “majority” “minority” city, three challenges are of special concern to the policy of multiculturalism.

3.1 Demographic and Social Change

Since the 1980s, Leicester has witnessed a remarkable demographic and social change that is now a distinctive feature of the city. The size of ethnic minorities is increasing, with the 2001 Census figure expected to be around 35–40 per cent of the city’s total population. Some guesstimates, based on surveys of primary and secondary-school pupils, suggest that the figure might be much higher. Evidently the age profile of ethnic minorities, coupled with higher birth rates among some groups, has been the major factor in this growth. Inward migration has contributed too. In recent years Leicester has received some 10,000 Somalis, most of whom have relocated from the Netherlands; and a sizeable number of asylum seekers and Eastern European emigrants have arrived as a result of the war in the Balkans. The city’s “success” as a “genial” multicultural locality has also attracted inward migration by ethnic minorities from other northern industrial towns. Most recently, the property boom in London and efficient rail communications have contributed to a new wave of professionals moving into the city, although many of these have located in the suburbs. Of course, against the patterns of inward migration we need to offset those who regularly leave, especially ethnic graduates but also the middle-aged and the elderly. There would appear to be very little detailed information on outward migration, but it is probably safe to say that it is not of a magnitude to significantly undermine projected growth. How this demographic change breaks down among the ethnic groups remains to be seen, though the dominance of Indian Gujaratis still prevails while the non-Indian ethnic population is increasing. This change is most likely to be reflected in the size of the Muslim population, which has seen new additions from within the UK, the EU and from countries such as Somalia, Malawi and South Africa (Singh forthcoming).

Demographic change has increased diversity in the city’s ethnic population; it also reflects increasing social diversity within the ethnic groups. Secular changes in patterns of employment, consumption, travel, family and lifestyles are also apparent among ethnic minorities, as highlighted by such indicators as female employment, divorce rates and family break-up. For the local policy of multiculturalism these changes raise two specific concerns.

First, there is some evidence of a white backlash against “colonisation from below” that is, the spectre of the city’s white population becoming a minority in its “own” locality. This theme has found some resonance in the right-wing national press, among neo-Nazi extremist groups operating in the region, and is probably reflected in the growing political disaffection with the Labour Party in its traditional white strongholds. The backlash has yet to translate into the virulent racism of the 1970s. But what makes it unnerving, however, is its resilience in the context of twenty-three years of official multiculturalism.
The second major challenge posed by demographic and social change is for a multicultural policy that adequately reflects and represents all constituencies within the city. The multiculturalism of the 1970s may be said to be corporatist, accentuating religious identification and, by accident or design, encouraging segmentation. Consequently it stands desperately in need of revitalisation so that it is more representative, secular and emphasises intercultural relations. In the context of emerging hyper-diversity, multiculturalism as a public policy has to embrace new public space as well as the promotion of rights of “minorities within minorities” (e.g. women, youth and gays). While LCC policy in the last decade has been to recognise this change, the overall emphasis has been on consolidating the ethnic vote-banks. The failure of “minorities within minorities” to secure significant representation in structures throughout the local state underscores the domination of traditional community gatekeepers and their close relations with the local structures of power.

3.2 Ethnic Diversity and Social Cohesion

Demographic and social change in Leicester also draws attention to the tension between ethnic diversity and social cohesion. Although comparatively Leicester was identified as an example of “best practice”, the LCC’s self-assessment of “community cohesion” is far more sanguine, recognising that the progress made is insufficient to underpin a robust conception of civic multiculturalism. As a recent report indicates: “Leicester’s cultural diversity is an economic and social asset but all our communities do not share equally in its success. Inequality and deprivation mixed with cultural and racial diversity create exceptional complexities. Choice, tolerance and justice are pulled in different directions. Local politicians, health providers, faith leaders and the media wrestle with sensitive contemporary issues such as targeting, deprivation, promoting choice and welcoming integrity (Leicester City Council 2002, 2).

The “exceptional complexities” would appear to arise from the twin objectives of promoting social and ethnic diversity alongside tackling deprivation, particularly on large council estates with an overwhelmingly white population. The report notes that thirteen of the city wards (electoral districts) fall into the top 10 per cent of the most deprived wards in the United Kingdom (LCC 2002). Underlying this analysis is an implicit assumption of the dangers of a further polarisation of the city population along geographical and ethnic lines. There is certainly a perception among the wider local populace that the pursuit of diversity has been privileged at the expense of deprivation. One recent public opinion survey of community satisfaction of LCC service delivery indicated that the satisfaction rate among Asians was 53 per cent while the comparable figure among whites was 17 per cent (LCC 2002, 10).

The LCC proposes to tackle these “exceptional complexities” in four ways. First, by articulating a vision for “Leicester to be a premier city in Europe with a thriving
Multiculturalism in Contemporary Britain

and diverse society in which everyone is involved” (LCC 2002, 3). By managing and celebrating diversity, the LCC hopes to tap the creative energy within the local community to ensure that “Leicester remains a model of European best practice, improving integration, sharing innovative ideas and continuing to learn” (LCC 2002). Second, this vision, it is claimed, is shared by the LCC political leadership, its officers, and broader organisations within the local state (e.g. Leicester Council of Faiths) that have successfully generated widespread community support to confront potential ethnic tensions within the locality. Third, the LCC proposes to develop a more effective and consistent community engagement through better networking and partnership with local community groups. Revitalisation of neighbourhoods, where development funds are increasingly channelled to targeted areas, is viewed as the key mechanism for eradicating deprivation. Fourth, the LCC intends to continue to celebrate diversity by promoting festivals such as Dewali, Vaisakhi, Eid, Christmas and the Caribbean carnival, but it recognises that the celebration of diversity through ethnic and non-ethnic festivals needs to be embedded in new cultural spaces. To this end, the LCC is proposing a new £80 million “Cultural Quarter” in the city that “demonstrates both the commitment and willingness to think outside the box [of existing cultural identities] and the ability of staff to work creatively to create new spaces in which communities can come together, learn from each other, and create new forms of intercultural artistic expression” (LCC 2002, 9).

3.3 Political Commitment

Political commitment, as the community cohesion self-assessment of the LCC makes clear, is considered to be the critical variable in shaping a successful multicultural policy. Labour’s dominance since 1979 was established primarily through the ethnic vote, which eroded Conservative Party presence in the inner-city areas while simultaneously consolidating the Labour vote through new forms of patronage-client politics. A measure of this development can be gauged from the observation that in the mid-1980s nearly 10 per cent of the revenue budget of the LCC was allocated to community associations, a large number of which were ethnic minority associations (Willmot 2002). In some ways this initiative encouraged ethnic participation in local politics, with a quarter of current LCC councillors coming from ethnic minority backgrounds; in others it began to produce large (“wasted”) Labour turnouts in wards of ethnic minority councillors while the Labour vote in predominantly white wards began a secular decline. Interestingly, the representation of councillors among ethnic minorities in the city has been confined almost exclusively to the Labour Party. This grave imbalance suggests that multiculturalism as a policy in Leicester has been very much a political project tied to the fortunes of the Labour Party. As such, political integration of ethnic minorities has been delivered almost exclusively through the Labour Party.
The Labour Party’s gradual decline since the 1990s – it currently has a majority of two seats and at the time of writing is expected to lose control in the 2003 elections to a Liberal Democrat/Conservative combine – poses real dilemmas in ensuring political commitment to a form of multiculturalism as pro-active policy that has been sustained by ethnic constituencies. While it is unlikely that a Liberal-Democrat/Conservative combine would deliberately undermine the long-term investment in Leicester as a “multicultural model”, a decision that would have serious repercussions in attracting funding for inner-city programmes, the narrowing of political competition among the three parties increases the potential for out-bidding. In the event of a local regime change what form the new civic vision of multiculturalism will take remains to be seen. Informed observers speculate that a “thin” commitment to multiculturalism as a public policy might be accompanied by a “thick” diversion of resources from the inner-city to the outlying areas of majority white settlement. If this were to happen, there is a danger of Leicester reverting to 1970s-style white political domination based on segmentation and a geographical divide. This “spectre” might be a useful political ploy for the Labour Party to further consolidate the ethnic minority vote. Alternatively, critics of Labour Party policies in Leicester point to the limitations of the Labour project in fostering political integration across local political parties and civic institutions.

4. **Assessing the Leicester Model**

Leicester as the model of best practice civic multiculturalism in the UK, if not in Europe, is clearly in need of a radical reassessment – an assessment that should be historically based, take into account the peculiarities of the city as well as the general framework within which race and ethnic relations have been structured. This brief survey, which is part of such a project (Singh forthcoming), highlights several issues for the current debate on multiculturalism in the UK and elsewhere.

First, the Leicester Model illustrates that political commitment to multiculturalism as a policy is a critical variable in shaping change. Leicester’s dramatic transformation from the “most racist city in Britain” to a model of multiculturalism was accomplished largely by the domination of the Labour Party from 1979 and by continuity in leadership. Yet while this domination has succeeded in combating racial discrimination, improving service delivery and celebrating diversity, it has also resulted in the Labour Party being the primary vehicle for political integration among the city’s ethnic minorities. The local Labour Party in the last two decades has functioned as an intra-consociational body, aggregating the interests of its segmented sections who have been allowed considerable autonomy in interpreting the theory and practice of multiculturalism. This mode of operation produced an effective coalition for policy delivery but at the expense of evolving a cross-party consensus on multiculturalism as a policy. As support for the Labour Party has declined, both the policy and the interests of Leicester’s ethnic minorities seem
threatened, though a realignment of ethnic minority councillors with Liberal Democrats and Conservatives cannot be ruled out.

Second, the recent concern of the LCC with community cohesion in an ethnically and socially diverse locality raises the broader issue of what Putnam (2000) has termed “social capital”. Given the high degrees of relative segregation – accommodation, schooling, employment, political affiliation, patterns of consumption – of the ethnic and non-ethnic minority populations in the city, one might question whether LCC plans to engineer greater intercultural contact will produce the desired outcomes. And even if these outcomes were realised, it is doubtful whether they would articulate a shared vision of a civic future. Whereas historically racism has been a key factor in the city’s segregation, it is not unreasonable to suggest that increasingly it might well be the outcome of self-selection, of “parallel lives” by choice rather than fear. If the latter assertion is valid, then the real challenge posed by the Leicester Model is that a contemporary multicultural city can survive primarily through political or economic integration, however impartial and incomplete this might be. Indeed, a minimal consensual coexistence might recognise the claims to difference without the assumed precondition of social cohesion following the community cohesion agenda.

Third, related to the above point, Leicester’s exceptionalism probably lies – if it lies in anything – in the limited claims the ethnic minorities made on collective goods as they settled in the city, the background of the majority of the migrants and the buoyant local economy. This serendipitous outcome, for all the qualifications introduced above, has gradually produced a virtuous cycle that is now generating problems of “success”. In so far as these conditions are to be found in other British localities – and not in the northern industrial towns – the lessons for successful civic multiculturalism are obvious.

Finally, because of the geographical concentration of ethnic minorities in certain localities and their overwhelming support for the Labour Party, the history of the City of Leicester since the 1960s reflects the general patterns of development in the UK. The multicultural model in Leicester was conceived by Labour radicals in opposition to the prevailing conceptions of political integration. Ironically, under Tony Blair’s “New Labour” the turn towards community cohesion marks a return to the normative ideals of integration prevalent in the 1960s. If carried to its logical conclusion, the agenda for community cohesion will require a rethinking of the traditional relationship between the Labour Party and its multicultural clients. To what extent this relationship takes the form of a reconstituted, decommunalised, and hyper-diverse multiculturalism or its subordination to social cohesion remains to be seen.
5. Postscript

This paper was written a year before three related developments that are likely to have profound consequences for the Leicester Model: the release of census data in early 2003, the second Gulf War and the loss of political control by the Labour Party in the May 2003 local elections.

Data for the 2001 Census indicate that the anticipated demographic changes are taking place at a lower rate than some of the more alarmist projections would appeared to suggest. The city’s ethnic minority population increased from 28.5 per cent in 1991 to 36.1 per cent in 2001. Within this category there has been a significant increase in the Muslim population. Although no directly comparable figures for 1991 are available, the religious composition of ethnic minorities in the city since 1983 has changed from 13.9 per cent Hindu, 3.8 per cent Sikh and 4.3 per cent Muslim to 14.7 per cent Hindu, 4.2 per cent Sikh and 11.0 per cent Muslim (Vertovec 1994, 266; National Statistics Online). The East African Gujarati Hindu demographic dominance in the city is being challenged by the Muslim community.

The second Gulf War mobilised significant anti-war opposition within the UK. In Leicester this mobilisation was orchestrated by the Leicester Council of Faiths. As in other cities, the Muslim community played a significant part in the anti-war protests. This campaign politically mobilised a sizeable section of the local population in the run-up to the May 2003 elections. Transnational issues combined with local politics, as elsewhere in the country (e.g. Birmingham), to undermine Labour Party support. Despite the anti-war stance of many sitting local Labour Party councillors, a large section of the Muslim vote went to the Liberal Democrats who had campaigned on an anti-war platform. This switch of allegiance strategically undermined the Labour Party in its core inner-city wards with the result that Labour was reduced to 20 seats, Liberal Democrat representation increased to 25 and the Conservatives managed to hold on to 9 seats. Overall, ethnic minority representation in the new council declined from 14 seats (all in the Labour Party) to 10, with four Muslims and one Sikh among the new Liberal Democrat councillors.

In the new political configuration, Liberal Democrats have joined with Conservatives to form an alternative administration. This combine has yet to define its policies on civic multiculturalism but will most certainly compromise them in the need to respond to its old and new constituencies alike. Interestingly, all three leading parties have committed themselves to the issue of community cohesion, which is seen as central to urban regeneration. Here the corporatist structures within the local state – Leicester Regeneration Company, national public-sector bodies and voluntary organisations such as the Council of Faiths – have been the key drivers in ensuring this commitment. How this commitment is translated into policy remains to be seen.

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Notes

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1 Detailed figures became available in early 2003 when the 2001 Census data were published. These estimates were based on interviews with LCC officials, and as reported in The Guardian, 1 January 2001.

2 It is difficult to establish a direct causal relationship between the decline in Labour Party’s support and the ‘white backlash’. However given the Labour’s decline is most precipitous in its traditional strongholds of white, public sector housing wards, the inference is certainly worthy of further detailed research.

References


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Multiculturalism in Germany: 
Local Management of Immigrants’ Social Inclusion

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The following case study of the City of Frankfurt am Main reports on the experience with an Office for Multicultural Affairs (OMCA) which was established in 1989 to reshape the city’s administration. Introducing elements both from a theory of the welfare state and from organisation theory, the paper argues that the adoption of a programme of “multiculturalism” (MC) as an instrument of governance and inclusion management is not an moral question but a pragmatic decision of the administration. Multiculturalism is either used or rejected according to the context-dependent contingencies of an organisation’s own rational considerations. In the process of adoption, the MC programme is transformed into internally relevant information. Several examples show that the transformation is highly selective, changes the make-up of MC, and may even turn the concept on its head.

Multiculturalism can be defined as a globally diffused blueprint, offered as an institutional pattern to redefine and manage increasing ethno-cultural plurality, which is a result of all types of immigration. Since the 1980s, the new semantic of MC has been taken up around the world, either conceived as a concept of ethnic mobilisation to improve justice and equity (Rex and Drury 1994), or as a tool of national and local governance to promote integration and keep ethnic conflict under control (Barry 2001).

There are different national and, more important, local adaptations of the concept of MC which respond to varying political and social problems, resources and needs. Whereas there have been several attempts by political philosophers to provide theoretical and normative foundations and precision for the concept (Taylor 1992, Kymlicka 1995), this article adopts a strictly sociological perspective. Following a Weberian approach to ethnicity, MC is regarded as a social phenomenon subject to sociological observation, asking what use is made of the distinction of “cultures” and “ethnic communities” in different social contexts (Rex 1996).

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Against statistical evidence, Germany in the second half of the twentieth century reluctantly denied being an immigrant country. For years, multiculturalism was nothing more than a mere discourse in the political arena and the media, brought forward as an argument by those in competing political parties, in churches and welfare organisations who attempted to initiate a re-description of the dominating jus-sanguinis-based self-concept of the nation. Their political and pedagogical intention was to advocate the recognition of ethnic diversity and to upgrade the integration of immigrants to a major task of the administrations at all federal levels (Radtke 1994).

Even in its post-modern reading (McLaren 1994), MC can be understood as a pedagogical effort to collectively change people’s minds. In a Rousseauian sense, at the root of modern thinking is the “pedagogical” belief that society is changed through the minds and virtues of individuals. Following this axiom, social integration in a multicultural society was thought of as a type of re-education programme to accommodate the population, and thereby transform all institutions to the new and unfamiliar situation of cultural and ethnic diversity. Addressing all, majority and minority (children), the declared aim of education in the long run was to enhance tolerance and mutual recognition of all ethnic groups.

The following case study of the City of Frankfurt am Main reports on the experience of the Office for Multicultural Affairs established in 1989. This paper has two aims. First, it may be read as an empirical snapshot of the reality of public integration policies in Germany as a whole, and on MC and its use as a pedagogical tool of governance at the local level. MC is discussed as a new element in the relationship between immigration, social integration and the welfare state. Second, it asks what use is made of MC when adopted at the level of a city and its welfare administration (see Bommes and Radtke 1996) and what happens to the concept in these administrative contexts.

Bommes and Geddes (2000) have introduced elements from the theory of the welfare state and from organisation theory into the debate on immigration and integration. Drawing on this perspective, the present study shows that MC is not a moral problem of people’s attitudes. Instead it is argued, from an organisation theoretical point of view, that MC as an instrument of governance is either used or rejected according to the context-dependent contingencies of an organisation’s own rational considerations. Initially registered as an unspecific outside irritant to an organisation’s common procedures, the MC programme thus has to be transformed into internally relevant information. This is the case when it is appropriate to re-describe the organisation’s problems and to improve the effective task management of routine operations. Only if MC is regarded as a convenient problem-solver will it be adopted as an additional semantic resource. Only then will it be transformed into an internal programme. The transformation is highly selective, changing the make-up of MC and perhaps even turning the concept on its head.
1. Inclusion Mediation at the Local Level of the Welfare State

Before looking at the City of Frankfurt’s specific way of adapting MC for public integration policies, some clarifications are necessary of local government functions in the Federal Republic of Germany. The federation is divided into three administrative levels, corresponding to the federal government (Bund), then sixteen state governments (Länder) and, at the third level, local governments or municipalities (Gemeinden) including large cities as well as rural areas. In a system of checks and balances, they all are endowed with certain participation rights and duties, and collect their own taxes.

Cities and municipal administrations thus make up the operational level of the German welfare state where, despite immigration, the social integration of all inhabitants has to be managed. In a post-Parsonian view on modern functionally differentiated society, the main social risk for the individual is non-inclusion or permanent exclusion from relevant social systems (Luhmann 1994). Individuals are no longer automatically “members” of the society as a whole, but have to qualify themselves to be claimed by society’s various functional systems. At the operational level, which is characterised by organisation and interaction, to be “claimed” or “called on” means to be part of the system’s specific communications, mostly in the complementary role of member or client, as for example a company, a hospital or a school. In this sense, social systems depend on people for their communications and operations, their minds and competencies.

The most relevant subsystem of society is the labour market. Inclusion in that subsystem today depends on various factors, of which the most decisive are demography, productivity and the mobility of capital. What all three have in common is that their particular development as well as their harmonisation are scarcely influenced by politics. The struggle against exploitation (“overthrowing” or “taming” capitalism), which characterised the period of class conflict in the nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries, has changed into competition between individuals and even whole regions to be included in the now singular and universal capitalist system. Apart from civil war, the almost complete exclusion of former industrial regions and even whole continents from the economic system is one reason for the enormous migration flows from the periphery to the prosperous centres where the chances of inclusion are expected to be higher (Bommes 1999).

In the centres, enduring non-inclusion or definite exclusion of individuals from employment because of labour market surpluses may cause a downward spiral to further exclusion from other systems such as housing, education and health care. In this understanding, the welfare state’s task at the local level is mediation of inclusion in the relevant social systems to avoid disintegration and anomie. The modern welfare state thus claims to create an inclusive universalism in the sense that every exclusion is transformed into a temporary or lasting inclusion in the social system of welfare. The only flaw of the welfare system is that it is linked to the state and thus is national, i.e. territorially segmented, and tends to exclude
foreigners. This is probably the main reason why transnational migration in modern world society is seen as a political problem and is communicated as such (Bommes 1995).

Because of the lasting exclusion of growing numbers of people from employment, local government’s effectiveness in coping with exclusion/inclusion is continually weakened. Traditional welfare policies face a dilemma because of diminishing tax revenue and social security contributions on the one hand, and increasing subsidiary costs for the unemployed paying no taxes and contributions, on the other hand. Under the argument of global market competitiveness (“globalisation”), the enforced change from Keynesian welfare policies (“aid for living”) to Schumpeterian workfare regimes (“aid for work”) (Jessop 1993, Torfing 1999) has been on the agenda since the 1980s. This change to a post-welfare policy replaces state intervention in favour of market mechanisms, which probably create low-wage and part-time jobs but do not claim to solve the problem of increasing social exclusion and marginalisation.

Against this background, from a city’s perspective immigration is in the first place not an issue of “ethno-cultural diversity” but has to be analysed as a socio-technical problem of social integration, of mediating inclusion in the key systems. The task is to facilitate the individual’s chances of being “called on”. This is a service provided in the local government’s best interests – to reduce its expenses for compensatory inclusion in the welfare system.

At the regional and local levels in Germany the different governing bodies work within the legal and financial framework set by central government legislation and the financial resources allocated to them. Municipalities depend on regional legislation and are obliged to implement integration policies drawn up at the higher levels of politics in direct interaction with the clients. Under conditions of financial shortage, which force local governments to choose between competing priorities, they are challenged by the burdensome task of social inclusion mediation arising from high unemployment while they have concurrently to care for the well-being of all their inhabitants. Every new increase in the number of unemployed and every new obligation in the integration of immigrants resulting from federal legislation financially restricts their autonomy of operation in other fields.

Federal immigration law regulates immigration flows, defines the legal status of immigrants, including their rights and claims to be made against the welfare system, and simultaneously decides which governing body is responsible and has to bear the costs of integration measures. The distinctions made by federal law are, with two exceptions, culture blind: “guest workers” and their families, Geneva convention “refugees”, “asylum seekers”, but by definition, ethnic German “resettlers” (Aussiedler) and, since 1989, “Jews” from the former Soviet Union. Additionally, the proposed 2002 immigration law creates a category of wanted
“technical experts”, professionals and scientists, who are allowed entry on a “green card” basis to fill temporary labour market shortages.

Immigration legislation creates several levels of restricted residency rights, from temporary toleration up to full citizenship. Against a background of a legally weakened social status, immigrants have to make their claims against the welfare administration and to compete with the indigenous population. The option to play off different groups of the population against each other is thus a structural part of the political and financial constitution of the German welfare system. Given the legal framework of status differentiation and the denial of full citizenship, even for third-generation immigrants, this option opens the doors to all mechanisms of direct and indirect institutional discrimination.

Direct institutionalised discrimination not only restricts the political and social rights of the immigrants, but is at the same time the cause of regular political conflict between the governing bodies. To give just two examples: if asylum seekers are by law not allowed to take up employment because of a policy of deterrence, this causes illegal employment, an increased demand for social aid and/or criminality at the local level; if state schools are not prepared to work fruitfully with immigrant children because of ideological considerations or financial restrictions, this again causes problems for the municipalities in several respects. Conflicts of this type are permanent and typical in functionally differentiated social systems. In so far as immigration law also prescribes which governing body is in charge of which category of immigrants, regional and local governments may try to recategorise them, for example, from “asylum seekers” to “refugees”, or vice versa, or from Aussiedlers to “asylum seekers”, and thereby transfer the responsibility of paying for the regulation integration measures or other effects of disintegration. Or they may deny their capacity to tackle problems caused at other levels of politics and ignore the social effects.

In Germany, nearly all public debate on immigration is determined by this conflict about responsibility and who has to pay. To enforce their position, politicians, especially local ones at the lower end of the decision chain, will despite ideological party affiliations formulate their objections against certain groups of immigrants in a populist style to gain maximum votes. It is at this point only that ethno-cultural distinctions are used as an argument to redefine immigrants as “foreigners”, “strangers” or even “aliens”. In an exchange of causes and effects, differences of religion and culture – not institutional discrimination and unequal treatment – appear as reasons for social disintegration and marginalisation. The German majority, especially those who associate immigration with loss of control in a rapidly changing world, can easily be intimidated by dramatisations of “immigration floods” and the threat of an expected overload of the systems of social security.
It was against this temptation that MC in Germany was introduced into the political arena as a kind of discursive counter-strategy to fight nationalism, xenophobia and racism. The nation, it was believed, should learn to see that immigration is inevitable in a globalised world, to welcome cultural diversity as an enrichment of everyday life, and, at the administrative level, to cope with immigration and manage integration successfully.

2. Frankfurt am Main’s self-description as a “Multicultural Metropolis”

When implemented in local policy in Frankfurt in the 1990s, MC was thus presented as a new answer to the problem of immigration and cultural pluralism. Adopted for political reasons, it shares the fate of all top-down innovations: suspiciously observed with great reserve, the new semantic was selectively covered, transformed and reshaped by the organisations and actors involved. For more than ten years now it has been an integral part of public policy – but to what end?

After 1989, there was tension at the national level in the aftermath of the surprising and sudden unification of the two German states at the end of the Cold War. This was characterised by nationalist joy but also by enormous immigration flows. The resurrection of a dirty nationalism and murderous waves of xenophobia and racial harassment in many German towns caused concern among all political actors. The introduction of the semantic of MC seemed to guarantee post-national political correctness. Against this national background, a configuration of political parties and individuals at the city level in Frankfurt produced in the municipal elections a very local policy formulation of MC in the form of what was to become the OMCA (AMKA 1990, 1993, 2000; Mestre Vives 1998; Radtke 1991). The office’s establishment should not be structural-functionally understood as a reaction to immigration or ethno-cultural plurality, but rather – in the context of a specific political and discursive climate – as a compromise between the strategic interests of local political parties, traditional administrative and informal power structures, and personal ambitions.

Frankfurt am Main is a comparatively small city in western Germany with less than 650,000 inhabitants. The medieval and the pre-modern city was rich and open to trade but governed by a notoriously illiberal and religiously intolerant regime of patrician families. Frankfurt always had immigrant minorities, among them a large Jewish community which, because of financial considerations, lived under the declared protection of the Emperor. Despite that, concentrated in a ghetto since the fifteenth century, Jews regularly experienced murderous pogroms. The ghetto was not abolished until the beginning of the nineteenth century during Napoleonic rule. The assimilated Jewish community – one of the largest in Germany – was completely deported after the final pogrom in 1938.
Frankfurt is the birthplace of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and, in 1848, happened to be the location of the first liberal-democratic National Assembly in the Church of St Paul (Paulskirche). The city saw the flourishing of a liberal bourgeoisie that in 1914 founded the modern university and in 1923 the then famous Frankfurt Institute for Social Research. As a symbol of the better traditions of Germany, the city in 1948 applied to become the provisional capital of the Federal Republic, but the bid failed after a very close decision. Since this outrage, the city has made it clear that it is not at all content with being an insignificant but prospering provincial sub-centre far from Munich, Hamburg, Cologne, and now Berlin. Despite its small size, Frankfurt wants to be recognised as a global city and a metropolis, comparable to other big cities around the world. There is a deep-rooted complex within Germany of being underestimated, countered in a permanent search for at least symbolic importance that motivates local policies.

Indeed, besides its futuristic architecture, Frankfurt has some characteristics of a global city. It is the centre of an agglomeration containing up to 4 million people, grouped around the international Frankfurt Airport. In the Rhein-Main area nearly 25–35 per cent of the population, the highest level in Germany, are non-German born. The unemployment rate during the 1990s was only half of the country’s average; the number of highly qualified people of working age (“young urban professionals”) was higher than in the rest of the country. With regard to formal education and income, there is a growing polarisation within the population. 40 per cent of children entering school every year speak a language other than German at home. Frankfurt is also a centre of drugs and all varieties of organised crime and illegal activities, including illegal immigration. A local lifestyle weekly reported in the early 1990s that, as in New York, the police had identified not only juvenile “street-gangs” but “multicultural” ones, too.

Part of this mixture of hurt pride, economic prosperity, and a enduring tradition and admiration of economic internationalism and globalism, is the early attraction to “multiculturalism” in a “we-should-have-it-too!” attitude. Multiculturalism was introduced into local discourse in the 1989 local election campaign when the disoriented left was afraid of a new German nationalism and chauvinism. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the May 1968 Paris student leader and prominent Frankfurt house squatter, who ran for lord mayor for the Green Party two years later, partially supported by the mass media, promoted the idea in a rhetorically and strategically brilliantly organised campaign under the slogan “cultural diversity instead of national simplicity”. Cohn-Bendit and his Green electorate were convinced that Frankfurt was, and had to be perceived as, a “multicultural city” and that the local government had to respond to this fact by restructuring the administration. Even if Cohn-Bendit was not elected mayor, he succeeded in doubling the Green vote, becoming a honorary member of the city council responsible for the by-then established OMCA, the first such office in the republic.
3. Exclusiveness of the Welfare System

A local administration is composed of a wide range of offices with specialised responsibilities for the needs of individual inhabitants and the community as a whole, with one notable exception – schooling. Apart from the municipal services in such fields as public order, energy and water supply, housing, rubbish removal, cemetery administration, etc., the core activities of the local welfare state include elementary education (Kindergarten) and day care, youth work, health care, social aid, and special services for the elderly and disabled – all supplied to prevent or minimise the major threat in modern society of exclusion from the relevant social systems. Some of these activities are subject to neo-liberal privatisation efforts, in other core fields of social work the municipality cooperates with subsidiary organisations of churches, unions or other welfare organisations.

From the perspective of the welfare system, schooling is an astonishing exemption in the catalogue of the city’s responsibilities. In the German federal system, staff recruitment and the definition of the curriculum is the major task of regional governments (Länder). The municipality has only to provide and maintain the school buildings. This division of responsibility – a relic of the magisterial state-centred organisation of the German school – is another cause of conflict between the administrative levels: schools in a meritocratic society not only have potential for social integration, but in particular the German three-track school system already creates inclusion/exclusion (“losers”) problems at the primary level, which have to be solved by other organisations of local welfare administration. Conflict between different administrations will arise when an organisation which causes a problem, in this case school failure, is not responsible for the consequences of its own actions, i.e. for the expenses for compensatory extra- or post-school integration measures or increasing social disintegration.

The example of the school points to a central paradox of the welfare state at the operational level: the various organisations are conceptualised as mediators of inclusion in the relevant social systems, but at the same time they are exclusive themselves, in so far as they define their competence and refuse their services to certain individuals or even whole groups of the population. All the different offices and welfare providers in a city are formal organisations which autonomously define what they recognise to be a relevant problem, and what problems they are responsible for. The definition of a social problem depends on the administration’s own abilities, resources and options. Decision-making in organisations follows de facto the maxim of reducing complexity and ensuring that the organisation is able to continue its operations, i.e. primarily to solve the organisation’s own problems which may cause (unobserved and ignored) problems in other social systems and their corresponding organisations. Non-inclusion in the welfare state predominantly affects those whose inclusion the organisation tries to avoid because of expected difficulties or extra costs, and who for institutional reasons can be treated differently. From the perspective of the clients, legal distinctions of individuals and groups appear as – positive or negative – “direct institutional
discrimination” (Feagin and Booher Feagin 1978, 1986; Gomolla and Radtke 2002). Acts of direct and indirect institutional discrimination are based on approved semantics, discourse elements and arguments that introduce topoi, categories that function as warrants (Toulmin 1975) to represent the decision as indisputably correct. In organisational contexts, the discriminatory act precedes its post-decision legitimation, known as sensemaking in organisation theory (Weick 1995). Sensemaking is to a large extent decoupled from the causes and motives leading to the decision. After racism was banned as politically incorrect, ethnocultural distinctions and determinisms have been established as a discursive substitute (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991). “Culturalism” as a semantic element is an integral part of organisational and public discourse. One of the key questions concerning the MC programme is: What are the intentional and non-intentional effects if “culture” is semantically revalorised as a marker of difference and loaded with social importance?

4. Preconditions for the Adoption of Multiculturalism in 1990s Frankfurt

When founded in 1989, the OMCA was a hybrid office with no genuine sphere of duty of its own, a very small, administratively inexperienced staff and a small budget. Decoupled from the main political instruments, legislation and funding, the office was from the beginning reduced to one of communications. In competition with the long-established “classical” offices that were concerned with immigration problems, the “Green”-headed OMCA had not only to find a place in the city administration but also to legitimise its mere existence against party rivalry. Given scare financial and symbolic resources, influenced by civil servants, the ruling parties looked jealously to the new competitor, claiming that they could make better use of the budget and also had more expert knowledge of the problems. The OMCA tried to turn weakness into strength and defined three major tasks.

1. The office tried to make the issue of “cultural pluralism” relevant for all other administrative bodies, to influence the ways in which other offices concerned with social inclusion viewed and realised their tasks towards immigrants. The overall aim of its work was the public and administrative recognition of “cultural differences”. Besides communication, the means were networking, cooperation and persuasion.

2. The office, not least through the multilingual composition of its staff, offered to be a clearing place for immigrants, perceived as “ethno-cultural minorities”. It provided them with information and advice for all legal and social questions. It also gave voice to immigrants’ interests vis-à-vis the indigenous population and tried to help them to deal with the administration.
3. The office established itself as an anti-discrimination clearing institution ready to intervene on behalf of individuals who had experienced racist, sexist or cultural discrimination.

From an organisational point of view, the success of such an enterprise was rather unlikely. Why should the established administrations accept any advice from the newcomer? Why should the immigrants and their organisations trust the new administration? And how should an office with no legal competence at all fight institutional discrimination? When looking at the short history of the OMCA, the unexpected results have to be acknowledged: after more than ten years, the office still exists. Now run by a conservative (Christian Democratic Union) governor, it has doubled its budget, it is accepted by almost all local government, it is proudly presented by the mayor to foreign official visitors and the international public, and it has been copied in several German and European cities.

One particular precondition of the success of the OMCA lies in Daniel Cohn-Bendit’s personality. Whenever during the first two legislation periods an attempt was made – from the left or the right – to attack MC or even abolish the office, Cohn-Bendit used his charisma and media skills to defend his policy and the existence of the office.

A second and equally important precondition of institutional stability of the OMCA was the political environment. The OMCA quickly became the symbol of Green Party participation in local government, a kind of identity anchor for the Green electorate. Not fixed to ecological questions, the urban Greens took away support from the Social Democrats and Liberals, and temporarily succeeded in gaining a hegemonic position as the intellectual avant-garde of the moral majority.

With the OMCA’s strategy of organising, for example, spectacular multicultural rock music events (“Come together – Frankfurt against racism”) and publicly claiming an “Anti-national holiday festival” under the provocative motto “Cultural Diversity instead of National Unity” in 1990, the year of the formal national unification), Frankfurt soon held a new attractiveness for the media. Even if the debate was highly controversial, the city government – with pain – realised that MC was gradually becoming an issue that positively improved the image of the city. If MC could not be defeated, it would have to be embraced – if only for the better marketing of Frankfurt.

5. Selective Responsiveness of the Local Administration to the Multiculturalism Programme

The OMCA’s dealings with the immigration administration were much more difficult and highly selective. The decision to respond to any kind of programmatic MC is made within various offices and organisations. The rationale to cooperate with the OMCA, to participate, for example, in “intercultural training courses”, or
to integrate the semantic of MC into the administration’s own concepts, depends on opportunity. Responsiveness is cross-cut by internal choices, including personal or party-political animosities, rivalries and power-plays. If organisational actors expect to gain from obstructing the initiatives, they will do so. Even within the same political party, strategic and personal rivalry between representatives of different organisations may prevent rational cooperation. This was particularly true of the major organisations, the mighty Social Aid, the Youth Office, the local School Administration and the Community College (*Volkshochschule*). All of these were citadels of partisans of the Social Democratic Party and firmly tied to the Union of Civil Servants. In the beginning they conceived MC as a Green idiosyncrasy. Their attitude to the OMCA oscillated between clandestine obstruction and public outbidding to be more competent in immigrant and integration issues.

How and to what purpose the various institutions finally did or did not pick up ethno-cultural distinctions, multicultural programmes and the related semantics can be illustrated in some examples taken from the practice and routines of some of the municipal organisations. In the case of Frankfurt, the modes of responsiveness follow three different patterns and their combination: problem delegation, extension of reliability and justification of failure.

### 5.1 Delegation of Problems

The first mechanism of responsiveness to MC is the option to delegate a complex problem and obtain relief from difficult or unpopular tasks. This option will be chosen if public scandal or conflict about a decision is anticipated and there is, moreover, an organisation keen to be involved – the OMCA. Examples of such problem delegation are reported from the Office for Foreigners where juridical decisions about legal and residence status have to be made, including deportation decisions in the case of asylum seekers or refugees, or the refusal of family unification for adult children of guest workers. Raising such controversial cases to a political level, and even publicly opposing federal legislation or the regional practice, the OMCA’s public communication of the conflict could validate some human and moral aspects and thus open up new interpretations to solving conflicts. The OMCA’s mere involvement – or its promise not to inform the press – could relieve the Office for Foreigners from moral reproach and suspicion. On this basis, casual but regular consultations of the OMCA could be established.

The same mechanism of responsiveness characterised cooperation with the police, who frequently had to cope with public protest and political demonstrations, for example of Kurds or Palestinians, or found themselves accused of discrimination and prejudice against asylum seekers by the immigrants’ representatives and international NGOs such as Amnesty International. The police therefore looked for relief, too, and were open to OMCA offers of conflict mediation. Cultural misunderstanding or “ignorance” on both sides, the police and the immigrants, and
the interpretation of discrimination and harassment as “isolated instances” and “black-sheep” cases due to prejudice, were just some of the arguments put forward in the semantic repertoire of defence.

A variation of this mechanism of problem delegation is the search for ethnic conflict mediation by the OMCA. In the city-owned Company for Garbage Disposal, conflicts between low-paid workers, mainly Turkish, and their predominantly German foremen and supervisors escalated to such an extent that peace at work and the functioning of the service was under threat. MC offered a chance to understand the quarrels as ethnic conflict and called on the OMCA to mediate, rather than the Union of Civil Servants which was not ethnically neutral. A mediation project was implemented with experts in adult education and intercultural communication, working together with the disposal workers to solve such conflicts as fair schedules for duties and vacations and promotion schemes. During the mediation process, it soon became obvious that these conflicts were not primarily motivated by cultural prejudice, or even racism, but had to be analysed as social conflicts about discrimination and material advantages in a highly competitive labour market. MC in this case served as a catalyst to launch a debate on distributional justice and access to desired social goods in a multicultural situation (Gülegen 1996, Freyberg 1996).

The same distribution conflicts arise in the housing sector between indigenous and immigrant families. The Housing Office is responsible for the distribution of public subsidised housing for families of low income and recipients of social aid. In a restricted housing market with extremely high rents, cheap flats are a desired social good which is subject to keen competition and is thus another area for institutional discrimination. OMCA support was welcomed to organise language improvement for civil servants and to develop and politically implement a classification system, thus removing the Housing Office from public criticism – without having to change its allocation practice.

5.2 Extension of Reliability

A second mechanism of responsiveness to MC is the extension of responsibility. With the help of the OMCA, an organisation may start a new intercultural activity with the expectation of maintaining or even expanding the reliability and thus the reputation of all the other offices. In this sense the police used their cooperation with the OMCA not only to resolve conflicts but also to improve the police image as not being racist and discriminatory against foreigners. Together with police leaders, the OMCA developed an intercultural in-service training course for ordinary police officers in order to stop prejudice and discrimination. Another idea jointly developed by the OMCA and the police was an nationwide advertising campaign offering jobs in the police service for young immigrants (with German citizenship). Notwithstanding the real effects of these prototypical innovations to everyday interactions between ordinary police and immigrants, the police chiefs
appreciated MC for the effective image improvement. The head of the police service took the opportunity to appear in the media and travel around the republic and to other European cities to present the Frankfurt model to his colleagues.

The consolidation of the organisation’s activities countered efforts to reduce staff and budget. Striking examples for such a programmatic expansion of activities can be drawn from both ends of life: pre-school education and ageing. Among the first to respond to MC were church-run pre-school and day-care institutions (Kindergartens), which were challenged by the new confessional composition of the population – decreasing numbers of German/Christian children and a concurrent increase in non-German/Islamic children – but also morally and politically convinced by the multicultural programme. Protestant pastors, teachers and youth workers, being an integral part of the Green electorate, actively responded to MC, sought cooperation with the OMCA and its financial support to develop and test intercultural concepts for work in multicultural groups (Diehm 1993).

A similar story can be told about the Cemetery Administration, which in the mid-1990s also ran into a crisis for demographic reasons. A “gap” in the mortality statistics because of the missing male cohort of soldiers killed in the Second World War, together with the practice of immigrants who wish to be buried in their home country, was said to be the reason for a significant 25 per cent decrease in burials and a 50 per cent increase in burial fees. Operating under neo-liberal terms of self-reliance, the head of the cemetery office was quoted in the local press: “Just 300 burials less makes 1 million D-Mark less income.” To stop this threatening development, supported by the OMCA, the Cemetery Administration launched an information campaign offering Islamic burials, a rite which formerly had been illegal because of hygiene regulations. Suddenly it was possible to open an Islamic cemetery and thus steadily increase the Muslim clientele. Meanwhile the office distributes information leaflets in Arabic and Turkish and has gained nationwide publicity.

Another example illustrating existing problems that could be solved by extending the services of an office for ethno-cultural activities can be drawn from the administration of community centres. These centres, erected under Social Democratic rule in all quarters in the 1960s and 1970s, had an acceptance problem on the part of the younger generation. Their facilities – restaurants, assembly halls and theatres with all their technical equipment – stood empty and did not cover their costs. In this situation the OMCA helped to acquire a new clientele: traditional Islamic marriages with sometimes nearly a thousand guests, lasting the whole weekend. The business flourished to such an extent that a Turkish manager is now employed especially for this task.
5.3 Justification of Failure

A third common, but unintentional, type of responsiveness to MC is the (mis)use of the newly valorised culturalist semantics to exaggerate the problem of immigration or to legitimise the failure of an organisation’s routines and obviously discriminatory practice against immigrants. This is the case with social workers and city developers, who try to identify problem quarters in the inner city and to legitimise the Social Office budget and the allocation of new projects; it is also true of schools which have not only programmatically implemented intercultural curricula but also to a large extent have adopted culturalist semantics to legitimise their uneven selection policies and categorise a disproportion of immigrant children as school failures. The discursive elements frequently used are: “cultural identity conflict”, “living between two cultures” and, more recently, “Islamic fundamentalism” and a religiously motivated “integration unwillingness” of parts of the immigrant population, an attitude that is said to produce “parallel societies” (Heitmeyer et al. 1997). Both groups of professionals, teachers and social workers, tend to dramatise the problems they have to cope with, but for different reasons. They not only meet in a strategy of “blaming the victim” but also of exaggerating the “disintegration problem”, which by the school professionals is seen as the main and overwhelming cause of failure, whereas the social workers use the analysis as a source of self-legitimisation. For both interests, MC offers a semantic solution that brings the pattern of cultural-deterministic argumentation into the sphere of political correctness, relieves the administration, presents the problem as insoluble and opens the door to “more-of-the-same” requests.

6. Reserved Reception of Multiculturalism by Immigrants

The picture of the OMCA’s success is blurred in so far as the local government’s partial and selective acceptance of MC cannot to the same degree be extended to the immigrants, their organisations and representatives. The elected representatives of non-EU immigrants (Kommunale Ausländervertretung [KAV]/Municipal Foreigner Representation [MFR]), which the OMCA had helped to establish with a public-relations and election campaign, was from the outset in bitter opposition to the OMCA. Both organisations, the MFR and the OMCA, were direct competitors for the small budget dedicated to the city’s integration policy. The MFR relied on the administrative apparatus of the OMCA and even shared office space. With the foundation of the OMCA, most of the budget was spent on the running costs of the new administration itself. Denying each other’s competence and right to speak and act vicariously for the immigrants, both organisations publicly attacked each other at every opportunity. This conflict again is less due to political dissent than to personal aversion, but on the side of the immigrants it also has systematic reasons in a general suspicion of patronisation and ethnic clientelism.

Because of this and other conflicts, the OMCA’s field of activity was confined to aid to self-organisation (ethnic clubs). The programmed aim was to support self-
assurance, to sustain cultural identity and to promote ethnic empowerment, and at least to make MC symbolically visible to the city’s public (e.g. ethnic festivals). A prerequisite for such a policy was the self-description of the immigrants as ethnic communities and their willingness to conform to the OMCA’s assumptions and present themselves as a visible ethnic group in order to gain a few financial benefits. The response of over 300 communities, clubs and associations, ranging from would-be political parties which for constitutional reasons had to pass themselves off as ethnic clubs ([communist] worker associations from Italy, Spain, Greece and Turkey) to a variety of religious and national communities, as well as special interest groups such as national teachers’ or parents’ associations, culture and sports clubs, was more or less non-acceptance and even rejection of the office. There might have been the temptation for some of the associations to reshape their profile to meet the multicultural programme of the OMCA and present their culture in an exotic way by organising spectacular events (“Asian new year receptions”). But with its very small budget, the OMCA had nothing to offer the bulk of the ethnic clubs to help them tackle their very urgent problems.

The majority of ethnic organisations traditionally worked under the umbrella of the Christian Churches or the union-run welfare organisations (Radtke 1997), which provided the infrastructure (rooms, administrative support, communication) as part of their social work and counselling programme. The welfare organisations were interested in covering this segment of immigrant social integration policy and maintaining financial support from regional and local government. In so far as they and their clientele had nothing to expect from the OMCA, there was no pressure to conform to MC.

There is little empirical research evidence on the specific situation of ethnic clubs and associations and their roots in the immigrant population. What we do know is that during the 1990s the associations and clubs went through a crisis (Seitter 1999) which had two contrasting characteristics: the traditional (Italian, Spanish, Portuguese or Greek) guest-worker associations, whose countries of origin became EU members, went through a transformation process of depolitisation and burn-out. These South European organisations had originally organised themselves primarily around political issues imported from their home countries (communism, anti-fascism) and were only secondarily ethnic associations. Simultaneously, they quite successfully supported their members in becoming part of German organisations and social systems. With the arrival of the second and third generations, the associations ran into trouble because of the ageing (and re-migration) of their members and their lack of attraction to the successful children and grandchildren of the founders, who had made their school and professional careers in Germany and were not interested in language maintenance or folklore.

In contrast, non-EU immigrants, mainly of Turkish, Kurdish or North African origin, went through a process of political and religious mobilisation. Inasmuch as these groups experienced lasting and even increasing discrimination and
marginalisation in Germany, they were marked as culturally and religiously “extra strange” by majority politics and the media. Their answer was self-organisation around religious and cultural issues, which for many of the Turkish immigrants meant a desecularisation and a new politicisation of religion, then labelled “Islamic fundamentalism” by public opinion. To an important extent, Islam here indeed worked as a resource of ethnic and political mobilisation which led to new community structures of self-sufficiency and increasing independence vis-à-vis German society. But this type of ethnic formation and Islamic self-organisation developed completely apart from German welfare organisations and the OMCA’s multicultural communication and governance.

To find out what are the conditions against (self-)ethnisation of social relations or radicalisation of ethnic conflicts in Frankfurt, we may rely on a report evaluating the “state of integration” (Strassburger 2001) which the OMCA commissioned at the European Forum for Migration Studies at the University of Bamberg (Germany). Using the common-sense term of “integration” to indicate “a similarity of living standards”, the report defined a wide range of indicators for economic, social and cultural integration. In a diachron perspective – based on the official statistics of the last thirty years – the report sees a demographic accommodation (age structure of the population, family size, fertility rate, intermarriage), a steadily increasing number of naturalisations and a higher education level of school leavers, which they can partially realise in the employment market to achieve upward mobility. These indicators, the report says, can be taken as signs of a process of demographic, cultural and structural integration in progress but not yet completed.

But the progress of the adjustment of living conditions does not embrace all immigrant groups to the same extent. On the contrary, there is a marked contrast in the situation of different groups along the above-mentioned ethno-religious line but also within these groups. In this respect, too, the situation of immigrants is similar to that of the native German population, in which an increasing gap is registered between winners and losers in the modernisation stakes. From this observation, the report states that integration does not primarily depend on ethnic but on social factors such as gender, migration cycle, generation, housing and, above all, education. Even if the situation in Frankfurt in general is healthier than in other comparable German or European cities, the number of permanently excluded is growing with the economic slump in the world market. Among the excluded are disproportionately high numbers of recent immigrants with low cultural capital, language ability and cultural knowledge.

7. Total Failure of Local Antidiscrimination Policy

The OMCA was far less successful in combating discrimination. However, the office was regarded by a minority as the only prominent address for complaints. Its annual report states that each year staff members acted informally in hundreds of cases brought by people discriminated against individually (one-third), as well as
institutional discrimination by public or private organisations (two-thirds). The executive head of OMCA tried to establish a “discrimination complain agency” but never found support for this project from the city parliament or local government. Again the OMCA saw its activities restricted to individual conflict mediation, trying to intervene on behalf of the discriminated – without publicity and with more or less positive results.

Not at all successful were the office’s attempts to implement anti-discrimination guidelines for the municipal administration and for public and private organisations in the city. All initiatives (hearings, motions) by the OMCA or deputies of the Social Democratic or Green factions in the local parliament were blocked by the majority, acting on behalf of the heads of administrations such as the Union of Civil Servants, unanimously declaring that one, there is no such thing as institutional discrimination in the city’s offices and two, anti-discrimination legislation would change nothing.

The structural problem of institutional mechanisms of discrimination in public debates was turned into a moral problem of individual failure: “A civil servant does not discriminate!” – and if so, these particular cases have to be treated individually. Though there is statistical evidence about unequal treatment in respect of the distribution of desired goods such as justice, cheap public housing, education, social aid and even employment quotas in the administration itself, the formation of a cartel of discrimination denial effectively managed to obscure the reality of everyday institutional discrimination and remove the issue from the political agenda.

Concerning the discrimination issue, the OMCA experienced the other side of the autonomy and selective responsiveness of the local administration. Organisations not looking for additional problems are disinclined to transform any outside irritation into an internal programme, except when they can secure advantages. At the point of discrimination, the communicative power of the OMCA and its representatives ended because there were no legal or financial instruments to enforce the anti-discrimination perspective. Despite the regulation in the federal constitution (Grundgesetz) which in a general formulation forbids discrimination on grounds of gender, race or religion, there is no anti-discrimination legislation in Germany at either federal or regional level which would have supported the office’s efforts. Anti-discrimination strategies were almost unanimously politically blocked: quotas for non-Germans in the various municipal offices, anti-discrimination guidelines, ethnic monitoring of schooling, housing and employment – none of these concepts, borrowed from the Anglo-American realm, could be implemented.
8. Conclusion: Paradoxes of Multiculturalism

Times are changing, and the fact that the OMCA meanwhile is working under the leadership of a governor belonging to the conservative CDU may be taken as a sign of normalisation. But, in his first decision, he redefined the office’s domain of responsibility to integration, reshaping the focus of its activities, but nevertheless making use of its public recognition. It is noticeable in the annual reports since 1990 that the OMCA has steadily changed its appearance and semantics, while new staff took over in 1999 with new projects and policies. The original focus on cultural difference and cultural recognition has given way to a pragmatic approach of facilitating the inclusion of new arrivals. During the 1990s, not only the city administration has selectively adapted to the principles of MC, but the OMCA has also accommodated its programme and rhetoric to reality. As a result of mutual adaptation, it effectively communicated and partially realised the concept of an integrated local inclusion management which for years was unique in Germany.

Assessing the results of this process of mutual adaptation, a paradox has to be considered. On the one hand, there are four indicators for successful implementation: (1) The semantic of MC is an integral part of the public communication and self-presentation of the city. It has proved to be an element of effective city marketing which the city government uses to improve the city’s image and self-esteem. (2) Concurrently, MC meets the lifestyle of the new indigenous middle classes of well-educated, young urban professionals who have accumulated cultural capital and developed a culinary attitude towards (some other) “cultures” – food, music, fashion, tourism. Moreover, MC is politically correct. (3) Inasmuch as the administrations learned to benefit from integrating the ethno-cultural semantics into descriptions of those problems they otherwise could not easily solve, they adopted a palliative MC. (4) Last but not least, MC has a particularly decisive influence on discussions in the field of education. The idea was enthusiastically welcomed by the educational establishment, forming worldwide networks around the new programme, even if the proposed revision of the canon, this time inspired by multicultural education, served as a battlefield for ritual debates on the national self-conception. On the other hand, as an internal programme directing the OMCA agenda, with success the semantic of MC is continually losing significance. This is due to accommodation to the local and European political environment. As the OMCA established itself as one office among others in the local administration, it started to behave as all organisations do: the main concern becomes the perpetuation of its own existence in terms of budget, influence and reputation. The priorities of immigration policy have changed. The German immigration law which the red-green federal government launched in 2002 has two aims: restriction and integration. Despite restraining regulations for access, the main issue is integration of those immigrants who are already in the country or the newly arrived. To obtain the necessary votes of the regional governments in the second chamber, the Bundesrat, the now-obligatory integration measures – predominantly German language courses from pre-school level to adult civil education, which the municipalities are obliged to offer – will be financially
Multiculturalism in Germany

subsidised by the federation with a large amount of money allocated to the regions and cities. The OMCA under its new leadership has committed itself to this task on an experimental basis and by this shift succeeded in doubling its budget. A whole range of new activities have been added to the traditional agenda: welcome packages are produced and experts in language training and civil education are employed to organise on a large scale the different courses for immigrant children and their parents. For the first time in its existence, the office has a proper task, competence and money to undertake projects.³

Under the neo-liberal rule of economic self-reliance, the OMCA will have to raise funds for new projects from foundations, the national government or EU programmes. The office has already in recent years developed certain skills in meeting the conditions of various EU programmes. Some of the above-mentioned activities, such as cooperation with the police, the professionalisation of conflict mediation, a project on the medical and educational provision of Roma and Sinti, and the production of teaching materials for new arrivals to school, were funded by Brussels. The federal government as well as the EU adjust their financial subsidies to a pragmatic policy of inclusion mediation and exclusion avoidance in the field of (pre-)schooling and vocational training. Through this canal an ongoing reorientation of the OMCA agenda is enforced.

With the successful acquisition of government or EU funding, the OMCA could consolidate its position at the centre of the local administration. This advantage of improved standing makes it possible that the new political formula of integration would gradually replace the culturalist rhetoric in OMCA publications. In this way Frankfurt would follow the example of the Netherlands, which Entzinger (1998) describes as an integration cycle. First, starting with a policy of integration in the 1960s and 1970s, which was meant as (cultural) assimilation and had its correspondence in a foreigner-specific compensatory education, most of the European immigrant countries went through a second period of MC. Multicultural critique normatively condemned cultural assimilation and strengthened the sense of cultural pluralism. The idea was transformed by the EU and the Council of Europe under the label of “human rights education”, fostering equal cultural rights and mutual recognition as a universal principle.

Focusing on the systemic aspects of integration in the sense of social inclusion and legal incorporation, the idea of re-educating people for an ethnically plural society in Germany was criticised as a reductionist solution. Multicultural education was conceived as another example of individualisation and pedagogisation of social problems, restricted to questions of cultural differences and peaceful everyday arrangements in community life, but avoiding necessary structural, political or legal intervention (Hamburger et al. 1981) to advance political participation and social inclusion on the basis of equality of rights and opportunities.
Beginning with the second half of the 1990s, in a third period, public discourse and policy have returned to “integration”, which is now purified of almost all assimilationist demands and offered as a socio-technical approach to social inclusion in a pluralist society (Brubaker 2001). The Frankfurt OMCA represents the second period of MC and has undeniable merit for civilising the climate of public discourse in the city’s administration and among the public. The lesson that should be learned is that in the globalised world society, immigration and cultural diversity are no longer an occasion for public exaggeration or dramatisation but a reality that the institutions of receiving countries have to cope with calmly through effective inclusion management.

Notes

1 The term “integration” refers to two different spheres: that of sociological theories, where distinctions between integration, incorporation and inclusion are discussed, and that of social policy, where the minimisation of anomie and social conflict is the focus of action (Nassehi 2000). “Integration” is used in Germany in policy papers and public rhetoric.

2 Systematic research about local integration policies and the responsiveness of municipalities to MC is reported by Bade and Bommes (2003).

3 However, there are some uncertainties, because the proposed Immigration Law, not following the model of Frankfurt’s OMCA, assigns the integration task to the Foreign Office which is actually concerned with policies such as distribution and control of residence status. The responsibility could also be allocated to the Community College. Under post-MC political conditions, a decision for one or the other option would mean the end of the OMCA.

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Multiculturalism in France

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Although France is de facto a multicultural society, historically this interpretation has been very much contested by the Jacobin tradition which has been opposed to the right to be different, pluralism and group rights. Recent presidential elections and the rise of the National Front appear to confirm this reading. However, ideological multiculturalism has begun to make inroads into the French model of citizenship through the political accommodation of migrant groups, especially at the local level. Ideological multiculturalism is the only way to maintain a strong and vibrant French identity, open to the new challenges of globalisation, migration flows, diversity of religions and plural allegiances to nations and states. In France, like most democracies, the rise of claims for difference means that the republican model of integration has no other choice but to negotiate with multiculturalism.

France is, de facto, a multicultural country, but the notion has been much contested. Until the Revolution of 1789, the country was made up of provinces with their own cultures, languages, parliaments and systems of measures, although the compulsory use of French in administrative and judicial rules (Edict of Villers-Cotterêts, 1539), the defence and unification of the French language (creation of the Académie Française in 1635 by Richelieu), as well as the centralisation of the civil service, occurred very early. The French Revolution tried to change the definition of the French community, from an accumulation of cultures and institutions constitutive of the state, to a philosophical and political definition of national cohesion around the nation (Vive la Nation, Valmy, 1792) and the citizens, free and equal in their rights (Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen, 1789). During the republican periods of the nineteenth century (First, Second and Third Republics), the references to republican values embodied by an evolving citizenship, as well as the birth of ideologies cancelling particularistic belongings (class struggle model, universalistic values) blurred the frontiers of communities and progressively built France on the myth of national homogeneity. The recent appeal to republican values and to national cohesion during the last presidential campaign of May 2002, along with the permanent need to redefine
French identity faced with the challenge of the National Front, testify to the adaptation of the French model of the national citizen.

Multiculturalism in France has acquired some legitimacy very recently under the pressure of immigration, of Europe and of globalisation, but also from the desire to assert the weight of local cultures in the patrimony of national culture. Many French people are reluctant to admit this and set it against the exclusiveness of Jacobin values: secularism, formal equality, legal freedom, civic values of living together (*fraternité*), with an exclusive allegiance to the nation-state republican model (patriotism). The right to be different, the pluralism of allegiances, the plural citizenship model (and reality), the intercultural relations projects, the expression of groups and minorities as referring to a France of minorities, are still to some extent taboo. These values are seen to be opposed to assimilation, integration (more used today in official discourse), social cohesion (Jacques Chirac during the 2002 presidential campaign), republican and national citizenship (former socialist Home Office minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement, who set up the Jacobin and republican Mouvement des Citoyens), equality of rights (the French reference to fight against discrimination), social contract of rights and duties (*La communauté des citoyens*, Dominique Schnapper 1996), public order and public security for living together (Home Office ministers’ definitions). An illustration of this can be found in the ambiguities of the freedom of associations and of the recognition of regionalism in France: during the Revolution of 1789, corporations were prohibited (Le Chapelier Law of 1791), and the freedom of associations was acquired in 1901, while regionalism has waited for two centuries to be rehabilitated in state institutions (1982).

But some features of multiculturalism finally penetrated the French model of citizenship as its content evolved since the French Revolution. First confronted with the class struggle (the *question sociale*, in 1848), then by gender equality rights (since the end of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth), it has been more recently challenged by immigration and Europe, which brought new values such as anti-discrimination (Article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty, 1997), citizenship of residence including plural citizenship, expression of ethnic and religious affiliation. Multiculturalism belongs to this generation of new components of citizenship: a multiculturalism *à la française*, included in a citizenship which is the result of a permanent compromise with communitarianism in a neocolonial management of differences.

This paper argues how far multiculturalism in France may have seemed odd among French political values and how some aspects of multiculturalism have successfully imposed themselves on the French model of citizenship and integration.
Multiculturalism in France

1. Can France Define Itself as Multicultural?

1.1 Historical Background

Before the Revolution of 1789, the early unification of France remained compatible with the diversity of provinces. There was a distinction between the “five big farms” having internal customs and freedom of circulation for goods – Normandy, Ile-de-France, Picardie, Anjou, Maine, Champagne, Bourgogne, Bourbonnais, Berry, Poitou; the so-called foreign provinces (provinces réputées étrangères) and the provinces under foreign allegiance (provinces à l’instar de l’étranger effectif) – Alsace, Lorraine, Three bishoprics – the provinces under feudal links with the King of France (Brittany, Béarn, Provence); a small kingdom – Navarre; and a province wishing to be ruled by its own natives – Artois. Brittany and Provence were also claiming their autonomy. These regions spoke their own languages made up of various langues d’oil in the north and langues d’oc in the south, had their own taxes, tribunals, parliaments and systems of measures. This diversity introduced some discrepancies in the exercise of royal power on the eve of the revolution, in the reluctance of regional parliaments to abide by the law, the difficulty of understanding among the population and the obstacles to exchanges arising from various customary rights. As Mirabeau said, le royaume n’est encore qu’un agrégat de peuples désunis (the kingdom is still only an aggregate of disunited peoples). Behaviour towards minorities was expressed thus by the Comte de Clermont Tonnerre at the meeting of the États Généraux in 1789: Donnez aux Juifs tous les droits en tant qu’individus mais aucun comme communauté (Give the Jews all rights as individuals but none as a community).

During the revolution, the pluralist trend, inspired by federalism, was expressed by the Girondins, setting regional identities against the centralised, authoritarian and Jacobin governance of Paris. But the Girondins lost their battle against the Jacobins, and the centralisation and unification of the state was reinforced by Napoleon I. He reformed and unified the laws, endowed France with a civil and penal code and centralised the administration. His work was continued by Napoleon III, although throughout the nineteenth century the defence of regional autonomy was still alive as a rightist position, represented by Auguste Comte (1851) or Frédéric Le Play. The feeling of a French identity embodied by a nation began to emerge, markedly after the loss of Alsace Lorraine in 1871 (expressed in the works of historian Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges and philosopher Ernest Renan in his famous essay, Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?, 1871).

Then the Third Republic gave to the people of France a feeling of unity, defended by universalistic and republican values mixed with patriotism, through the establishment of compulsory, secularised and free education in primary schools. This pedagogic enterprise was illustrated by Gaston Bruneau’s well-known book Le tour de France par deux enfants, in which two young boys travel and discover France, by the maps of France in every school drawn up by Paul Vidal de La Blache – although he was in favour of some federalism around several regional...
metropolises – and took effect in compulsory military service for each male citizen. The celebration of republican values was also manifested in the erection of statues, city halls, schools in every town and village and in 1889 the inauguration of an annual public holiday, 14 July, referring to the Revolution of 1789. School and army became powerful tools of homogenisation and socialisation of a very culturally diversified France, recently crossed by migration flows (Germans, Belgians and Italians). However, the unification of cultures was not so easy: in his book La guerre des boutons, for example, Louis Pergaud shows that one century after the adoption of the metric system, the rural French were still using the old measures, even the young children.

But some nostalgia for the former regions and regionalist trends were re-emerging, such as Frédéric Mistral’s movement in Provence attempting to revive the culture and language of langues d’oc regions. In 1854 he created the Félibrige movement which inspired Charles Maurras and then Maurice Barrès, who transferred those particularistic identities to Lorraine. Mistral also inspired Alphonse Daudet, who tried to restate the authentic and specific culture of Provence and to popularise it in his famous Lettres de mon moulin (Letters from my Windmill), and later Jean Giono’s novels celebrating rural and local values in Regain or Un de Baumugnes. In Brittany, the revival of localism was illustrated by a return to the genuine Celtic culture and language. But these trends were marginal compared with the expression of republican patriotism encouraged by the First World War.

Two very different periods gave real legitimacy to the expression of cultural diversity in France: the Vichy regime, when Philippe Petain tried to play regionalism and plurality against the leftist and unifying values embodied by Paris, the Parliament and more broadly, the political milieu of the dying Third Republic (1940). He found some echoes in the regions where a tradition of autonomy existed, such as Brittany, Alsace and Provence. But this rightist and traditionalist trend failed after the Second World War, when the Fourth and Fifth Republics fought against all remaining values and tried to reconcile the French around the Resistance and generally around the Trente Glorieuses years (1945–74), a period of economic growth when the class struggle also blurred some other attachments.

A second revival of regionalism oriented towards French internal cultural diversity promised to be more successful, appearing on the left among some 1968 activists such as Robert Lafont. They claimed a regionalism of bottom-up diversity with the radical socialist ruralite’s hatred of Paris. The return to the land of some supporters under the programme Vivre et travailler au pays (Live and work on the land) and the successful fight for the liberation of Larzac (a region of the Cévennes dedicated to sheep-rearing) from army settlement (1972–73) belongs to this movement – a trend more recently expressed by the anti-globalisation mobilisation of José Bové on the left, and by the traditionalism of Philippe de Villiers on the right. The latter, a former Minister of Culture and Member of Parliament, tries to give legitimacy to the counter-revolutionary past of Vendée. Brittany and Corsica today lead some
regionalist and separatist fights on the topics of cultural diversity of languages, which has been accepted in schools; and political autonomy, made official with the settlement of a Corsican Parliamentary Assembly by Lionel Jospin in 2001. But the latter region had also claimed the recognition of a peuple corse in the 1990s, which was defined as contrary to the Constitution by the Constitutional Council (9 May 1991: La Constitution ne connaît que le peuple français, composé de tous les citoyens français sans distinction d’origine, de race ou de religion), while an armed faction goes on to practise terrorism at local level. This same high court in 1999 also condemned the 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages as contrary to the principles of the Republic (indivisibilité de la République, égalité devant la loi et unicité du peuple français). However, immigration and Islam have long been absent from these expressions of multiculturalism.

1.2 Multiculturalism against Exclusiveness of Cultural Identity

The turning point for the expression of multiculturalism with reference to migration was mainly the 1980s. The freedom of associative rights for foreigners in 1981 and the emergence of the beurs (Arabs in slang) gave legitimacy to the claims of cultural pluralism, intercultural projects and to the right to be different (droit à la différence), proclaimed by SOS Racisme, established in 1984. Some years before, the Council of Europe was already requiring more intercultural education for immigrants’ children and French public schools began to implement special courses added to the compulsory courses (Langues et Cultures d’Origine, established since 1974 by bilateral agreements with the embassies of the countries of origin in order to facilitate the return of the second generations to their parents’ countries).

The return of the left to power initiated public debates on a new definition of French identity, as exemplified by the publication of L’identité française (Espaces 89 1985), under pressure from the National Front which tried to impose its image of French identity (Bleu, Blanc, Rouge mixed with an ethnic approach to the nation – les français de souche – contrary to the philosophical definition of French citizenship). The “affairs” – the foulard (headscarf) affair in 1989, the debate on the reform of the nationality code from 1987 to 1993, the Gulf War in 1991 – placed more stress on a multicultural definition of French identity, referring to the plurality of allegiances, the legitimacy of collective identities inside the republican framework and the dissociation between nationality and citizenship around the topic of the new citizenship launched by civic associations in 1988.

While most political leaders stressed French identity, citizenship, secularisation and the social contract, with few variations between right and left, and tried to conduct public policies of integration (with the central role of the Fonds d’Action Sociale), many civic associations born with the emerging movement of the Marche des Beurs in 1983 were mixing these republican values at local level with
communitarian forms of management, especially in the inner cities. They fought against racial discrimination and social exclusion while aiming at recognising ethnic and even religious identities, which sometimes weakened their discourse on universalistic principles and equal rights. This contradiction was highlighted by Pierre-André Taguieff (1988), who argued that pleading for the right to be different would once more lead to the exclusion of the children of immigrants, giving weight to the arguments of the extreme right on the impossibility of assimilating Islam. Other civic associations, such as the very legitimist France Plus, stressed the right to indifference and respect for republican and assimilation values – secularism, rights and duties, registration and eligibility for electoral lists for second-generation immigrants with French citizenship.

Some confusion appeared in the public policy landscape of integration. Islamic associations, set up under the same law of 1981 granting freedom to associate, rapidly understood the benefit that they could gain from their acceptance of civic and republican values in the partnership offered by municipalities to secure social peace. The recent territorialisation of integration policy (Politique de la Ville, established in 1990) offered new opportunities in this respect. This positive discrimination tool was set up to fight against local discrimination at school (with the Zones d’Éducation Prioritaire or ZEPs in 1981), in housing and in access to employment. Although it has been a partial failure, it disclosed an exception to the republican myth of equality of rights and opportunities.

2. Has Multiculturalism Adapted to the French Model of Citizenship?

2.1 Citizenship: a Strange Bedfellow of Nationality

In France, citizenship is a philosophical concept expressed in the Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen of 1789, mainly inspired by universalistic ideals of freedom, legal equality and property, while nationality has a legal definition in the Civil Code. But citizenship is evolutive: first limited to well-to-do males having financial “capacities” (cens or annual dues, with active and passive citizens), it was progressively extended to all men (suffrage universel masculin in 1848) and later to women (1944) and to younger people (from 21 to 18 in 1974). Some populations were prohibited from the exercise of citizenship, such as prisoners, the army (la grande muette throughout the Third Republic) and the colonies (in Algeria, a French département, the second college for indigenous voting rights survived until 1960). One could thus be a national without being entirely a citizen.

On the contrary, some have been citizens without being nationals. During the Revolution of 1789, citizenship was not linked with nationality. Those who did not share the revolutionary values, such as the priests attached to the monarchist regime (called the prêtres réfractaires) were considered as non-citizens, traitors to the new values. But some well-known foreigners such as William Payne or Anarcharsis von Clootz were elected at the Convention in 1792. This recognition
of citizenship for civic activism was formalised in the Constitution of 1793, which enunciates the various forms of civism granting access to citizenship, independent of the possession of French nationality.

The link between nationality and citizenship was totally sealed with the Third Republic (1875), mixing civic values (fraternity) with the exclusive allegiance to national identity (patriotism). The famous monuments to the dead (monuments aux morts) which, as so many symbolic places for the celebration of a homogeneous and collective memory, were erected after the First World War in all villages, towns and cities of France and its colonies are one of the popular expressions of this linkage between citizenship and nationality around the celebration of patriotic and civic values. In the meantime, other forms of nationalism rapidly became anti-republican, cancelling citizenship from reference to the nation, such as the Action Française of Charles Maurras, created in 1899, and the extreme rightist leagues between the two world wars (Colonel de la Rocque’s Croix de Feu).

2.2 Concessions to Minorities, Differences and Specificities in the French Model

Since 1968, many exceptions have been introduced in the supposed assimilationist, centralised French model of Jacobinism. First, the teaching of regional languages was authorised in public schools and universities in Brittany and Corsica. Alsace, which never lost its German dialect, also uses German in local administration and in religious celebrations, and the Basques still speak their language, as well as Catalans (in the region of Perpignan, all the names of villages, roads, streets and towns are in French and Catalan). In Alsace and Lorraine – Metz – (the three départements of Haut Rhin, Bas Rhin and Moselle that were owned by Germany after the defeat of 1870, until 1918), religion is ruled by an agreement between the state and the three faiths of Roman Catholic, Protestant and Jewish (the “Concordat” of 1801) because it did not depend on France when the separation between the state and the Church was decided in 1905. Other newer specific treatments of beliefs can also be found, such as in the TOMS (Territoires d’Outre Mer) and other autonomous territories (acceptance of polygamy, for example).

Decentralisation, begun in 1982, has introduced much autonomy into regional management and some subsidiarity can be seen in the centralised administrative system: a debate opposing the tough republicans of left and right to the liberal ones of left and right. The specific Parliamentary Assembly of Corsica granted by the socialist government in 2001 provoked the resignation of Jean-Pierre Chevènement.

As for immigrants, the real debate, initiated as soon as an integration policy began to be implemented in 1974 (we were speaking then of intercultural policies), was really set up in the mid-1980s when the visibility of Islam emerged in the cities, in industry, at school (with the foulard affair of 1989) and raised the question of the dubious allegiances of French people with dual citizenship (French of Algerian
descent doing their military service in France or Algeria), especially when some young people in the inner cities claimed to sympathise with Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War of 1991. Again a Montesquieu-like question was asked: “How can one be French and Muslim?”, and this remains very timely in political debates, although neither an Arab or ethnic vote nor a penetration of external allegiances can be perceived among the majority of Muslims in France.

The rule is not the same for all minority religions. Protestants and Jews have a long tradition of living together with French monarchical and republican institutions, and today the revival of Jewish Sephardic identity is considered to be compatible with them – boys can wear the kippa in public schools, Muslims can be absent on Saturdays or close their shops on Saturdays and open them on Sundays. In contrast, they are suffering because of increased insecurity about their presence and principally of their visibility in France as representing the religion of the poor, the former colonised, the immigrants from developing countries. This is accentuated by the fact that the older people, who practise their religion most frequently and claim for recognition of Islam in public life, are excluded from the right to vote (demands for larger prayer rooms, special places for Muslims in cemeteries, organisation of the halal meat market and slaughter). Some expressions of dissent, linked with exclusion and discrimination, such as extremist Islamism (e.g. terrorism in the Paris Metro and RER stations or on the TGV rails by Khaled Kelkal in Lyons in 1995, or the involvement of Zacharias Moussaoui in the 11 September attacks), or the refusal of allegiance to French symbols (such as the insult to the French flag during a friendly French/Algerian football match in 2001) give weight to Jacobin arguments, even if they remain marginal.

However, compared with other European countries, if religion is seen in France as a serious concern, language is not considered to be a problem. Despite the globalisation of new immigration trends, most immigrants and their children are perfectly at ease speaking French (Maghrebians, sub-Saharan Africans, Indians from Pondicherry, Vietnamese) as well as Francophile elites. An evolution in public discourse occurred after 11 September due to the presence of 4 million Muslims, the largest concentration in Europe. France did not show an aggressive discourse towards this new challenge, in contrast to Germany or the United Kingdom, while it has always been more restrictive in admitting radical Islamites as refugees, who found a better shelter in those two countries. France was reluctant to involve itself in a war in Iraq: the will to maintain good relations with Maghrebian regimes and the desire for relative social peace in the inner cities may explain such equilibrium in diplomacy.

2.3 Multiculturalism: Negotiating Identities or Neocolonial Management?

In addition to the rise of what Tiryakian has called ideological multiculturalism, French identity is also questioned by Europe and immigration. European Union policies are isolating the French assimilationist model compared with other
countries which are much more open to multiculturalism and to diversity. The United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands have gone a long way towards recognising communities and ethnic and religious identities, although the latter two seem to have abandoned multiculturalism as a unique integration project for their urban areas in recent years. Furthermore, Europe proposes to impose, in a top-down way, new multicultural values as part of its identity: anti-discrimination (Article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty) and cultural diversity (recommendations of the Council of Europe). European citizenship, defined in the Maastricht Treaty (Article 8) is proposing an alternative model to classical citizenship, less exclusive than the national one, compatible with other affiliations (including dual citizenship and plural allegiances) and enriched with new concepts (citizenship of residence) giving space for multiculturalism. Since new citizens of immigrant origin have had access to French nationality, they can negotiate their difference in exchange for their vote, maintaining transnational networks and ethnic or religious identity while reasserting their allegiance to the French nation-state.

This situation is not without ambiguity, an ambiguity which lies less at the heart of leading French institutions. France has long managed its minorities in the colonial past with the complicity of civic and religious mediators (Caids, Bachagas, Marabouts), who expressed communitarian identities while accepting republican values and granted social peace. This local management, formerly implemented in Algeria, was then applied to immigrant areas in collective housing for workers (foyers) and in French suburbs. Associative leaders and local elites from the community were appointed as cultural mediators, a very up-to-date role of “frontiersmen” at the beginning of the 1990s, expressing both civic universalistic and ethnic group values. Civic values (anti-discrimination, combating social exclusion, registration on electoral lists, cultural programmes of leisure and sport) were necessary to obtain public subsidies from municipalities and national social funding (mainly from the Fonds d’Action Sociale). But the activities of associations may also be turned towards more communitarian identities and have religious input (such as learning Arabic).

More frequently, ethnicisation comes more from the representations and incentives of municipalities, political parties and public powers than from associative leaders or local elected young elites themselves: they have been chosen as the arabe de service (token Arab) to give visibility to public policies, and they are required to stick to multicultural aims in the republican frame but not to apply for more ambitious and non-ethnic jobs or goals. This game in France remains very assimilationist, it often refers to the values of the French state because Maghrebians, largely Algerians, are the main actors. They are totally socialised in the French culture of administration and republican values, which they know how to manipulate. They “play the game” of all French integration policies and dialogue with the immigrant populations in France. No other group, Chinese, Turkish, African or Portuguese, can bargain multiculturalism within French values and be so successful with the state, which subsidises most of the multicultural activities.
The unintended effect lies in the creation by public powers of a multiculturalism par défaut (unwillingly and artificially), through policies of recognition of ethnic visibility in the public space. However, most political and administrative elites are today conscious of the multicultural dimension of urban societies, a discourse which would have been impossible twenty years ago. In overseas DOM TOMs (Départements et Territoires d’Outre Mer), the obsession of communitarian identity also emerges in republican consensus. Recently, the French DOM TOM minister refused to speak of “peoples”, preferring the term “population” for these peripheral regions, which annoyed MPs and local representatives. The difficulty that collective identities have in defining themselves faced with republican values shows that French political space is poorly integrated and scarcely permits the emergence of communitarian groups. Multiculturalism in France has a long way to go in order to be more explicit and acquire full legitimacy.

3. Conclusion

It could be argued that the French model seems reluctant to implement multiculturalism because the Maghrebians are themselves playing a very republican card in their negotiations with French institutions. They are expected to receive delegated authority from public powers to maintain order and assume cultural identities within the French framework. This equilibrium, which looks like a French compromise, can be defined as “multiculturalism à la française”. In this evolving model, Europe has a large part to play in order to make it acceptable in French public opinion, which still nurtures the homogenisation myth. Multiculturalism is the only way to maintain a strong and vibrant French identity, open to the new challenges of globalisation and of cultural identities, migration flows, diversity of religions, attractiveness of community links, localism and transnational networks, soft and plural allegiances to political institutions, nations and states. As far as France is concerned, like most democracies, the rise of claims to be different means that the republican model of integration has no other choice but to negotiate with multiculturalism.

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Multiculturalism in Japan: 
Citizenship Policy for Immigrants*

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Since the increase in international migration, all advanced societies have tried to cope with culturally different minorities in order to bring about social order and establish just societies. A key public policy for governing multicultural societies is to grant citizenship to immigrants. Japan is a typical example of an East Asian country that has become a multicultural society with a considerable number of immigrants and has developed a citizenship policy for immigrants in some areas such as residential status, alien registration, social benefits and perhaps voting in local elections. However, an “internal multicultural logic”, which implies that the government responds to the ethno-cultural diversity within society emphasised by researchers on multiculturalism, is not the Japanese Government’s main incentive to advance citizenship policy. Rather, an “external logic” from outside the society, especially international pressure, changes governmental behaviour concerning citizenship policies for immigrants.

In a set of collaborative projects on “Multiculturalism and Political Integration in European Cities”, Rex and Samad have addressed the main questions for research into migration and multiculturalism: (a) whether the notion of multiculturalism was compatible with the types of political structure that have been established in Western Europe; (b) what were the main forms of political mobilisation amongst immigrant ethnic minorities; (c) how the state and the local state have responded to the presence and mobilisation of these minorities; (d) what is the nature of the political relationship which consequently has arisen between the host society and its minorities; and(e) how far this relationship serves the needs (i) of the state, (ii) of the minorities, and (iii) of democracy (Rex and Samad 1996, 11).

These questions, with some minor modifications, can undoubtedly be regarded as core issues of “governance in multicultural societies”. But, at the same time, an assumption behind the questions seems to be that multicultural issues and events
have risen from internal influences within a society independent of external influences from other societies. This article focuses on question (c), investigating how to govern multicultural societies from the viewpoint of citizenship policy, and extends the analysis to a nation-state outside the Western sphere through discussion of an East Asian country, Japan. In order to establish and stabilise multicultural societies, a key public policy of national governments is citizenship. The question considered here is how and why the Japanese state has responded to the presence of immigrants and ethnic minorities by a distinctive set of citizenship policies.

I demonstrate that, contrary to myths of an ethnically homogeneous society and an immigrant-free country, Japan has become a multicultural society. Furthermore, I investigate citizenship policy in Japan to understand how the Japanese Government attempts to deal with its multicultural reality. Finally, I seek an explanation for the implementation of Japan’s citizenship policy: whether the state responded to the internal pressure of multicultural reality or to external factors.

1. A “Multicultural” Japan

Since the establishment of modern nation-state institutions in the nineteenth century, Japan seems to have been characterised by two powerful myths: it is an ethnically homogeneous society and an immigrant-free country. The ethnic homogeneity idea symbolised by the slogan “one nation, one ethnicity” has played an important role in people’s belief that Japan’s democracy is based on the idea that everyone is equal because everyone is Japanese (Yamanaka 1994, 413).

The myth of Japan as an ethnically homogeneous society may lead to the impression that Japan is a country free from any demand for citizenship by multicultural actors such as foreigners, immigrants, indigenous people or ethnic minorities. Even after the 1980s, Japan had a smaller foreign and immigrant population than other countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Table 1). For example, compared with Germany (8.9 per cent in 1999) and Italy (2.2 per cent in 1999), the other main countries defeated in the Second World War, the ratio of foreigners and immigrants to the total population in Japan is relatively low. The immigrant population comprised 1.2 per

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cent of the total population at the end of the twentieth century. Moreover, the annual number of permitted naturalisations increased beyond 10,000 cases in 1993. Then in 2000, over 15,000 foreigners, largely Koreans and Chinese, acquired Japanese nationality by naturalisation (see http://www.moj.go.jp/). In mid-January 2000, the ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Komeito party and the Hoshuto party set up a panel to revise the Nationality Act, which may allow special permanent residents, largely “Oldcomers” (see below), to be granted Japanese nationality if they simply register, although the bill had not been submitted as of spring 2003 (Mainichi Shinbun, 8 February 2001).

Table 1. Percentage of Foreign Population in Selected OECD Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>748 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>897 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>259 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>87 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>6.3b</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3 263 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>7 343 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>117 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1 252 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1 556 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>159 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>651 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>178 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>190 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>801 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>487 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>1 368 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>3.1c</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2 208 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. These figures include neither immigrants who hold the citizenship of the host country nor immigrants who have been naturalised. Data for foreign populations are from population registers or registers of foreigners except for France (census), Portugal (residence permit), and Ireland and the United Kingdom (labour force surveys).

b. Data for 1990.


Since overrunning, but not completely exterminating, the indigenous Ainu in northern Japan, Hokkaido, and Okinawan cultures on the islands of southern Japan, the Japanese seem to have enjoyed centuries of ethnic and cultural homogeneity and stability. But the myth of homogeneity has long been challenged by the presence of ethnic and national minorities, including ethnic Koreans and Chinese. Ironically, the idea has denied basic human rights to the “Oldcomers” who were Japanese subjects before 1947 and are now permanent non-national residents in Japan, where they were born and educated (Yamanaka 1994, 413). In addition, since the late 1980s Japan has been struggling to deal with the influx of “Newcomers” and the voices of Oldcomers. As shown by Table 2 on the ethnic composition at the end of the twentieth century, about one-third of immigrants are Oldcomers, mainly Koreans and Chinese (including Taiwanese) who themselves, or whose parents or grandparents, settled in Japanese society before the end of the Second World War. More than half of all immigrants are referred to as Newcomers, having entered Japan mainly after the 1980s. Among these, a large number of immigrants from Brazil and Peru, Nikkeijin, are ethnic Japanese who do not hold Japanese nationality unless they are naturalised, but can acquire legal permission to work in the country at all skill levels for a period of up to three years. Also, in terms of satisfying the unskilled labour shortage, Kenschusei (company trainees) and Shugakusei (students) are important among Newcomers, because after entry they become de facto unskilled workers despite their original purpose of staying in Japan, such as learning skills and technology for international transfer or studying the language to develop their own abilities. Finally, almost one-seventh of total immigrants are “Overstayers” who typically entered Japan in the period of the bubble economy and have stayed on, working illegally, after their visas expired.

In the end Japan has become a “multicultural society” in its own right, as it has a structure of immigrants mainly composed of Oldcomers, Newcomers, Nikkeijin and Overstayers. Japan, facing up to managing this ethno-cultural diversity, is no exception but a good example in the comparative exploration of governance in multicultural societies.
Table 2: Number of Foreigners and Status of Residence in Japan*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Oldcomers</th>
<th>Newcomers**</th>
<th>Overstayers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korea (North &amp; South)</td>
<td>528 450</td>
<td>108 463</td>
<td>62 577</td>
<td>699 490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>4 349</td>
<td>266 426</td>
<td>44 237</td>
<td>315 012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>220 549</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>220 563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>103 765</td>
<td>40 420</td>
<td>144 206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22 933</td>
<td>30 065</td>
<td>52 999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40 788</td>
<td>10 320</td>
<td>51 110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>42 475</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>42 656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6 584</td>
<td>9 989</td>
<td>16 577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14 928</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>14 931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Rep. of Iran</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7 139</td>
<td>7 304</td>
<td>14 448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6 362</td>
<td>4 936</td>
<td>11 299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5 886</td>
<td>4 307</td>
<td>10 199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4 498</td>
<td>5 487</td>
<td>9 986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>118 627</td>
<td>51 406</td>
<td>170 391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>533 396</td>
<td>969 423</td>
<td>271 048</td>
<td>1 773 867</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* As of the end of December 1998 and 1 January 1999. Oldcomers and Newcomers mean Old registrants and New registrants, respectively. The following are excluded from the table: American forces stationed in Japan and their dependants, diplomats who are not obliged to register as foreigners, and those who entered the country illegally, including stowaways.

** Those who do not acquire resident’s status are excluded, even if they are registered, because they are counted as Overstayers in the table.

*** The number is so small that it is included in “other”.


2. Citizenship Policy for Immigrants in Japan

Citizenship is a key public policy because it is believed that to grant citizenship to immigrants and ethnic minorities is a useful tool for establishing and stabilizing multicultural societies. Japan does not seem to be an exception. According to T. H. Marshall, citizenship is a status in society followed by duties and three sets of rights: civil rights, political rights and social rights (Marshall 1963). After defeat in the Second World War, Japan very abruptly changed into a nation-state, depriving Oldcomers such as Koreans and Taiwanese of Japanese nationality as imperial subjects. Since then, in Japan, nationals have been able to enjoy full sets of rights...
because they have Japanese nationality, while non-nationals have been considerably restricted in enjoying these rights and marginalised within the host society. Oldcomers’s rights, in particular, from the civil element through the social to the political, were strictly limited before the 1970s, because they were no longer Japanese nationals after the war. In that sense, Japanese citizenship status was totally equated with nationality, which excluded non-nationals from opportunities to claim their rights. Access to citizenship status was considered to be identical with joining the “ethnic” nation, which evokes foreigners’ antipathy to naturalisation. If citizenship policy for immigrants and ethnic minorities in post-war Japan is viewed in the light of these three sets of rights, some issues emerge concerning non-nationals’ citizenship rights and the considerable “improvements” made to them, as follows.

In terms of civil rights, since Japan regained its independence in the early 1950s, Oldcomers, mainly Koreans and Chinese, had stayed in the country without any formal residential status for over thirty years, but they were gradually granted a stable status as residents. In 1965, the Japan-South Korean Treaty was concluded, and the first and second generation of South Korean residents were granted Kyotei eijyu (permanent residence upon agreement). In 1981 the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act was passed. Under the act, Ippan eijyu (general permanent residence) could be granted to North Korean residents and mainly second-generation South Korean residents, subject to a few conditions. In 1990 this act was revised to grant the formal status of Tokubetsu eijyu (special permanent residence), to first-, second- and third-generation South Korean residents in Japan.

Similarly, the fingerprinting system for alien registration certificates, a former requirement in order to stay in Japan for one year or more, was relaxed and finally abolished. In 1952 the Foreigner Registration Act had required people of age 14 or more, who had been in Japan for at least one year, to have their fingerprints taken at the time of registration and to reapply for a new certificate every three years. In the Foreigner Registration Act which was redrafted in the 1980s, only foreigners who had reached the age of 16 or more were required to have their fingerprints taken. Their certificates needed to be renewed every five years. Finally, the 1992 revision of the act replaced the fingerprint with a signature at the time of foreigner registration (Komai 2000, 313).

A recent example of a civil rights issue concerns a residence permit for Overstayers. At the time of the bubble economy, from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, an influx of immigrants and foreign workers came to work without work permits and have stayed on after their visas expired. On 1 September 1999, twenty-one Overstayers visited the Immigration Office to request Zairyu Tokubetsu Kyoka (special residence permits), or amnesty to stay in Japan. In 2000, special residence permits were given to four families whose children were attending primary, secondary or grammar schools in Japan (Asahi Shinbun, 3 February 2000).

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With regard to social rights, under the 1982 political regime the Japanese Government abolished restrictions on non-nationals’ eligibility for public housing, public finance, the national pension scheme, and child and family allowances. Immigrants who were not covered by health insurance in their workplace were permitted to join the National Service run by local government. Since then, foreign residents such as Oldcomers have also been granted social rights, although a problem still remains with the national pension scheme.3

Concerning immigrants, varying from the order suggested by Marshall, civil rights are granted first, followed by the endowment of social rights. Among the three sets of rights in citizenship, the granting of political rights for immigrants may be the last element to be agreed (Layton-Henry 1990). A bill to give suffrage in local elections to permanent foreign residents has been submitted to the National Diet intermittently since 1994 (Tarumoto 2002). Although the foreigner suffrage bill had not been passed as of spring 2003, there is no doubt that Japan is considering political rights for immigrants in the same way as some other advanced countries.

Castles (1997) categorises responses of countries to issues of ethnic diversity into three models of “differential exclusion”, “assimilation” and “pluralism”, and he places Japan in “differential exclusion” in which immigrants are incorporated into some areas of society, such as the labour market, without official policies for them, and with no access to other areas such as welfare systems and political participation. However, as mentioned earlier, it is obvious that official citizenship policy, in terms of residential status, alien registration, social benefits, and perhaps voting in local elections, has been developed in Japan, which seems to be reducing the gap between the rights deriving from nationals’ and non-nationals’ citizenship status, even if the development demonstrates only a form of de facto multiculturalism.

3. Internal Multicultural Logic

It may be tempting to conclude from such “improvements” in immigrants’ citizenship rights in Japan that the government has responded to the activities of multicultural actors by rescuing them from their disadvantages, establishing social justice, and stabilising Japanese society. However, when the processes and causes of the “improvements” are examined, it will be found that factors other than multicultural logic explain the change in immigrants’ citizenship rights.

As alternatives to national citizenship based on monoculture, some of the citizenship models that have been suggested and are worthy of note so far include multicultural citizenship based on coexistence of multiple cultures, denizenship based on residence, and post-national citizenship based on human rights (see Tarumoto 2001a, 2001b).
Different logics are adopted to introduce different types of citizenship. First, post-national citizenship theorists insist that the citizenship institution for immigrants has been changed due to the international norm of “universal human rights” through institutions and organisations inside and outside nation-states. They emphasise “human rights logic” as an external influence on society (see Soysal 1994). Against the idea of post-national citizenship, anti-post-nationalists tend to emphasise domestic processes such as legal practices in explaining changes in the institution of citizenship. They insist that domestic logic induces the state to make and execute positive citizenship policy for immigrants (see Brubaker 1992, Joppke 2001).

On the other hand, the theorists of denization do not clearly mention what factors induce states to introduce denization policies for foreign residents. One of the reasons why the theorists are not concerned about an explanatory approach is that they devote themselves to the normative approach only to display a “desirable situation” for immigrants. However, it cannot be denied that the denization advocates tend to exaggerate immigrants’ situations within the society in order to develop immigrants’ rights (see Hammar 1990).

Finally, researchers on multiculturalism share the same attitude as the denization theorists towards stressing factors internal to society, such as one-country democracy and disempowered groups within the country. Moreover, researchers on multiculturalism are inclined to emphasise internal influences, such as the activities of multicultural actors and some forms of social disorder, to explain why citizenship policy is planned and implemented to improve immigrants’ citizenship status.

When a state plans and implements citizenship policy in order to replace an ethnically monocultural and exclusive understanding of the nation with a multicultural version responding to internal influences, we refer to the logic of the state as “internal multicultural logic”. As a consequence of this internal multicultural logic, the state must accept group rights based on cultural differences and ascriptive, intermediate loyalties which can weaken the direct link between the state and individuals and can disregard nationhood as the congruence of culture and polity.

As Castles (1997) clearly formulates, multicultural citizenship can be a means of dealing with the transformation of society where increased migration and cultural diversity has been caused by globalisation. To achieve a full set of rights for all, including members of disempowered groups, multicultural citizenship follows the principles of equality of all members of society before the law; recognition of dissonance between formal equality of rights, and equality of respect, resources, opportunities or welfare; establishing institutions for group representation and participation; and differential treatment for people with different characteristics, needs and wants. Most theorists of multiculturalism hold current debates on how
universalistic democratic systems should respond to ethno-cultural diversity. In other words, in the debate they take up the fundamental dilemma of whether or not the recognition of collective cultural rights is achieved within a universalistic democracy.

For example, Young (1990) advocates “differentiated citizenship” as a type of multicultural citizenship to secure participation of specific disadvantaged groups in decision-making and to avoid thoughtless adoption of “the principle of universality or equal treatment” originally based on the experiences of the more powerful groups. According to Kymlicka (1995), many people consider the “politics of difference” as a threat to liberal democracy. But political life has an inescapably national dimension in terms of drawing boundaries and distributing powers, deciding the language of schooling, courts and bureaucracies, choosing public holidays, etc. These inescapable aspects of political life give a strong advantage to the members of majority nations. To prevent any resulting alienation, disadvantages and injustice, some steps need to be taken towards multicultural citizenship, including poly-ethnic and representation rights to accommodate disadvantaged groups within ethnic national groups, and self-government rights to allow autonomy for national minorities alongside the majority nation. Taylor (1994) insists that the emergence of multiculturalism leads to a contradiction between the politics of universalism and the politics of difference: the former emphasises the equal dignity of individuals through the equalisation of rights and entitlements, while the latter gives weight to recognition of the unique identity of an individual or group and to distinctness. Habermas (1994) maintains that individual rights do not contradict group identity, basically because citizens can only be autonomous by collectively exercising their political rights. An inherent connection between democracy and the constitutional state should be established in a multicultural society where social and cultural rights are guaranteed for every individual as a result of social movements and political struggles.

The theorists of multiculturalism insist that improvements in rights for immigrants have developed as a response to the challenges of growing ethno-cultural diversity within society and the claims on the recognition that individuality is formed in a variety of social and cultural contexts.

However, the Japanese experiences show that foreign pressure from outside the society can be the most crucial factor in adopting citizenship policy. The motivating factor in improving immigrant rights in Japan is not the challenge of growing ethno-cultural diversity within society, but international pressure from other countries.
4. A Logic for “Improvement”

4.1 Civil Rights

“Improvements” in residential status and a fingerprinting system for Oldcomers were claimed by various Oldcomers’ groups and Japanese support groups through social movements (Yamawaki 2001). In addition, the international human rights regime may be effective to some extent through the courts, although the Japanese courts decided cases not on grounds of international law but on domestic law (Iwasawa 1998, 292–306). However, the most crucial factor for improving residential status and fingerprinting was foreign pressure in the context of international bilateral relationships between nation-states. In particular, the Government of the Republic of Korea has been negotiating with the Japanese Government for about half a century and claims to have secured the rights of its citizens in Japan by “solving” the legacy of the war. Securing civil rights for Oldcomers was not based on an internal multicultural logic, but on foreign pressure in the context of an international bilateral relationship.

The issue of Nikkeijin may be considered as a problem concerning the right of entry and the civil rights of labour. In the 1990 revision of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, the Japanese Government sought to block the influx of illegal immigrants. The provisions in the revision, such as residence categories, simplified visa application procedure, criminal sanctions for the recruitment and hiring of illegal immigrants, prompted the introduction of Nikkeijin and Kenshusei (company trainees) disguised as cheap labour. This may be interpreted as the Japanese Government trying to satisfy the market demand for unskilled labour yet avoiding the introduction of a multicultural labour force who would have to settle in Japan. However, that is not necessarily the case. Around this period, the government was pressed by the Government of the Republic of Korea to improve the residential status of the third generation of Korean residents. Once the question of improving Korean residential status was in the bureaucratic process, the residential status of Japanese descendants of foreigners, particularly from Latin American countries, was raised in terms of jus sanguinis as a principle of attribution of nationality. Since the Japanese Government made the residential status of third-generation Korean residents consistent with that of Nikkeijin in terms of nationality and jus sanguinis, Nikkeijin were granted the right to enter and work in Japan, which was an unintended consequence for the Japanese administration. To introduce cheap labour while avoiding a multicultural situation was not a priority for the Japanese Government at that time (Kajita 1999).

The Overstayers case may be expected to show that the Japanese Government adopted an internal multicultural logic, or a human rights logic, to govern a multicultural society. However, only a minority of Overstayers who visited the Immigration Office received a special residence permit, granted at state discretion. Moreover, an amnesty to legalise the situation of illegal immigrants based on human rights has never been granted by the government, even at the end of the
twentieth century. As far as civil rights for Overstayers are concerned, Japanese policy has been centred on the logic of monocultural national citizenship and state sovereignty, not on an internal multicultural logic.

4.2 Social Rights

For several years before giving social rights to foreign residents, Japan faced the arrival of “boat people”, asylum seekers from the Indo-Chinese peninsula. Although, in the beginning, Japan accepted them only as temporary stayers, the country was forced to receive them as permanent residents in 1978. Circumscribed by international pressure linked with becoming a summit member, Japan signed both the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol of the Convention, which threw it into the international human rights regime. Under this regime, in 1982 domestic political policy included the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act. The granting of social rights to Oldcomers was an unintended consequence for the government, followed by the measures on the refugee problem taken by the 1982 regime, because the Convention that Japan had signed to deal with the refugee problem imposed equal treatment for foreigners and Japanese with respect to social rights. Again, the granting of social rights to Oldcomers was due to international pressure, not to an internal multicultural logic.

4.3 Political Rights

Finally, does the issue of the foreigner suffrage at local elections show that the Japanese Government follows an internal multicultural logic? Indeed, there have been social movements of Oldcomers and Japanese supporters to claim political rights for foreign residents. But the most crucial motivator is again foreign pressure. The Government of the Republic of Korea has long been pressing Japan to grant the right to vote to Korean permanent residents. Largely prompted by this pressure, New Komeito and the Liberal Party, junior partners of the coalition government in Japan, together with the proportionately larger Liberal Democratic Party, submitted a bill to the National Diet in January 2000, although there was some Liberal Democrat opposition to it. This was the first bill on this subject that the ruling parties, even if only some of them, had submitted to the Diet. In terms of political rights, an internal multicultural logic is not adopted as a code of behaviour by the Japanese Government. Foreign pressure in the context of international bilateral relationships is once again the impetus for considering political rights for immigrants.

5. Conclusion

Inglis (1996) distinguishes three interrelated, but nevertheless distinctive, referents of multiculturalism and its related adjective, multicultural, in public debate and discussion; the demographic-descriptive; the ideological-normative and the programmatic-political. Demographically and descriptively, it has been shown that
Japan has become a multicultural society. A large number of immigrants, such as Oldcomers, Newcomers, Nikkeijin and Overstayers, have exposed the myth that Japan is an ethnically homogeneous society and an immigrant-free country. However, Japan seems to dismiss or refuse ideological-normative and programmatic-political multiculturalism. Even after receiving such immigrants, the Japanese Government has not adopted the internal multicultural logic in which multicultural actors can be granted citizenship to prevent their disadvantage and in recognition of their own raison d’être. When the government adopts policies for granting citizenship rights to non-national immigrants, it is partly affected by the activities of multicultural actors and the international human rights regime, but the main factor has been foreign pressure in the context of international relations.

Castles (1997, 21) argues, from an Australian point of view, that the development of multiculturalism has not been part of a conscious strategy for rethinking citizenship to make it appropriate for a culturally diverse nation, but policies concerned with ethno-cultural diversity have essentially been top-down social policies. Multiculturalism has developed in an ad hoc way as a strategy for integrating immigrant communities into a basically unchanged society. Similarly, Japanese citizenship policy for immigrants can be understood as a set of policies developed in an ad hoc way, rather than a conscious strategy for immigrants’ inclusion, which has resulted in narrowing the gap between national citizenship status and immigrant citizenship status in enjoying rights. Unlike the Australian case, however, Japanese policy deliberately avoided integrating immigrants into Japanese society, especially by granting rights to non-national immigrants, but instead to deal with international pressure from foreign countries. Why has Japan been sensitive to foreign pressure, while it can resist the international human rights regime and claims of multicultural actors? There are at least three reasons. First, the legacy of empire-colony relations has not yet been resolved and still constrains the thought and behaviour of the Japanese Government. In some of the “improvements” mentioned above, the Republic of Korea has been the main partner in negotiations on immigrants’ citizenship issues, bringing external pressure on Japan. In Japan, through foreign pressure, citizenship issues of immigrants turn into a “Korean problem”, dating back to the war, which creates inextricable difficulties. Japan has been embedded in the empire-colony relationship since the war, even at the turn of the century.

Secondly, the fact that Japan began to participate in the international community “late” is all important. Japan was eager to catch up with “early starters” and to be recognised as a full member of the group of “advanced countries”. This lateness leads to the fact that Japan has been very sensitive to foreign pressure, even at the price of a mono-ethnic nation-state. As a side effect, to receive recognition from other countries, Japan, as a “late starter”, had to make immediately clear its attitude in accepting world norms as codified in the conventions and resolutions of various international organisations. But note once again that this has not been due to domestic influences such as the courts or multicultural actors, but to international pressure.
The third reason is that the domestic decision-making process has not been flexible enough to respond to securing immigrants’ citizenship. For example, the courts are remarkably reluctant to deal with international human rights law. Even when the courts rule in favour of a party invoking international law, they do not use international law directly but decide the cases on domestic grounds such as the Constitution. The judges seem to be unfamiliar with international law as a relatively new branch (Iwasawa 1998). Another example is an administrative system vertically divided between ministries. When the introduction of foreign workers was planned in the late 1980s, the then Ministry of Labour took a positive attitude. On the other hand, the Ministry of Justice strongly opposed it and mobilised Oldcomers’ groups to voice their objections (Kajita 2001, 182–8). As this example clearly demonstrates, even if citizenship policy for immigrants is in the interests of one ministry, if it is against the interests of another ministry it faces much difficulty in being realised. Moreover, politicians in Japan are not particularly active and positive towards mediating the interests of ministries in immigrant and foreigner policies, because they do not expect to win votes thereby, even if the policies are successful.

To sum up, there have been some recent improvements in immigrants’ citizenship rights in Japan. However, these have not been based on an internal multicultural logic, but on foreign pressure and state sovereignty, due to the legacy of empire, the late-participation effect, and the rigidity of domestic decision-making processes. In the dilemma between globalisation and national institutions and identity, Japan has refused to adopt multicultural citizenship through the front door.

Notes

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1 See also Rex and Drury (1994) on questions concerning multicultural societies.

2 To allocate citizenship, two systems are mainly used: jus soli and jus sanguinis. Under jus soli, every person who was born within the territory of a country, even a non-citizen’s child, can acquire citizenship of it. In contrast, jus sanguinis only allows citizens to transmit their citizenship to their children or grandchildren, etc., by parentage. Recently, new systems such as jus domicili, where citizenship is allocated by residence, are being used in some countries.
If non-nationals were 35 years old or over at the time of the 1981 revision of the National Pension Act, they cannot receive an old-age pension because they have not paid enough contributory premiums (Kondo 2001, 17).

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